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FOREWORD TO THE 2021 EDITION
This Guide was last significantly updated in 2012 – nine years ago. In 2012, I wrote
about how many developments there had been in the “crimmigration” field since the 2010 update
to this Guide. Those developments pale in comparison to the developments that have occurred
since 2012, however, both in terms of numbers and significance.
The United States Supreme Court has been a major player in this area since 2012,
weighing in with a number of significant decisions during that period of time. In fact, two of
those decisions, Moncrieffe v. Holder and Descamps v. U.S., fundamentally altered the way in
which state statutes must be analyzed in order to determine if they carry immigration
consequences for non-citizens. I have included a detailed discussion of these and other Supreme
Court cases in the text of this edition and incorporated the holdings of those cases in the analyses
of the Nebraska criminal statutes that accompany this edition of the Guide.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has also issued some interesting opinions in the last several
years regarding post conviction relief in cases involving either failure of a court to give the
immigration advisement to a defendant, as required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02, or as the
result of criminal defense counsel failing to give Padilla advice to a non-citizen client entering a
guilty plea. This edition of the Guide includes my take on those state cases as well.
In an effort to make this Guide more user-friendly for criminal law practitioners, I have
significantly altered the format of the statutory analysis appendix. Now, as you will see, the
appendix takes the form of a chart that discusses the most important aspects of immigration
consequences. My inspiration for this format came from the superb work being done by Kathy
Brady and her folks with the Immigrant Legal Resource Center in their analysis of immigration
consequences of selected California offenses. I was struck by the compact nature and
succinctness of this format. I hope that you will find this chart format to be easier and quicker
to use on a day-to-day basis, whether it be in the courtroom, the courthouse hallway, or your
office. The major downside I see to this new format is that it is essential that you carefully read
the introductory text in order to sus out the immigration consequences for your particular clients.
For example, my chart does not consider immigration consequences peculiar to DACA recipients
– but that issue is explored in detail in the introductory text.
As with each past edition of this Guide, I invite your comments, critiques, thoughts and
contributions. As it has been from the beginning, my goal is to be as helpful to criminal
practitioners as possible. Your input certainly makes it more likely I will achieve that goal.
As I have done in all past editions, I would like to take a point of personal privilege to
thank all of those who have supported me in the latest endeavor, from my family to my coworkers in the Clinic to the College of Law itself, without whose help and encouragement none
of this could have happened. Dean Richard Moberly was gracious enough to approve my

i

sabbatical request for the fall semester of 2020, during which most of the updates to this Guide
were completed. Those tireless advocates who work, day in and day out, in the Douglas County
and Lancaster County Public Defender’s offices were very helpful in steering me toward the
most frequently-charged offenses to analyze. It was also the idea of Ally Mendoza and her
colleagues in the Douglas County Public Defender’s office to analyze some of the more
frequently-charged municipal code ordinances. Mark Carraher from the Lancaster County
Public Defender’s office weighed in on Lincoln ordinances that his office sees with some
frequency. As both Ally and Mark are alums of the College of Law’s Immigration Clinic, I am
particularly gratified for their input.
My research assistants, Chelsey Borchardt, Jordan Klein, and Max Tierney, along with
Stefanie Pearlman, who steered both Chelsey and Max my way through her legal research
fellowship program here at the College of Law, were instrumental in keeping me on track and
making this Guide significantly better than it would have otherwise been without their help.
Jordan in particular, exhibited much courage in agreeing to work with me, since he was an
undergraduate student at Doane University during the time he worked on this Guide, and had to
summon up the courage to attempt legal research and analysis without having been to law
school. Thanks, Jordan. You did great. Sara Houston, Assistant Professor and Director of the
Law, Politics and Society Program at Doane University, worked extensively with Chelsey and
Jordan to get them up to speed and supervise much of their work during the time they helped
with the Guide, and I very much appreciate not only her work with those folks, but also her
substantive contributions to the contents of the Guide itself.
To my co-workers and tireless proofreaders/editors, Deanna Lubken and Sydnee
Schuyler, I owe more than I can ever count. Deanna has worked with me in some fashion since
our days together at Western Nebraska Legal Services in the early 1980’s, and has been saving
me from myself for all of these years. Most would question why she has chosen to put up with
me for so long – and they would be right to do that. But I remain grateful for both her poor
judgment in associating with me for such a long time and her invaluable contributions. Sydnee
is a much more recent addition, but I have come to rely heavily on her good eye and discerning
voice as well. This Guide is far better than it would be without their involvement.
Finally, to my wife, Sara Houston, thank you for all of your love, help, support,
encouragement, and ideas that have improved not only this Guide, but me. I could not have
done it without you.
PREFACE TO THE 2022 EDITION
I promised myself, after the long-overdue revisions reflected in the 2021 edition, that I
would do my best to update this Guide every year. This is the first installment on that pledge.
Although there have been modest changes this year, there are still important updates
incorporated into this year’s edition. I have also expanded on some of the topics that appeared
in the 2021 edition, as my thinking – and caselaw – continue to evolve.
As always, if you see any errata or have any thoughts on my analyses, please let me know
by emailing me at kruser1@unl.edu.
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THE NEBRASKA CRIMINAL LAW PRACTITIONER’S
GUIDE TO REPRESENTING NON-CITIZENS
IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
I.

OVERVIEW.
A.

Introduction.

On March 31, 2010, the lives of criminal law practitioners changed dramatically. On
that day, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in the case of
Padilla v. Kentucky,1 holding that criminal defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to
be advised by their lawyers of the potential immigration consequences of guilty pleas
they are contemplating. It is my hope that this Guide will be of assistance to criminal
defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges as they negotiate the mine field that lies at the
intersection of criminal and immigration law.
The scope of this Guide is limited to potential immigration consequences of Nebraska
state criminal proceedings. And even with that limitation, this Guide is far from
comprehensive in its treatment of Nebraska state criminal law. The goals of this Guide
are to give Nebraska criminal law practitioners and judges an overview of the federal
immigration system, acquaint them with immigration issues that may arise as the result of
state criminal proceedings, and analyze various Nebraska criminal statutes in terms of
their potential immigration consequences. Having said that, I readily admit that there are
likely a number of issues this Guide does not address. For that, I apologize in advance.
I had to make choices about what to include and what to omit, and those choices will
inevitably disappoint some.
I invite those who use this Guide to give me feedback on how it could be improved. I
will continue to update this Guide periodically, and would like it to be as useful to
Nebraska practitioners and judges as possible.
B.

Why This Stuff is Important.
1.

Changes in the Law.

Although the Padilla decision certainly highlighted the “crimmigration” area,
criminal convictions have always been a problem for individuals who are not
citizens of the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)2 has
1

559 U.S. 356 (2010).

2

The Immigration and Nationality Act, found at Title 8 of the United States Code, is the
major piece of legislation governing federal immigration law. The current version of the INA
was enacted in 1952, but has been amended frequently since first being enacted.

1

always contained provisions that could result in the deportation of those noncitizens convicted of a criminal offense. However, as the Padilla opinion
recognized,3 the stakes are as high today as they have ever been for non-citizens
facing criminal proceedings.
Two major pieces of legislation were enacted in 1996 that dramatically increased
the negative consequences for non-citizens facing criminal proceedings. Those
laws are the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)4 and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).5
This Guide will address specific changes wrought by those laws in the course of
discussing individual topics. However, suffice it to say that the AEDPA/IIRIRA
combination was decidedly anti-immigrant. Since April 1, 1997, the effective
date of most of IIRIRA’s provisions, the working assumption of criminal defense
lawyers should be that non-citizens charged with or convicted of most crimes will
find themselves in deportation proceedings, although that is not universally true.6
But the safest approach is the cautious one – assume that your non-citizen clients
will find themselves in trouble with ICE, and counsel them accordingly.
Additionally, AEDPA and IIRIRA drastically restricted a non-citizen’s ability to
avoid deportation if he or she is being deported because of a criminal conviction.
3

559 U.S. at 360.

4

Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).

5

Pub.L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996).

6

On January 25, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13768, establishing new
enforcement priorities in the interior of the U.S. This Executive Order expressly terminated all
provisions of the November 20, 2014 memo issued by former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson
regarding ICE enforcement priorities. In essence, this Executive Order made all undocumented or
out of status immigrants fair game for deportation. The Biden Administration has changed that
approach. On September 30, 2021, DHS Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas issued a memorandum
that provided general guidance for apprehension and removal of non-citizens. The memo set forth
general guidelines on how DHS would deploy its limited resources in terms of instituting or
prosecuting removal cases. Generally speaking, three categories of non-citizens are priorities for
removal under the Mayorkas memo: (1) those who are a threat to national security; (2) those who
are a threat to public safety; and (3) those who are a threat to border security. With the exception
of the third category, which explicitly includes those non-citizens who are apprehended while
attempting to enter the U.S. without documents or who entered without documents any time after
November 1, 2020, the categories are somewhat vague. Further clarification of DHS’
enforcement priorities was provided in a memo written by Kerry E. Doyle, Principal Legal Advisor
for ICE, on April 3, 2022. The memo became effective on April 25, 2022. The primary means
by which ICE will exercise prosecutorial discretion is to either dismiss non-priority cases currently
in Immigration Court, or not institute removal cases against non-citizens not deemed to be a
priority. As of this writing, the Mayorkas memo is the subject of litigation, and parts of it have
been enjoined. Suffice it to say that developments in this area are fluid.

2

Practically speaking, a client’s immigration status will nearly always make a
difference in the way a criminal prosecution proceeds. Prosecutors are
increasingly aware of a criminal defendant’s immigration status, and undoubtedly
will use that information in deciding how to prosecute a case, what type of plea
bargains to accept, and what sentencing recommendations to make. And in the
wake of Padilla, criminal defense attorneys now have a constitutional duty to be
well-informed. Those who are not well-informed risk not only having
convictions vacated by successful post conviction claims, but stand to do their
non-citizen clients a huge disservice. Furthermore, once a final criminal
conviction is entered against a non-citizen, there are limited remedies an
immigration attorney can invoke to ameliorate the immigration consequences of
such a conviction. It is therefore mandatory that criminal law practitioners
become familiar with immigration law so that they can try to minimize the impact
of criminal proceedings on non-citizen clients before a final conviction is entered
against them.
2.

Demographics.

The complexion of Nebraska’s demographics is changing. Once a nearly
homogeneous state, in the past nearly four decades Nebraska has experienced a
dramatic influx of foreign-born individuals. Refugees from Afghanistan,
Vietnam, Sudan, Iraq, and various other countries from central and eastern Europe
have settled in Nebraska. But by far the greatest change has occurred in the area
of Nebraska’s Latino population. One need only look at figures from the United
States Census Bureau to get a sense of the enormity of this change.
In 1990, the U.S. Census Bureau put Nebraska’s total population at 1.57 million
people. Of that number, 36,969 individuals, or approximately 2.3%, were of
Hispanic origin.7 The 2000 census indicated a total population in Nebraska of
1.7 million people. Yet the Hispanic population in Nebraska in 2000 totaled
94,119 people, or approximately 5.5% of the population, making Nebraska’s
Hispanic population the largest minority population in the state.8 Viewed
another way, Nebraska’s Hispanic population increased by 57,150 during the
decade of 1990-2000. While Nebraska’s total population increased by 130,000
during that decade, Nebraskans of Hispanic origin represented 44% of that
population gain. Nebraska’s population increased 8.3% between 1990 and 2000.

7

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990 Census of Population (1992),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1990/cp-1/cp-1-1.pdf (last visited June
14, 2022).
8

U.S. Bureau of the Census, Profiles of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000
Census of Population & Housing (2001),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2001/dec/2khus.pdf (last
visited June 14, 2022).
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Without the increase in the Hispanic population, Nebraska would have
experienced a population growth of only 4.6% during this time.9
This trend is also reflected by the 2010 census figures. The 2010 census shows
that Nebraska’s total population was 1.8 million people. The total population
increased by around 115,000 people, or 6.7%, between 2000 and 2010. The
white population of Nebraska increased by around 39,500 people, or by 2.6%
from 2000 to 2010. The Hispanic population increased by around nearly 73,000
people, or by 77.3%. The increase in Nebraska’s Hispanic population between
2000 and 2010 accounted for 64% of Nebraska’s population gain between 2000
and 2010. Without the gain in Hispanic population, Nebraska would have grown
by only 42,000 people, or 2.6%.10
According to the 2020 census, Nebraska’s population stood at 1.96 million
people, an increase of just a little over 135,000 (around 7%) since the 2010
census. Nebraska’s “white alone” population (not including Hispanics or
Latinos) totaled around 1.67 million individuals. Hispanics and Latinos
accounted for 11.3% of the total population, or a total of approximately 219,000
individuals. Between 2010 and 2020, only 24 of Nebraska’s 93 counties gained
population, and of those 24 counties, only eight reported an increase in their white
population, which demonstrates that most of the growth was driven by members
of minority populations.11
So, since the most recent immigrant influx began in Nebraska in the 1990s,
Latinos have grown by a total of approximately 182,000 individuals, and by a
percentage of over 9%. That trend is likely to continue into the foreseeable
future.12
Of course, not all of the growth in Nebraska’s Hispanic community has been as
the result of immigration. But the numbers suggest that a large portion of that
increase was because of immigrants coming to Nebraska to work in the
meatpacking industry. The 2019 Hispanic population exceeded the statewide
9

All figures come from comparing the numbers of the 1990 U.S. Census with figures
from the 2000 U.S. Census.
10

All figures come from the 2010 U.S. Census. U.S. Census Bureau, United States:
2010 Summary Population & Housing Characteristics (2013),
https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2012/dec/cph-1-1.pdf (last visited June 14, 2022).
11

Census: Metro areas gained in Nebraska, rural areas lost,
https://apnews.com/article/nebraska-census-2020-e9e6443240098a3ff831e865b8b31993 (last
visited June 14, 2022).
These statistics are taken from the last figures available on the U.S. Census Bureau’s
website: https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?g=0400000US31 (last visited June 14, 2022).
12
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average in 15 Nebraska counties.13 Many of those counties host or are adjacent
to counties that host businesses related to and involved in the meatpacking
industry. In some of those counties, the increase in the Hispanic population
during the 1990-2020 time period was nothing short of dramatic.14
There is no reason to believe that the increase in Nebraska’s foreign-born and
minority population, which began to take off during the 1990’s, will slow down to
an appreciable degree in the foreseeable future. If Nebraska follows the national
trend, Nebraska’s Hispanic population will continue to increase. While not all of
this increase will be in the form of new immigrants, much of it could be, given
recent history. And, in general, with more people come more legal problems, so
Nebraska criminal law practitioners will continue to confront the issue of how
best to represent non-citizens facing criminal proceedings.
C.

How This Guide is Organized.

This Guide is structured to provide an overview of the immigration agency structure and
the procedures involved when various divisions of the Departments of Homeland
Security and Justice attempt to remove a non-U.S. citizen from the United States.
Following those overviews, the Guide provides a more detailed discussion of the specific
immigration consequences that could flow from Nebraska state court criminal
proceedings.
The heart of this Guide are the charts containing analyses of immigration consequences
of various Nebraska statutes and municipal ordinances. Those charts contain my
analyses of selected Nebraska criminal statutes in terms of the possible immigration
consequences to a non-U.S. citizen client if the client is charged with or convicted of a
crime under the statute or ordinance in question. It is my hope that practitioners will, if
nothing else, be able to use the charts to quickly access my analyses of potential
immigration consequences of selected state and municipal criminal proceedings.
There are also attachments at the end of this Guide that contain various forms or resource
materials that I believe will be helpful to the criminal defense lawyer who represents a
non-U.S. citizen in state court criminal proceedings.

13

Box Butte (12.5%), Chase (12.3%), Colfax (45.4%), Dakota (38.8%), Dawson
(33.3%), Dixon (13.7%), Dodge (12.9%), Douglas (12.6%), Dundy (11.8%), Hall (27.7%),
Madison (15%), Morrill (15.4%), Platte (19%), Saline (25.3%), and Scotts Bluff (23.8%). U.S.
Census Bureau website, https://data.census.gov/cedsci/profile?g=0400000US31 (last visited June
14, 2022).
14

Colfax County (Schuyler) is such an example. The 1990 census indicated a Hispanic
population in Colfax County of 224 people, which represented 2.5% of the total population. By
2019, there were approximately 4894 people of Hispanic origin living in Colfax County,
representing approximately 45.4% of the total population.
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D.

General Issues Facing Counsel Involved in Representing Non-U.S. Citizens in
Criminal Proceedings.
1.

Nebraska Statutory Provisions.

Although the immigration implications of criminal proceedings have always
lurked in the background as an issue for Nebraska practitioners, they came to the
forefront as the result of the passage of LB 82 in 2002, codified at Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1819.02, et seq.
The purpose of the law, as set forth in the statute itself, is to make certain that
non-U.S. citizen criminal defendants are advised by a court that entry of a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere may have immigration consequences. Further, the
Legislature intended that, in the event a criminal defendant or his or her lawyer
was unaware that a guilty or nolo plea might carry immigration consequences, the
court should grant the defendant additional time to negotiate with the
prosecutor.15 In addition, the statute expressly provides that no defendant should
be required to reveal his or her immigration status to the court.16
Section 29-1819.02 requires courts to administer the following advisement to
criminal defendants prior to the acceptance of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere:
“If you are not a United States citizen, you are hereby advised that
conviction of the offense for which you have been charged may
have the consequences of removal from the United States, or
denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United
States.”17
Failure of a court to give this advisement after July 20, 2002, the effective date of
the statute, requires a court, upon a motion by the defendant coupled with a
showing that conviction may have immigration consequences of the type
described in the statute, to vacate the judgment of conviction and permit the
defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea.18 If no record is made that the
15

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.03.

16

Id. In my experience, some judges routinely ask criminal defendants preparing to
enter a guilty plea if they are U.S. citizens. This question appears to violate the provisions of
the statute. And, in fact, there is no need to ask this question. The statutory advisement should
routinely be given to all criminal defendants, regardless of their immigration status.
17

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02(1). There is a limitation to the scope of this statute,
however. The advisement need not be given by the court if the offense in question is only an
infraction. Id.
18

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02(2).
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advisement was given, there is a presumption that it was not given.19 Nebraska
cases interpreting the provisions of this statutory scheme are discussed in further
detail in Section I.D.2.b(2)., infra.
2.

Case Law — Duty of Courts and Counsel to Advise.

Before examining the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, it is
useful to take a look at some of the federal and state jurisprudential history of the
statutory and constitutional obligations of both courts and counsel to advise
defendants of potential immigration consequences of guilty pleas.
The case law in Nebraska has thus far focused on three questions when it comes
to possible immigration consequences of criminal proceedings: (1) does a trial
court have a constitutional duty to inform a criminal defendant of the possible
immigration consequences of criminal proceedings; (2) what are the parameters of
a court’s duty to give to defendants entering nolo or guilty pleas the statutory
advisement found in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02 and what remedies are
available to defendants if the statutory advisement is not given properly; and (3)
what are the contours of criminal defense counsel’s Padilla obligations?
a.

Constitutional Duty of Courts to Advise.

In State v. Schneider,20 the Nebraska Supreme Court held that trial courts
have no constitutional obligation to inform criminal defendants of
collateral consequences to their entry of guilty pleas.21 The defendant in
Schneider contended that the trial court’s failure to advise him that he
would have to register as a sex offender if he pled guilty to two counts of
attempted sexual contact with a child rendered his guilty pleas
unintelligent, unknowing, and involuntary. As a result, Schneider sought
leave to withdraw his pleas at his sentencing hearing.
The Nebraska Supreme Court held that failure of the trial court to advise
Schneider that he would have to register as a sex offender was a
“collateral consequence” of the criminal proceedings, citing State v.
Torres.22 The Court held that, given such a determination, there was no
constitutional requirement for the trial court to advise Schneider that he

19

Id.

20

263 Neb. 318, 324, 640 N.W.2d 8, 15 (2002).

21

While the Schneider case did not involve an immigration issue, it is instructive
because it discusses the collateral consequences doctrine.
22

254 Neb. 247, 575 N.W.2d 861 (1998).
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would have to register as a sex offender, employing the Boykin test.23 As
a result, the Court held that Schneider’s guilty pleas were intelligent,
knowing, and voluntary, and further held that he had no right to withdraw
them as a matter of constitutional principle.24
The Nebraska Supreme Court has also held that trial courts have no
constitutional obligation to advise criminal defendants entering nolo or
guilty pleas of the immigration consequences of those pleas.25 In YosChiguil, the court cited to a 2010 post-Padilla decision of the Georgia
Supreme Court in support of this conclusion. That decision, Smith v.
State,26 expressly holds that, even in the wake of the Padilla decision,
immigration consequences of criminal proceedings remain collateral
consequences, at least for purposes of whether a trial court has a
constitutional obligation to advise a defendant of such consequences. The
Georgia Supreme Court defined “collateral” consequences as those that do
not lengthen or alter the sentence imposed by a trial court. In the Georgia
Supreme Court’s view, Padilla did not convert immigration consequences
into direct consequences of criminal proceedings for purposes of a Fifth
Amendment analysis; rather, the court opined, it simply held that the Sixth
Amendment requires trial counsel to advise clients of potential
immigration consequences because prevailing professional norms require
such advice by effective defense counsel.

23

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Boykin, the Supreme Court held that
constitutional principles require an affirmative showing that any guilty plea entered into by a
criminal defendant and accepted by a trial court be done knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily.
24

The Court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow
Schneider to withdraw his guilty pleas “for any fair and just reason.” Schneider, 263 Neb. at
325, 640. N.W.2d at 14. It is interesting to contrast this holding with that of the court in United
States v. Singh, 305 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.D.C. 2004), where the court allowed the defendant to
withdraw a guilty plea, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d), due to the fact that his being advised
that he “might” be deported after pleading guilty to an aggravated felony constituted a “fair and
just” reason for withdrawing the plea. The defendant filed his motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Some courts have agreed with Singh (see, e.g., United States v. Couto, 311 F.3d 179 (2d Cir.
2002)), while others have not (see, e.g., Santo-Sanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327 (5th Cir.
2008)). A more recent decision of the Second Circuit expressly held that non-compliance with
Rule 11’s advisement requirements results in a constitutionally defective guilty plea. United
States v. Gonzalez, 884 F.3d 457 (2d Cir. 2018).
25

State v. Yos-Chiguil, 281 Neb. 618, 626, 798 N.W.2d 832, 840 (2011).

26

287 Ga. 391, 697 S.E.2d 177 (2010), overruled on other grounds by Collier v. State,
307 Ga. 363, 834 S.E.2d 769 (2019).
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One wonders about the underpinnings of this analysis. Almost routinely
before Padilla, courts held that the direct/collateral distinction meant
something in the Sixth Amendment context.27 But that notion was
shattered by Padilla:
The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla’s
ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he
sought about the risk of deportation concerned only
collateral matters, i.e., those matters not within the
sentencing authority of the state trial court. In its view,
“collateral consequences are outside the scope of
representation required by the Sixth Amendment,” and,
therefore, the “failure of defense counsel to advise the
defendant of possible deportation consequences is not
cognizable as a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.”
253 S.W.3d, at 483. The Kentucky high court is far from
alone in this view.
We, however, have never applied a distinction between
direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of
constitutionally “reasonable professional assistance”
required under Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689, 104 S. Ct.
2052. Whether that distinction is appropriate is a question
we need not consider in this case because of the unique
nature of deportation.28
So it is clear that, in an immigration context, the direct/collateral
distinction is meaningless for purposes of a Sixth Amendment analysis.
Rather, the touchstone inquiry is whether defense counsel’s advice is
ineffective under a Strickland analysis. In other words, the
direct/collateral distinction is no longer applicable in the Sixth
Amendment context, as the court made clear in Padilla. But most courts
would hold that the direct/collateral distinction is still alive and well in the
Fifth Amendment context. Why?
One suspects that the answer to this question lies in the courts’ fear of the
“slippery slope” – if the Fifth Amendment requires a court to advise of all
collateral consequences of a guilty plea in order for that plea to be
27

For example, in a pre-Padilla decision, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in State v.
Zarate, 264 Neb. 690, 651 N.W.2d 215 (2002), held that immigration consequences were
collateral consequences of a criminal proceeding, and therefore effective criminal defense
counsel did not have to advise a client of such consequences when counseling the client about
whether to plead guilty to a crime. Zarate has obviously been overruled by Padilla.
28

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 364-365 (internal footnotes omitted).
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knowing and voluntary for Fifth Amendment purposes, where do courts
draw the line? Most courts would likely hold that a rule requiring a judge
to advise a criminal defendant of all consequences to a guilty plea would
simply be unworkable.29
But is that a sufficient answer, particularly in the immigration context?
Padilla makes it clear that there is something different and unique about
immigration consequences of criminal proceedings, as compared to all
other types of consequences flowing from a conviction or guilty plea:
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly
severe “penalty”; but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal
sanction. Although removal proceedings are civil in
nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the
criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal
convictions and the penalty of deportation for nearly a
century. And, importantly, recent changes in our
immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic
result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we
find it “most difficult” to divorce the penalty from the
conviction in the deportation context. Moreover, we are
quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of
deportation for a particular offense find it even more
difficult.30
That difference – that uniqueness of immigration consequences – led the
Padilla Court to hold that the direct/collateral distinction for purposes of
Sixth Amendment analysis simply does not exist. Given the Court’s
recognition of the unique and severe nature of immigration consequences,
does the direct/collateral distinction make sense in the Fifth Amendment
context either? And wouldn’t the answer to the “slippery slope”
argument be that this one category of consequence, which is both unique
and singularly severe, must be disclosed by a court to a defendant in order
to make that defendant’s plea knowing and voluntary?31
29

The Georgia Supreme Court took comfort in the fact that the combination of (1)
Padilla and (2) the existence of a Georgia statute requiring trial courts to give criminal
defendants a general advisement regarding immigration consequences at the time of accepting a
guilty plea likely provide adequate constitutional protection to defendants, thereby making their
guilty pleas knowing and voluntary. Smith v. State, 287 Ga. 391, 697 S.E.2d 177 (2010).
30

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 365-366 (internal citations omitted).

31

Indeed, the Court has held as much in the Sixth Amendment context in Lee v. United
States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 198 L. Ed. 2d 476 (2017). In that case, the government argued that the
defendant demonstrated that he would not have pled guilty to a criminal offense had he known
that it carried immigration consequences, even though the evidence of his guilt was strong and
10

Here’s how the argument sets up. Although it is undeniably a Sixth
Amendment case, Padilla says that immigration consequences are actually
part of the penalty faced by non-citizens in criminal proceedings:
In 1996, Congress also eliminated the Attorney General’s
authority to grant discretionary relief from deportation, 110
Stat. 3009–596, an authority that had been exercised to
prevent the deportation of over 10,000 noncitizens during
the 5–year period prior to 1996. Under contemporary law,
if a noncitizen has committed a removable offense after the
1996 effective date of these amendments, his removal is
practically inevitable but for the possible exercise of
limited remnants of equitable discretion vested in the
Attorney General to cancel removal for noncitizens
convicted of particular classes of offenses. Subject to
limited exceptions, this discretionary relief is not available
for an offense related to trafficking in a controlled
substance.
These changes to our immigration law have dramatically
raised the stakes of a noncitizen’s criminal conviction.
The importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens
accused of crimes has never been more important. These
changes confirm our view that, as a matter of federal law,
deportation is an integral part – indeed, sometimes the most
important part – of the penalty that may be imposed on

the likelihood that he would have been convicted at trial was high. But the Court held the
likelihood of conviction at trial was the wrong focus in a case where a defendant claimed that
lack of information about immigration consequences affected his decision-making at the plea
stage:
When a defendant alleges his counsel’s deficient performance led him to accept a
guilty plea rather than go to trial, we do not ask whether, had he gone to trial, the
result of that trial “would have been different” than the result of the plea bargain.
That is because, while we ordinarily “apply a strong presumption of reliability to
judicial proceedings,” “we cannot accord” any such presumption “to judicial
proceedings that never took place.” We instead consider whether the defendant
was prejudiced by the “denial of the entire judicial proceeding ... to which he had
a right.” As we held in Hill v. Lockhart, when a defendant claims that his
counsel’s deficient performance deprived him of a trial by causing him to accept a
plea, the defendant can show prejudice by demonstrating a “reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.” Id. at 1965, 198 L. Ed. 2d at 484-85
(internal citations omitted).
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noncitizen defendants who plead guilty to specified
crimes.32
If, at least in the immigration context, immigration consequences are
indeed part of the penalty faced by non-citizen criminal defendants, then
under the rationale of Boykin, courts receiving guilty pleas have a
constitutional obligation under the Due Process clause to insure that
defendants have been advised of such a penalty, in order to ascertain that a
guilty plea has been entered voluntarily and understandingly. At the
federal level, courts have a duty to make certain defendants entering a
guilty plea are aware of the possible maximum and minimum penalty they
face.33 At the state level, Nebraska common law imposes this
requirement on trial courts.34 So there is a plausible argument that trial
courts are compelled not only by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02 to inquire
into a defendant’s awareness of possible immigration consequences, but
are also constitutionally compelled to make such an inquiry.35
b.

Statutory and Rule-Based Duty of Courts to Advise.
(1)

Fed. R. Crim. P., R. 11.

A 2013 amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires that federal courts accepting guilty pleas advise
defendants that the plea may have immigration consequences.36

32

Padilla, 559 U.S. at 363-364 (internal citations and footnotes omitted; emphasis

supplied).
33

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b). See also, United States v. Gonzalez, 884 F.3d 457 (2d Cir.

34

State v. Hays, 253 Neb. 467, 476-477, 570 N.W.2d 823, 829 (1997).

2018).

35

In People v. Peque, 22 N.Y.3d 189 (2013), the New York Court of Appeals held that
a court’s duty to advise non-citizen criminal defendants of possible deportation consequences of
guilty pleas does, in fact, have a constitutional dimension, both under the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. Other courts, however, disagree with Peque. See, e.g., People v. Guzman, 43
N.E.3d 954, 398 Ill.Dec. 44 (2015), where the Illinois Supreme Court held to the contrary. As a
practical matter, if a trial court in Nebraska complies with Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02, any
Fifth Amendment obligation will likely be satisfied. So, at least in Nebraska or other states
requiring a court advisement, whether by rule or by statute, this discussion is mostly academic.
36

F. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(O).

12

(2)

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02.

In 2002, the Nebraska Legislature adopted LB 82, which is
codified at Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02, requiring Nebraska
courts to give a similar advisement. The Nebraska Supreme Court
has decided several cases since 2002 applying the provisions of
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02 in the context of post conviction
cases filed by non-citizens who sought to have their convictions
vacated because, they argued, trial courts did not comply with the
statute’s requirement that they give advisements regarding possible
immigration consequences.
Before discussing those cases, I pause to emphasize an important
limitation on the duty of courts to advise pursuant to Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 29-1819.02, and that is that the statutory duty of courts to
advise is not triggered if the offense involved is designated as an
infraction under Nebraska law.37 Although this could come up in
a number of settings, perhaps the most consequential setting, for
purposes of the immigration analysis, is that involving first offense
simple possession of (1) marijuana weighing one ounce or less, or
(2) a similar weight of specified cannabinoids listed in the
statutes.38 Given that such offenses are mere infractions, there is
no statutory duty of a court to advise of immigration consequences
under § 29-1819.02, and it is also likely that a client would not
have consulted a lawyer before pleading guilty to the offense.
Such clients can find themselves in a precarious situation.
(a)

State v. Rodriguez-Torres.

In State v. Rodriguez-Torres,39 the Nebraska Supreme
Court held that a defendant cannot use § 29-1819.02 to
vacate a guilty plea that was entered before the effective
date of the statute (July 20, 2002) once the defendant has
completed his sentence:
In § 29-1819.02, the Legislature gives a
court discretion40 to vacate a judgment or

37

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02(1).

38

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-416(13)(a).

39

275 Neb. 363, 746 N.W.2d 686 (2008).

40

This choice of words is curious, since the statute says if the advisement is not given
and the requisite prejudice is shown, a trial court shall vacate the judgment and permit the
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withdraw a plea where a court has failed to
provide the advisement required for pleas
made on or after July 20, 2002. It does not,
however, convey upon a court jurisdiction to
do so where a party has already completed
his or her sentence. Nor has the Legislature
in any other statute allowed for a specific
procedure whereby a person who has been
convicted of a crime and has already served
his or her sentence may later bring a motion
to withdraw his or her plea and vacate the
judgment.41
The court held that, as a result, the trial court did not have
subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant’s motion and
dismissed the appeal.
(b)

State v. Yos-Chiguil (Yos-Chiguil I).

The next significant post conviction case in an immigration
context came one year later. In State v. Yos-Chiguil42
(Yos-Chiguil I), the defendant entered guilty pleas to one
count of attempted second degree murder and one count of
second degree assault in 2008. The trial court accepted the
guilty pleas and sentenced the defendant.
After the judgment was final, but before the defendant had
completed his sentence, he filed a motion requesting that
the court vacate his guilty pleas pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat.
§ 29-1819.02. He argued that, although the trial court
gave him a general advisement regarding immigration
consequences at the time he pled guilty, the advisement did
not strictly comply with the statutory language. The trial
court denied Yos-Chiguil’s motion to withdraw his pleas
and he appealed denial of the motion to the supreme court.
As an initial matter, the State raised a subject matter
jurisdiction argument, pointing to language in RodriguezTorres, and contended that since the judgment was final,
statutory vacatur under § 29-1819.02 was not available to
the defendant. In effect, the State argued that the statutory
defendant to withdraw his guilty or nolo plea if he files a motion to do so.
41

Id. at 367, 746 N.W.2d at 689 (emphasis supplied).

42

278 Neb. 591, 772 N.W.2d 574 (2009).
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vacatur procedure is only available to a defendant on direct
appeal.
The Nebraska Supreme Court held “that there is no
language in the statute which would support such a limited
construction.”43 As a result, the court held that the trial
court had jurisdiction to consider a statutory vacatur motion
raised by a defendant to whom the statute applies (i.e., one
whose plea is entered on or after July 20, 2002), whose
judgment is final, and who has not yet completed his
sentence. The court also reiterated that the statute has a
two-part test before a defendant is entitled to vacatur of a
plea: (1) the defendant must show that the advisement was
not given by the court and (2) the defendant must show
there is a more than theoretical chance that he faces adverse
immigration consequences. The second requirement was
fatal to the defendant’s claim in this case, the court held,
because he produced no evidence showing that he actually
faced adverse immigration consequences of any kind; he
only argued that the advisement was not in strict
compliance with the statute. That, the court held, was
insufficient to trigger the vacatur provisions of the statute.
The court held that a defendant seeking statutory vacatur
must demonstrate that there is more than a merely
hypothetical risk he will suffer negative immigration
consequences.
The court did not decide whether the vacatur procedure
under § 29-1819.02 is available to defendants who have
completed their sentences. In Rodriguez-Torres, the
defendant also sought to use the statutory vacatur process –
and only the statutory vacatur process – to withdraw a
guilty plea that had been entered in 1997, long before the
effective date of § 29-1819.02. The court in that case held
the statute did not apply to such a plea. But in Yos-Chiguil
I, the statute was in effect when the defendant entered his
guilty plea in 2008. In an apparent retreat from its
language in Rodriguez-Torres, supra, the court did not
foreclose the possibility that statutory vacatur is available
to defendants who have completed their sentences, but did
not decide the issue because of the lack of evidence from
the defendant on the issue of prejudice.44
43

Id. at 596, 772 N.W.2d at 579.

44

Id. at 597, 772 N.W.2d at 579.
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The court also did not decide the issue of whether an
advisement that does not parrot the statutory language
requires vacatur of a guilty plea in cases where the
defendant can show immigration-related prejudice. But, as
indicated above, the court held that a defendant must show
that he faces more than a hypothetical possibility of
specific immigration prejudice in order to entitle him to
vacate the judgment and withdraw his plea.
In Yos-Chiguil I, the trial court’s advisement was: “If you
are not a citizen of the United States, and if you are
convicted of a crime, that conviction could adversely affect
your ability to remain or work in this country.”45 Compare
that to the statutory language: “If you are not a United
States citizen, you are hereby advised that conviction of the
offense for which you have been charged may have the
consequences of removal from the United States, or denial
of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United
States.”46 Those are very different advisements. The trial
court’s advisement in Yos-Chiguil I mentioned nothing
about naturalization. But because the defendant did not
show any prejudice of any type from a failure by the trial
court to adhere strictly to the language of the statute, the
court did not reach the issue of whether such a variance
requires vacatur under § 28-1819.02. However, it did
indicate that a defendant would have to show a nexus
between the faulty advisement and the immigration
prejudice he faces.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has
construed similar statutory language to mean that “a
defendant must demonstrate more than a hypothetical risk
of such a consequence, but that he actually faces the
prospect of it occurring.” Applying this principle, the
court held that a convicted defendant who faced deportation
and was warned that deportation was a possible
consequence of his guilty plea was not entitled to withdraw
the plea on the ground that he was not also given a
statutorily required warning that conviction could result in
“‘exclusion from admission to the United States.’” The
court reasoned that although the advisement given by the
trial court did not cover all the immigration consequences
45
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enumerated in the statute, it would not construe the statute
to impose the “extraordinary remedy” of vacating the
judgment of conviction “in circumstances where the
inadequacy complained of is immaterial to the harm for
which the remedy is sought”. . . . We agree with the
reasoning of the Massachusetts courts and hold that failure
to give all or part of the advisement required by §
29-1819.02(1) regarding the immigration consequences of
a guilty or nolo contendere plea is not alone sufficient to
entitle a convicted defendant to have the conviction vacated
and the plea withdrawn pursuant to § 9-1819.02(2). The
defendant must also allege and show that he or she actually
faces an immigration consequence which was not included
in the advisement given.47
(c)

State v. Mena-Rivera.

The defendant in State v. Mena-Rivera,48 was a lawful
permanent resident who pled guilty to a Class III felony
child abuse charge. At the time of his arraignment and
plea of not guilty, the court gave the defendant the
advisement required by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02. The
defendant later appeared before the court and, pursuant to a
plea agreement, withdrew his not guilty plea and pled
guilty to attempted child abuse, a Class IIIA felony. The
court did not re-administer the statutory immigration
advisement at the hearing during which it accepted the
defendant’s guilty plea, but the defendant did acknowledge
at his second hearing that the court had arraigned him
previously and that he understood his rights. Around six
months after the hearing at which the defendant pled guilty,
and while he was still in state custody awaiting sentencing,
he moved to withdraw his plea, alleging that because the
court failed to re-read the immigration advisement at the
plea hearing, he was entitled to withdraw his plea. The
defendant also offered evidence at that hearing that he was
the subject of an immigration detainer, meaning that
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) had sent a
notification to state authorities that it wished to be notified
at the time the defendant was to be released from state
custody. Such “ICE detainers” are routinely issued by ICE

47

Yos-Chiguil I, 278 Neb. at 597-598, 772 N.W.2d at 580 (citations omitted).
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when they believe a state prisoner is removable from the
United States.49
The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw
his plea pursuant to the statute, holding that he had not
shown prejudice related to the court’s failure to re-read the
advisement to him, which is a requirement of the statute.
The court then imposed sentence on the defendant related
to his guilty plea. The defendant appealed the denial of his
motion to withdraw his plea, and the Nebraska Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the statute requires the trial
court to give the immigration advisement to a defendant
immediately before accepting his guilty plea. The court
also held that, by introducing a copy of the ICE detainer
that had been lodged against him, Mena-Rivera had
sufficiently demonstrated that he may suffer adverse
immigration consequences, which is all the statute requires.
(d)

State v. Yos-Chiguil (Yos-Chiguil II).

In State v. Yos-Chiguil50 (Yos-Chiguil II), the pro se
defendant pursued a claim under the Nebraska Post
Conviction Act. (Yos-Chiguil I involved the same
defendant’s attempt to withdraw his guilty plea under the
more specific statutory procedures in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 281819.02.) One of the main claims raised by Yos-Chiguil
in this second case was that his trial counsel was deficient
because he did not discuss with him the possibility of an
intoxication defense to the charges Yos-Chiguil faced.
Yos-Chiguil also claimed that trial counsel’s performance
was deficient because counsel failed to argue that § 281819.02 required strict adherence to the statutory language,
as a matter of due process. In other words, one of his
claims in this second case was a classic ineffective
assistance of counsel Sixth Amendment claim, unlike the
argument he made in Yos-Chiguil I, which was premised
only on § 28-1819.02. But he also raised a Fifth
Amendment due process claim directed at what he believed
was the trial court’s duty to advise him of immigration
consequences of his guilty plea.

49
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281 Neb. 618, 798 N.W.2d 832 (2011).
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The trial court denied Yos-Chiguil an evidentiary hearing
on his post conviction claims for various reasons, in two
separate orders: one dated January 22, 2010, and one dated
June 21, 2010. The Supreme Court held that Yos-Chiguil
had not timely appealed the trial court’s January 22 order,
and that it therefore only had jurisdiction to consider the
trial court’s ruling on the June 21 order – that involving
counsel’s failure to advise him of the possibility of an
intoxication defense. The court held that Yos-Chiguil
should have been granted an evidentiary hearing on this
issue, and reversed and remanded the case to the trial court.
There are two important features of the court’s holding that
relate to a trial court’s duty to advise defendants of possible
immigration consequences of nolo or guilty pleas. First, as
to the Fifth Amendment due process issue, the court
explicitly held that a criminal defendant does not have a
constitutional right to have a court advise him of possible
immigration consequences of a guilty plea.51 Second, the
court made clear that a vacatur motion filed under § 291819.02 can only relate to failure of a court to deliver the
statutory advisement regarding possible immigration
consequences of a guilty plea. Such a motion is not a
proper vehicle to raise any other type of error regarding the
plea process.
(e)

State v. Medina-Liborio (Medina-Liborio I).

In State v. Medina-Liborio,52 the Nebraska Court of
Appeals, in an unreported decision, held that a statutory
motion to vacate is the only proper vehicle for raising error
when a trial court fails to deliver the advisement required
by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1819.02. In that case, the trial
court did not give the statutory advisement at the time it
accepted the guilty plea from the defendant. The
defendant appealed the judgment of the trial court, alleging
that the trial court abused its discretion by accepting his
guilty plea without giving him the advisement. The Court
of Appeals held that the only way to raise the nonadvisement issue is by way of a motion to vacate the plea
under the statutory provisions in § 28-1819.02. So
although it affirmed the judgment of the trial court, it
51
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pointed out to the defendant that he could still seek a
statutory vacatur under § 28-1819.02 if he wished to do so.
(f)

State v. Medina-Liborio (Medina-Liborio II).

He did. But his motion was denied and he appealed. This
time, his appeal was heard by the Nebraska Supreme Court
in State v. Medina-Liborio.53 At the hearing before the
trial court, the State, over Medina-Liborio’s objection,
introduced evidence in the form of jail recordings that he
had had conversations about the immigration consequences
of his guilty plea with his family. His former counsel, also
over objection, testified that he had discussed the possible
immigration consequences of a guilty plea with MedinaLiborio. As the result of this evidence, the trial court held
that the legislative intent of § 29-1819.02 had been satisfied
since he was actually aware of the possible immigration
consequences of his guilty plea, and denied MedinaLiborio’s motion to vacate his plea. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the plain language of the statute
entitled Medina-Liborio to withdraw his guilty plea since
he had met both elements of the statute. In response to the
State’s claim that such a holding would allow criminal
defendants to “game the system,” the court wrote:
Finally, we do not share the district court’s
concern that applying § 29–1819.02 as it is
written will somehow permit defendants to
“game the system.” The statute makes the
trial judge responsible for giving the
advisement. The prosecutor, in the interest
of securing a valid plea-based conviction,
also has a role in making certain that the
advisement is given. A defendant can game
the system only if both the court and the
prosecutor fail to ensure that the defendant
is afforded his or her statutory rights, i.e.,
actually given the advisement. If the
advisement is given as the law requires,
there is no game for a defendant to play.54
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(g)

State v. Llerenas-Alvarado.

In a decision handed down shortly before the Supreme
Court’s decision in Medina-Liborio, the Nebraska Court of
Appeals, in State v. Llerenas-Alvarado,55 held that the
defendant had no right to withdraw his guilty plea under
§ 29-1819.02. Because the facts are akin to those in
Mena-Rivera, supra., they are reviewed in some detail here.
Llerenas-Alvarado was charged with kidnapping, a Class
IA felony. Before his initial arraignment in county court,
he was given a written advisory by an interpreter who read
the advisory to him. The advisory included language that
essentially advised Llerenas-Alvarado of possible
immigration consequences of a guilty plea, in language
very similar to that in § 29-1819.02. On June 7, he
appeared before the county court and was advised of his
rights, including the effect of conviction of non-citizens.56
His case was then bound over to district court. On July 14,
Llerenas-Alvarado appeared before the district court for a
group arraignment. At that arraignment, the district court
gave the advisement required by the statute. On August
29, Llerenas-Alvarado appeared again before the district
court for a pretrial conference. Pursuant to a plea
agreement, the State was granted leave to file an amended
information, but withdrew it because Llerenas-Alvarado
was not ready to enter a plea to the amended information.
On September 1, the parties again appeared before the
district court and indicated they had reached a plea
agreement. The district court asked Llerenas-Alvarado if
he remembered the court explaining his rights to him on
July 14, and asked if he wanted the court to repeat that
information. He said he did recall that court date and that
he did not wish to have any of the information repeated to
him, including “the possibility of deportation from the
United States.” The court then continued the hearing until
the following day, September 2, at which time it accepted
Llerenas-Alvarado’s guilty plea. The court did not repeat
the statutory immigration advisement at the September 2
hearing.
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Before the date for sentencing, Llerenas-Alvarado filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea, based on the failure of
the court to give the statutory advisement. A hearing on
his motion was held in the district court on November 18.
The district court denied his motion to vacate and LlerenasAlvarado appealed. On appeal, he raised two arguments:
(1) that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered
(in essence, a Fifth Amendment argument) and (2) that the
statutory advisement was not timely given to him as
required under the Mena-Rivera opinion.
Llerenas-Alvarado’s Fifth Amendment argument was not
based on the fact that the trial court failed to advise him of
the possible immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
Instead, it dealt more with his contention that the court
failed to adequately examine him to determine if he
understood his rights and, specifically, that he had
difficulty understanding his rights because, among other
things, he required the assistance of an interpreter. The
Court of Appeals held that the record did not support this
claim. As to his claim that the statutory immigration
advisement was not given to him immediately prior to the
entry of his guilty plea, as required by Mena-Rivera, the
Court of Appeals held that, although Llerenas-Alvarado
had not been given the complete immigration advisement
on either September 1 or 2, he had waived his statutory
right to receive the advisement and therefore “the
legislative intent of the statute [was] not frustrated in this
case.”57
Given the strict way in which the Nebraska Supreme Court
has interpreted the provisions of § 29-1819.02, one
wonders about the holding in this case. The facts certainly
did not help Llerenas-Alvarado, given that he refused the
court’s request to repeat its advisements just prior to taking
his plea. On the other hand, the statute, as interpreted by
Mena-Rivera, is exacting in its requirements. One senses
that this was a close call.
(h)

State v. Rodriguez.

The Supreme Court next considered § 29-1819.02 in State

57
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v. Rodriguez.58 The precise issue in this case was whether
a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear a motion
by a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea even after he has
completed his sentence related to the guilty plea. The
Supreme Court held that a trial court does, in fact, have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear such a motion. In order
to reach this conclusion, however, the Supreme Court had
to deal with some troubling language in its own RodriguezTorres opinion from 2008 (discussed above). That opinion
stated, inter alia:
In § 29-1819.02, the Legislature gives a
court discretion to vacate a judgment or
withdraw a plea where a court has failed to
provide the advisement required for pleas
made on or after July 20, 2002. It does
not, however, convey upon a court
jurisdiction to do so where a party has
already completed his or her sentence.59
The Supreme Court attempted to dispatch this language,
which is obviously inconsistent with the result it reached in
this case, on a couple of theories: (1) Rodriguez-Torres
dealt with a pre-July 20, 2002 plea and (2) the language
was dictum. Ultimately, however, the court distanced
itself from the language:
To the extent that our statement in
Rodriguez-Torres can be interpreted to limit
the relief provided in § 29-1819.02 to a
defendant whose sentence has not been
completed, such interpretation is expressly
disapproved.60
There is another interesting issue presented by this case,
however, that was first raised in the Yos-Chiguil cases – an
issue that has not yet been resolved by the Nebraska
Supreme Court. If a trial court’s advisement does not
conform exactly to the statutory language, does that mean
that the advisement has not been given as required by the
58
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statute, and that a defendant therefore has a right to
withdraw a guilty plea, provided the other elements of the
statute are met? The court did not have to address that
issue directly in Yos-Chiguil, and in this case the court
simply remanded the issue to the trial court, having found
that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion to
vacate.61 Justice Cassel, in his concurrence, hinted that the
Supreme Court would not look favorably on an advisement
that does not track the statutory language:
I write separately only to make plain an
important matter inherent in the court’s
opinion. There is no excuse for failing to
administer the statutory advisement. It
takes only a moment. The wording is
succinct. The statute specifies the precise
language. Judges have no reason to
improvise or summarize. The “cost” of
timely giving advisements is minuscule
compared to the “benefit” of avoiding plea
withdrawals years after the resulting
judgments have been fully executed.
Judges should fully and timely comply with
the statutory mandate. And the practicing
bar should ensure that judges do so.62
Although not of constitutional dimension, this opinion, and
the shot across the bow from Justice Cassel contained in it,
echo the language used by Justice Stevens in Padilla,
which is that the responsibility for seeing that the Sixth
Amendment’s requirement of competent counsel is
complied with is the responsibility of not only defense
counsel, but also the prosecutor and the judge.63 Justice
Cassel’s language makes it clear that all participants in a
criminal proceeding have an interest in seeing that § 291819.02 is complied with.
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According to a Justice search, on remand the district court did allow Mr. Rodriguez to
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(i)

State v. Gach.

In this case64, the Supreme Court built on its holdings in
Yos-Chiguil I and Mena-Rivera in denying post conviction
relief to the non-citizen defendant, who filed a claim to
withdraw his guilty plea under § 29-1819.02, arguing that
the trial court’s advisement did not exactly track the
statutory language.
The trial court’s advisement certainly did not track the
statutory language:
[Deputy county attorney]: Your Honor,
before I give the factual basis I just remind
the Court that perhaps before [Gach] entered
the plea you could do the immigration
advisory, of any potential impact on that.
Would you like me to do that or would you
like to do the —
THE COURT: Let me do that right now, sir.
In addition to the penalty of 1 to 50 years’
imprisonment, 50 being the max, one year
being the minimum, your immigration status
with the United States could be affected.
Do you understand that, sir?
[Gach]: (No response.)
THE COURT: In other words — do you
understand that?
[Gach]: Yes.
THE COURT: In other words, you could be
deported. . . . Do you understand that?
[Gach]: Yes.
In his post conviction claim, the defendant argued that he
should be allowed to withdraw his plea, since ICE had
lodged a detainer against him and was seeking to remove
him from the United States. At the post conviction hearing
before the trial court, the parties stipulated that the
64
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defendant was not a U.S. citizen either at the time of the
plea hearing or at the time of the post conviction hearing.
The Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court’s denial of
the motion to vacate the guilty plea, held, following its
holding in Yos-Chiguil I, that the defendant had not carried
his burden to show that he actually faced an immigration
consequence that was not included in the advisement
actually given by the trial court. The court held that,
although the advisement given by the trial court did not
track the statutory language, it did fairly advise the
defendant that his guilty plea could result in his
“deportation” from the United States and that the failure of
the trial court to also advise him that it could affect his
ability to naturalize was not a material omission.
The court did not address the issue of whether the trial
court’s failure to track exactly the statutory language in
§ 29-1819.02 was sufficient to allow a defendant to vacate
a plea under the statute, given its holding that Gach did not
carry his burden on the second element under the statute.
But the court did mention, again, Justice Cassel’s
concurrence in State v. Rodriguez about the importance of
giving the verbatim advisement.65 And, given the court’s
holding that the defendant had carried his burden of proof
on the first element of his claim – that the trial court failed
to give “all or part of” the advisement required by the
statute66 – it seems unlikely that anything other than a
verbatim recitation of the statutory language will suffice.
(j)

State v. Garcia.

In State v. Garcia,67 the Nebraska Supreme Court
confronted an argument by the defendant that asserted
§ 29-1819.02 was not complied with because a key word in
65

The Court also stated, as a general principle of law, that the right to withdraw a plea
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the advisement was not properly interpreted into Spanish,
the defendant’s primary language.
The court held that there is nothing in the language of the
statute itself that requires correct interpretation of the
statutory advisement:
Indeed, if we were to find that § 291819.02(2) allows for the withdrawal of a
plea based on inadequate translation, we
would have to read substantial content into
the statute that does not appear in its text.
Were we to hold that the statute extends to
translation inadequacies, subsidiary
questions such as when is translation
required, by what standards are alleged
translation errors to be evaluated, and by
what evidence are they to be proved would
inevitably follow. There is nothing in the
text of the statute that addresses those
questions, and we are neither well-equipped
nor authorized to develop answers to them
on our own. See, Neb. Const. art. II, § 1;
Heckman v. Marchio, 296 Neb. 458, 466,
894 N.W.2d 296, 302 (2017) (explaining
that “ ‘judicial legislation’ “ violates article
II, § 1, of the Nebraska Constitution).
Id. at 922-923; 920 N.W.2d at 715. And although, at oral
argument, Garcia contended that the inaccurate translation
violated his due process rights, the court did not reach that
argument because Garcia had not raised it in his motion to
vacate. So the holding of the court on the statutory basis
was, in effect, if the advisement is given correctly in
English to a defendant, the statute has been satisfied, even
if the translation might not have been accurate. Any
complaint about the accuracy of translation is a due
process, and not a statutory, argument.
c.

History of Duty of Counsel to Advise.
(1)

Strickland v. Washington.

In Strickland v. Washington,68 the U.S. Supreme Court delineated
68
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standards and factors courts must apply to determine whether or
not a criminal defendant has received the level of effective
assistance of counsel required by the Sixth Amendment. The
Court imposed a two-pronged test: first, courts must consider
whether trial counsel’s performance was deficient; second, courts
must decide, in the event the performance was deficient, whether
such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant and therefore
deprived him or her of a fair trial. If a defendant can prove up on
both elements, they state an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC)
claim that opens up post conviction remedies.
(2)

Padilla v. Kentucky.

On March 31, 2010, much of the previous jurisprudence in this
area was drastically altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Padilla, supra.
Mr. Padilla, the petitioner, a nearly 40-year lawful permanent
resident of the United States and Vietnam veteran, was charged
with transporting around 1000 pounds of marijuana in a
commercial truck. After some skirmishing about whether or not
Padilla had validly consented to a search of the truck, he pled
guilty to three state crimes, the most serious of which was a drug
trafficking offense, a felony under Kentucky law. Padilla was
sentenced to five years’ imprisonment followed by five years’
probation. Nearly two years after sentencing, Padilla filed a pro
se collateral attack on his conviction, alleging that his trial counsel
was ineffective because counsel had failed to investigate and
advise him of the potential immigration consequences of his guilty
pleas. Padilla alleged that trial counsel had told him that he did
not need to worry about any immigration consequences of the
guilty pleas, because of the length of time he had been in the U.S.
He also alleged that, had he known of the potential immigration
consequences of the guilty pleas, he would not have pled guilty.
The advice given to Padilla by his criminal defense counsel was
clearly wrong. Not only does a drug trafficking conviction have
an effect on a non-citizen’s legal status, it has one of the most
detrimental effects possible. In fact, a drug trafficking offense
such as the one to which Padilla pled guilty is an aggravated
felony.69 That not only made Padilla deportable, it barred him
from qualifying for nearly every type of relief from removal that
might otherwise be available to him. So the affirmative advice
offered by criminal defense counsel was about as incorrect as it
69
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could be. Nevertheless, a majority of the Kentucky Supreme
Court held that, because immigration consequences are “collateral”
to criminal proceedings, Padilla could not prevail on his Strickland
challenge. In so ruling, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
there was no constitutional defect in trial counsel’s advice on a
collateral matter even when that advice was legally incorrect.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on two questions:
1. Whether defense counsel, in order to provide the
effective assistance guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment,
has a duty to investigate and advise a non-citizen defendant
whether the offense to which the defendant is pleading
guilty will result in removal.
2. Whether petitioner’s counsel provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by affirmatively misadvising
petitioner concerning the likelihood of removal upon the
entry of his guilty plea.
Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion for the Court, in which
Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined.
Justices Alito and Roberts concurred in the judgment, while
Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented.
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal
defense counsel to inform his or her non-U.S. citizen client
whether or not a contemplated guilty plea carries a risk of
deportation. The Court also held that constitutionally competent
counsel would have advised Padilla that his drug conviction made
him subject to automatic deportation. Finally, the Court remanded
the case to the Kentucky Supreme Court so it could determine
whether or not Padilla could demonstrate prejudice under
Strickland’s second prong.
In reaching its holding, the Court made several noteworthy
observations. First, the Court held that it need not determine
whether deportation consequences are “collateral” to criminal
proceedings, since it found that deportation is an integral part of
the penalty imposed on non-citizen defendants.70 This is so, the
Court held, because of various amendments to the Immigration and
Nationality Act since the early 1990’s that have restricted nearly
every form of relief from deportation that was once available to
non-citizens facing removal from the U.S. So it is now beyond
70
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dispute that at least immigration consequences are not “collateral”
consequences for criminal proceedings for Sixth Amendment
purposes.
Second, the Court rejected a rule, which the concurrence would
have adopted, that would hold only affirmative mis-advice can
serve as the basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
The Court reasoned that such a rule would “give counsel an
incentive to remain silent on matters of great importance, even
when answers are readily available,” and “would deny a class of
clients least able to represent themselves the most rudimentary
advice on deportation even when it is readily available.”71
Third, the Court dismissed any concerns that its new rule would
open the floodgates to collateral attacks of convictions in which
defendants were not advised of potential immigration
consequences of guilty pleas.
The Court wrote that it had confronted a similar argument in
Strickland itself but “[a] flood did not follow in that decision’s
wake.”72 In addition, the Court pointed out, in order to prevail on
Strickland’s prejudice prong, a defendant must convince a court
that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational
under the circumstances, not an easy hurdle to clear.
Finally, the Court wrote, “It seems unlikely that our decision today
will have a significant effect on those convictions already obtained
as the result of plea bargains. For at least the past 15 years,
professional norms have generally imposed an obligation on
counsel to provide advice on the deportation consequences of a
client’s plea. We should, therefore, presume that counsel satisfied
their obligation to render competent advice at the time their clients
considered pleading guilty.”73
This last point is significant. As the Court later expands upon in
the opinion, the “professional norms” it refers to are likely to be
the template for counsel in deciding what type of immigrationrelated advice they will need to give to their non-citizen clients
contemplating guilty pleas.
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As to how detailed counsel’s immigration advice must be, the
Court adopted a sliding scale test. At a minimum, counsel must
advise his or her client that a pending criminal charge may carry a
risk of adverse immigration consequences.74 However, in
“obvious” cases such as Padilla’s, counsel must advise the client
that a guilty plea would make him deportable.75 This, of course,
begs the question of how detailed immigration advice must be in
those cases that fall between “difficult” and “easy.” How is
counsel to figure this out?
Part of the answer comes from the Court’s discussion and review
of “prevailing norms of practice.” The Court states that such
norms are guides to determining whether counsel’s advice is
competent in any given case. And, the Court points out, the
weight of these norms is to advise the client “regarding the risk of
deportation,”76 which goes much farther than simply advising a
client that there may be adverse immigration consequences to a
guilty plea. This interpretation is bolstered by the concurrence,
whose rule would have only required counsel to advise a client that
there could be adverse immigration consequences to a guilty plea,
something akin to the advisement required to be given by courts
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02. The concurrence laments
that the majority goes too far in what it requires.77 That lament
signals that what the majority requires is something more than just
“you might be in trouble with Immigration if you plead guilty.”78
A look at some of the “professional norms” mentioned by the
Court further supports this interpretation. For example, the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, § 14-3.2(f), states:
To the extent possible, defense counsel should
determine and advise the defendant, sufficiently in
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advance of the entry of any plea, as to the possible
collateral consequences that might ensue from entry
of the contemplated plea.
The commentary to this section is even more explicit in its
exhortation:
For example, depending on the jurisdiction, it may
well be that many clients’ greatest potential
difficulty, and greatest priority, will be the
immigration consequences of a conviction. To
reflect this reality, counsel should be familiar with
the basic immigration consequences that flow from
different types of guilty pleas, and should keep this
in mind in investigating law and fact and advising
the client.
(3)

Post-Padilla Cases.

There have been a number of post-Padilla cases decided by both
the United States Supreme Court and various state courts around
the country, applying the lessons of Padilla to various legal and
factual settings. Those cases will be discussed later in this outline
in the context of the legal issues they raise and resolve.79
However, at this point, it is worth discussing four major postPadilla cases: Chaidez v. United States,80 the disposition of
Padilla on remand to the Kentucky state courts,81 Lee v. United
States,82 and Diaz v. State,83 an Iowa supreme court case that
expounds and expands on defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment
obligations in light of Padilla.
(a)

Chaidez v. United States.

Before this case was decided in 2013, Courts of Appeal
79
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across the U.S. were split on whether Padilla was effective
retroactively; that is, whether it applied to cases that took
place before March 31, 2010.84 In a 7-2 opinion written by
Justice Kagan, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, under the
Teague v. Lane85 test, Padilla does not operate
retroactively.
Interestingly, however, that is not necessarily the end of the
story. It is the end of the story, of course, if one is talking
about retroactivity under a federal constitutional analysis.
However, other state courts have held, as a matter of state
constitutional principles, that Padilla does have a
retroactive effect when analyzed under state law.86 The
analysis of these state courts varies, but the authority for a
state court to apply its own retroactivity analysis is rooted
in the case of Danforth v. Minnesota,87 which held that the
Teague rule does not constrain the authority of state courts
to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure
than is required by federal law.
The New Mexico Supreme Court’s opinion in Ramirez is
particularly interesting, since it relied primarily on the fact
that, since 1990, a court rule required that New Mexico
courts and practitioners had to ascertain if defendants
understood possible immigration consequences of guilty
pleas. As the New Mexico Supreme Court pointed out:
Unlike the federal system, since 1990 New
Mexico has required attorneys in all trial
courts to advise their clients of the details of
the plea colloquy. [The Supreme Court
form] was amended in 1990 to, among other
things, require the judge to advise the
defendant that a conviction may have an
effect on the defendant’s immigration status.
[The form], applicable to all New Mexico
trial courts, also obligated the attorney to
84
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certify having explained the plea colloquy to
the client in detail.88
Because of this fact, the New Mexico Supreme Court had
no problem in holding that, in New Mexico state courts,
Padilla did apply retroactively, since a professional
standard of conduct had been established under state law
that pre-dated Padilla by 20 years.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court took a different route to
arrive at its decision that Padilla applies retroactively.89
The Court began by pointing out that, prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Chaidez, it had held that
Padilla was effective retroactively.90 But it revisited that
decision in the wake of the Chaidez decision. The Sylvain
opinion held that the U.S. Supreme Court, post-Teague, has
adopted a rule about what constitutes a “new rule” that
expands what Teague originally imagined:
Although we consider the retroactivity
framework established in Teague to be
sound in principle, the Supreme Court’s
post-Teague expansion of what qualifies as a
“new” rule has become so broad that
decisions defining a constitutional safeguard
rarely merit application on collateral
review.91
As a result, the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to
follow Chaidez and concluded that Padilla did not, in fact,
establish a “new rule.”92
The Nebraska Supreme Court, citing Chaidez, has held that
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Padilla does not apply retroactively.93 But the issue was
not squarely raised or briefed by the parties in the case, and
the analysis by the Nebraska Supreme Court was not as
detailed as that of either the Massachusetts or New Mexico
Supreme Courts, nor did it appear to address the issue in a
Danforth context. As a result, this issue may still be an
open one, as a matter of state law, in Nebraska.
The rationale used by the New Mexico Supreme Court
might get some traction in Nebraska. Using that general
rationale, the Washington Supreme Court, in In re YungCheng Tsai,94 held that Padilla is retroactive as a matter of
state law because, since 1983, Washington has had a statute
requiring that a non-citizen criminal defendant be warned
about immigration consequences before pleading guilty.
That statute took the form of a standard plea form that all
criminal defendants, their lawyers, and prosecutors must
sign at the time the court is asked to accept a guilty plea.
One of the advisements in the form reads a lot like § 291819.02:
If I am not a citizen of the United States, a
plea of guilty to an offense punishable as a
crime under state law is grounds for
deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United States, or denial of naturalization
pursuant to the laws of the United States.
The Washington Supreme Court held that the existence of
this form – and the language regarding possible
immigration consequences contained within it – give noncitizen defendants the “unequivocal right to advice
regarding immigration consequences and necessarily
imposes a correlative duty on defense counsel to ensure
that advice is provided.”95 And, the failure of a lawyer to
investigate the potential immigration consequences of a
plea, without any tactical purpose, is constitutionally
deficient performance by the lawyer.96 Therefore, given
93
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the existence of the statute (and court form) since 1983, the
Washington Supreme Court held that Padilla is a garden
variety application of the Strickland test that simply refines
the scope of defense counsel’s constitutional duties to the
client.97
Wouldn’t the same hold true in Nebraska, at least since
§ 29-1819.02 came into existence in July, 2002? Since
that time, all Nebraska courts and practitioners have been
aware that it is the intent of the Legislature that a criminal
defendant entering a guilty plea be advised by the court that
such a plea may have immigration consequences. The
Washington statute reads very similar to the Nebraska
statute.98 A competent defense lawyer in Nebraska, at least
since July, 2002, is aware of a non-citizen criminal
defendant’s right to be advised that a plea may carry
negative immigration consequences and, therefore, the
lawyer should have a correlative duty to advise a noncitizen defendant of possible immigration consequences of
a guilty plea. And to that extent, Padilla did not impose a
“new rule” for purposes of the Teague analysis. Or so the
argument goes.
(b)

Padilla on Remand.

As discussed earlier, the Strickland test regarding
ineffective assistance of counsel claims is two-fold: (1)
whether the assistance of counsel falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness and (2) if so, whether the client
suffered prejudice as a result of deficient performance by
counsel. The Padilla decision by the Supreme Court
decided the first Strickland issue, but remanded the case to
the Kentucky state courts on the prejudice issue because
they had not had a chance to engage in the prejudice
analysis.
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On remand, Mr. Padilla argued that he was prejudiced by
counsel’s deficient performance because, had he been
advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea,
he would not have pled guilty but would have insisted on
going to trial. However, that subjective argument is not,
by itself, sufficient to prevail on the Strickland prejudice
prong. Instead, one must show that the decision to reject a
plea offer and proceed to trial would have been objectively
reasonable under the circumstances.99 The Kentucky trial
court held that Mr. Padilla had not shown prejudice because
a decision to proceed to trial would not have been
reasonable under the circumstances. Padilla appealed to
the Kentucky Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial
court’s holding and determined that Mr. Padilla had, in fact,
produced evidence sufficient to meet his burden to show
prejudice.
In so holding, the Kentucky Court of Appeals, citing the
Third Circuit in United States v. Orocio,100 stressed how
the calculus in decisions in cases involving immigration
consequences are different from those in cases that do not
involve immigration consequences:
For the [non-citizen] defendant most
concerned with remaining in the United
States. . . it is not at all unreasonable to go to
trial and risk a ten-year sentence and
guaranteed removal, but with the chance of
acquittal and the right to remain in the
United States, instead of pleading guilty to
an offense that, while not an aggravated
felony, carries “presumptively mandatory”
removal consequences. . . .
Likewise, we conclude that although not the
exclusive factor when determining whether
a particular defendant’s decision to insist on
a trial would have been rational, the
immigration consequences of a guilty plea
can be the predominate factor.101
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(c)

Lee v. United States.

The Kentucky Court of Appeals’ reasoning in the Padilla
case on remand was vindicated by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Lee v. United States102 In that case, a criminal
defendant was charged with a drug trafficking offense,
which amounted to an aggravated felony. The defendant
was a long-time legal permanent resident (LPR) who had
lived in the United States for 35 years and who had never
been back to his country of nationality since coming to the
U.S. After being charged with the drug trafficking crime,
he repeatedly asked his criminal defense counsel if he
should be worried about possible immigration
consequences of the charge, as well as the possible
immigration consequences of the plea deal that the
prosecution was offering him. And his criminal defense
counsel repeatedly (and erroneously) told him no, that he
had nothing to worry about regarding possible immigration
consequences.
As a result, Mr. Lee agreed to plead guilty to a charge that
turned out to be an aggravated felony drug trafficking
offense. Once he found out that such a conviction had
severe negative immigration consequences, he filed a
motion to vacate his conviction, arguing that his counsel
had provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of
counsel. Both the trial court and appellate court held that
Mr. Lee had demonstrated that his counsel was ineffective
under the Strickland analysis, but further held that, because
the evidence against him was very strong, he could not
show that he had suffered prejudice as a result of his
counsel’s incorrect advice.
The Supreme Court disagreed. After reiterating that a
criminal defendant is entitled to constitutionally competent
representation even at the plea-bargaining stage, the Court
held that the usual test on prejudice, which is whether, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
criminal proceeding would have been different, was
inapplicable in a case where a plea deal was struck. In
such a case, the Court said, the focus when analyzing
Strickland’s prejudice prong is whether the ineffective
assistance of counsel led to a forfeiture of the proceeding
102
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itself.103 Therefore, the proper test is whether the
defendant can demonstrate a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial.
The government contended that Lee could not prevail on
the prejudice prong unless he could demonstrate that he
would have been better off going to trial. Further, the
government contended that, given the overwhelming
evidence of Lee’s guilt, there was no possible way for him
to make this showing in his case.
The Supreme Court held that was not the proper focus.
Instead, the focus should be on whether it was reasonable
for Lee, given his overwhelming concern about the possible
immigration consequences of his plea, to insist on going to
trial even in the face of the strong evidence against him.
The calculus, the Court held, must include an objective
inquiry, under the particular facts and circumstances of this
case, of whether, given the totality of the circumstances, a
decision to reject the plea offer was rational.
We cannot agree that it would be irrational
for a defendant in Lee’s position to reject the
plea offer in favor of trial. But for his
attorney’s incompetence, Lee would have
known that accepting the plea agreement
would certainly lead to deportation. Going
to trial? Almost certainly. If deportation
were the ‘‘determinative issue’’ for an
individual in plea discussions, as it was for
Lee; if that individual had strong
connections to this country and no other, as
did Lee; and if the consequences of taking a
chance at trial were not markedly harsher
than pleading, as in this case, that ‘‘almost’’
could make all the difference. Balanced
against holding on to some chance of
avoiding deportation was a year or two more
of prison time. Not everyone in Lee’s
position would make the choice to reject the
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plea. But we cannot say it would be
irrational to do so.104
(d)

Diaz v. State.

The Iowa Supreme Court decided a major case in 2017
regarding defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment obligations
in light of Padilla. Although the decision is not binding
on Nebraska courts, the decision did come from our nextdoor neighbor, and is examined for the reason that it might
have some persuasive value in Nebraska.
Mr. Morales Diaz was an undocumented immigrant who, at
the time of the events in the case, had been living in the
United States since 2002. He had a young daughter who
was a U.S. citizen. Until he was taken into custody by
ICE, he was her primary caregiver. Mr. Morales Diaz was
charged with forgery (a class “D” felony under Iowa law)
as a result of possessing a Texas identification card that he
bought on the street, which he admitted was not a
legitimate document.
After consulting with his criminal defense lawyer, Mr.
Morales Diaz agreed to plead guilty to an aggravated
misdemeanor forgery under Iowa Code section
715A.2(2)(b). Defense counsel told Mr. Morales Diaz that
he was “probably going to be deported to Mexico no matter
what happened,” both because he was undocumented in the
U.S. and because he had previously missed a hearing in
Immigration Court. As a result of his criminal conviction,
Mr. Morales Diaz was removed to Mexico. However, he
returned to the U.S. in custody of the Department of
Homeland Security and filed a post conviction claim in
which he alleged his criminal defense counsel was
ineffective under a Strickland analysis for failing to advise
him of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea.
In a remarkable opinion, the court granted Morales Diaz’s
post conviction claim, holding that he met both Strickland
prongs: deficient performance by trial counsel and resulting
prejudice. The court also held:
· Counsel’s duty to advise a criminal
defendant of immigration consequences
104
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exists separate and apart from the colloquy
engaged in by a trial court under Iowa Rule
of Criminal Procedure 2.8.105
· Counsel has a duty, under Padilla, to
advise noncitizen defendants whether a
conviction of a crime “is also a crime that
renders a noncitizen deportable.”106
· Once it is clear that conviction of a
particular offense will result in immigration
consequences, defense counsel must advise
the defendant not only that immigration
consequences will follow, but precisely what
those consequences will be. Such
consequences not only relate to the
likelihood of deportation, but also to
unavailability of relief from removal (such
as eligibility for cancellation of removal),
grounds of inadmissibility, and the
likelihood of mandatory detention by ICE.107
The Iowa supreme court recognized that
these duties are burdensome, but, referring
to the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice,108 said “we do not find them too
onerous a burden to place on the
professional advisers employed to represent
their clients’ best interests.”109
The court said that, in its opinion, Padilla
did not alter the standard to which defense
counsel is held. “Instead, counsel after
105
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Padilla is held to the same standard counsel
was before Padilla: to provide objectively
reasonable assistance as measured by
prevailing professional norms.”110
(4)

Post-Padilla Nebraska Cases.

The Nebraska Supreme Court has decided a number of post
conviction cases in which defendants argued that their criminal
defense lawyers were ineffective because they did not advise the
defendants of immigration consequences of guilty pleas they
entered. Those decisions are reviewed below.
(a)

State v. Gonzalez.

State v. Gonzalez111 is the seminal case in this area. The
defendant in that case was undocumented. As a result of
her not having any immigration status, Gonzalez was
placed into removal proceedings by Immigration and
Customs Enforcement in late 2006. In 2007, while those
immigration proceedings were still pending, she was
charged with fraudulently receiving public assistance
benefits, a Class IV felony. She was initially arraigned in
early 2008, and pled not guilty. Two months later, she
withdrew her not guilty plea and entered a plea of no
contest to the charge, in exchange for the State’s agreement
to recommend a sentence of probation. She also agreed to
pay restitution in the amount of $18,522, the amount of
benefits unlawfully obtained by her. The trial court gave
Gonzalez the statutory advisement in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 291819.02 both at the time of her arraignment and at the time
of the entry of her no contest plea. The court accepted her
no contest plea and sentenced her to a term of 5 years’
probation.
Her conviction made Gonzalez ineligible for a type of relief
from removal, specifically, cancellation of removal for
certain non-permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
The conviction made her ineligible for cancellation of
removal both because it was a “crime involving moral
turpitude” under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) and because it
was an “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C.
110
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§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (specifically, the offense was an
aggravated felony because of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(I),
which states that a crime involving fraud or deceit in which
the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000 is an aggravated
felony).
As a result, in July 2010, over two years after she was
convicted, but while she was still in state custody pursuant
to her conviction, Gonzalez filed a “Motion to Withdraw
Plea and Vacate Judgment,” alleging she had received
ineffective assistance of counsel because her criminal
defense lawyer had not told her that conviction of the
charge to which she pled no contest would bar her from
qualifying for cancellation of removal. Gonzalez’s
testimony at the hearing on her motion to withdraw her plea
revealed that she had only learned of this immigration
consequence about five months before filing her motion,
and only then because she was consulting with a different
lawyer who advised her of this consequence. The trial
court denied her motion, finding that she had failed to
demonstrate prejudice from counsel’s failure to tell her of
the immigration consequences of her plea. Gonzalez
appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
The first argument the court addressed was whether it had
subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. The State
argued that there was no jurisdiction because there was no
vehicle for Gonzalez to use to withdraw her guilty plea
over two years after conviction and judgment. The
supreme court held that it did have jurisdiction over the
appeal. In a detailed discussion, the supreme court held
that there are three avenues available for a defendant to use
to seek to withdraw a guilty plea if she claims she was not
advised of the immigration consequences of such a plea:
(1) a motion for post conviction relief under the Nebraska
Post Conviction Act; (2) statutory vacatur of a plea under
§§ 29-1819.02 and 29-1819.03; and (3) a “common law
motion to withdraw a plea.”112 The supreme court found
that Gonzalez was not proceeding under the Post
Conviction Act, nor was she seeking to use the statutory
procedure in Chapter 29. So it turned its attention to the
only remaining possibility: her common law motion to
withdraw her guilty plea.
112
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To begin with, the supreme court reiterated what it had
foreshadowed in Rodriguez-Torres:113 that a common law
motion to withdraw a plea might exist in cases where a
defendant could not use the provisions of either § 291819.02 or the Post Conviction Act to vacate the
conviction. The court’s language is important, and bears
repeating verbatim (footnotes have been omitted):
Gonzalez has pursued [a common law
motion] here. And contrary to the State’s
suggestion, it is well established that a
defendant may move to withdraw a plea,
even after final judgment. However, the
grounds for such a withdrawal are quite
difficult for a defendant to prove –– the bar
is set high. If a motion to withdraw a plea
of guilty or no contest is made before
sentencing, a court, in its discretion, may
allow a defendant to withdraw his or her
plea for any fair and just reason, provided
the prosecution would not be substantially
prejudiced by its reliance on the plea. But
with respect to withdrawal of a plea of guilty
or no contest made after sentencing,
withdrawal is proper only where the
defendant makes a timely motion and
establishes, by clear and convincing
evidence, that withdrawal is necessary to
correct a manifest injustice. That standard
applies even where a motion to withdraw a
plea has been made after the sentencing
court’s judgment has become final. A
motion for withdrawal is timely if made
with due diligence, considering the nature of
the allegations therein, and is not necessarily
barred because it was made subsequent to
judgment or sentence.114
The common law motion described by the court was not
given a name – it is simply a “common law motion to
withdraw a plea.” However, the court goes on to describe
exactly how a defendant can show “manifest injustice”
113
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sufficient to allow withdrawal of a guilty plea after
judgment or sentence by way of a common law motion:
We have explained that “manifest injustice”
may be proved if the defendant proves, by
clear and convincing evidence, that (1) he or
she was denied the effective assistance of
counsel guaranteed by constitution, statute,
or rule; (2) the plea was not entered or
ratified by the defendant or a person
authorized to so act on his or her behalf; (3)
the plea was involuntary, or was entered
without knowledge of the charge or that the
sentence actually imposed could be
imposed; or (4) he or she did not receive the
charge or sentence concessions
contemplated by the plea agreement and the
prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to
oppose those concessions as promised in the
plea agreement. And the defendant must
plead and prove that such omissions have
resulted in prejudice.115
In effect, in order to demonstrate “manifest injustice”
sufficient to withdraw a guilty plea after sentencing where
the issue is ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must prove up a Strickland/Hill116 claim by clear and
convincing evidence. It is also significant that the court’s
description of “manifest injustice” tracks exactly the
language found in Standard 14-2.1(b) of the ABA
Standards of Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty. Although
the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that these standards
have not been “adopted” by the Nebraska Supreme Court in
any formal sense,117 the fact that the test set out by the
court in Gonzalez for demonstrating “manifest injustice”
exactly tracks the language in the ABA Standards suggests
that, at the very least, the provisions of those Standards are
115
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highly influential in interpreting state common law in this
area.
The court ultimately affirmed the denial of Gonzalez’s
motion, holding that she had not shown any prejudice from
the failure of trial counsel to inform her of the immigration
consequences of her plea. The court held that Gonzalez’s
testimony that she “would have looked for another
solution” did not carry her burden of proof to show, by
clear and convincing evidence under the Strickland/Hill
prejudice prong, that she would have rejected the plea offer
in favor of going to trial, and that such rejection would
have been objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
(b)

State v. Diaz.

In State v. Diaz118 the defendant sought to withdraw a
guilty plea he had entered in 2000, due to his lawyer’s
failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of
the guilty plea. The procedural vehicle Diaz sought to use
to withdraw his plea was a writ of error coram nobis.119 At
the time he filed his motion, Diaz had completed his
sentence, and was no longer in state custody. The crimes
to which Diaz pled guilty were misdemeanor attempted
possession of cocaine, and driving while intoxicated.
Diaz, a Honduran national, had been in the United States
since 1994 pursuant to a grant of Temporary Protected
Status from the United States Attorney General, which
allowed him to stay in the United States, and work
lawfully, until such time as the Attorney General
determined it was safe for Hondurans to return home.
Diaz’s convictions made him removable from the United
States because a TPS recipient who is convicted of two or
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more misdemeanors loses his TPS status.120 Since Diaz
had no other immigration status and no other relief from
removal available to him, that meant he had no way to
remain in the United States.
The trial court found that Diaz’s uncontradicted testimony
was insufficient to prove that he was not advised of
immigration consequences by his trial lawyer in 2000, and
further found that his testimony alone was insufficient to
prove that he was currently in removal proceedings. As a
result, the trial court denied his motion for a writ of error
coram nobis. Diaz appealed.
The State argued that Diaz’s motion should be considered
to be the type of common law motion described by the
court in Gonazlez, supra, and that a court does not have
jurisdiction to consider such a motion once the defendant
has completed his sentence. The supreme court declined
to consider Diaz’ motion as anything other than a motion
for writ of error coram nobis, however, since all parties and
the trial court had always treated the motion in that way. It
then proceeded to analyze the propriety of a writ of error
coram nobis in Diaz’ situation.
The supreme court held that a writ of error coram nobis
was not available to allow Diaz to withdraw his guilty plea.
The essence of the writ, the court held, is to allow vacatur
of a guilty plea where some unknown fact existed at the
time of the plea that, had it been known, would have
prevented the rendition of the judgment. The court held
that Diaz’s claim – that Padilla had been decided after his
plea was entered – was not an unknown fact at the time he
entered his plea, but rather an unknown issue of law.
Although the court recognized that several federal courts
have allowed withdrawal of pleas under a coram nobis
theory in cases such as Diaz’s, it found that the state law
elements of a coram nobis claim in Nebraska do not match
those in federal court, making coram nobis unavailable in a
situation such as Diaz’s. The court also clarified that
common law motions, such as coram nobis (and the motion
described by the court in Gonzalez, supra), originate from
Nebraska’s adoption of English common law, as codified in
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 49-101.
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Given its disposition of the case, the court did not reach the
issue of whether Padilla applies retroactively.
(c)

State v. Yuma.

The defendant in State v. Yuma121 raised two issues on
appeal: (1) could he use a common law motion to withdraw
his plea, as recognized in Gonzalez, and (2) did Padilla
apply to Yuma’s case, since he plead guilty before Padilla
was decided?
The supreme court held that the common law motion was
available to Mr. Yuma because he could not use the
Nebraska Post Conviction Act to assert his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. He was released immediately
upon being sentenced to time served and therefore was
never in state custody as a result of his conviction, which is
a requirement of the Post Conviction Act.
As to the second issue, the supreme court held that Padilla
did apply to Mr. Yuma’s case. Although he entered his
guilty plea before Padilla was decided, he was not
sentenced until after Padilla was decided. Because his
conviction was not final until the sentence was imposed,
and because that date was after Padilla was decided, the
“new rule” announced by Padilla applied to Mr. Yuma.
(d)

State v. Chojolan.

In State v. Chojolan,122 the supreme court held that Padilla
does not apply retroactively to pleas that were entered
before its effective date of March 31, 2010. However, as
noted above,123 the Nebraska Supreme Court has never
engaged in a detailed analysis of whether Padilla might
apply retroactively under a state law Strickland analysis
made possible by Danforth. The sum total of the supreme
court’s reasoning of this issue was succinct:
In prior cases, we have noted that in Chaidez
v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court held that
121

286 Neb. 244, 835 N.W.2d 679 (2013).
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288 Neb. 760, 851 N.W.2d 661 (2014).
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See section I.D.2.c.(3)(a), supra.
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because Padilla, which was decided in 2010,
announced a new rule, those defendants
whose convictions became final prior to
Padilla could not benefit from its holding. . .
. In the present case, Chojolan was
convicted and sentenced in 2006, and
therefore the rule announced in Padilla in
2010 does not apply retroactively to his
conviction. We conclude that the district
court did not err when it determined that
Padilla did not apply retroactively to
Chojolan’s 2006 plea and conviction.124
(e)

State v. Mamer.

State v. Mamer125 is a case with difficult facts that led to a
questionable outcome. Mr. Mamer was charged with first
degree sexual assault. On advice of counsel, he pled guilty
to attempted first degree sexual assault. As the result of
his conviction, Mamer served approximately three weeks
after sentencing, since much of his sentence was comprised
of time already served before the date of his sentencing.
Mamer was discharged from state custody on October 7,
2011. On February 9, 2012, Mamer filed a motion to
withdraw his guilty plea, alleging that his criminal defense
counsel had not given him any advice regarding the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.126 The basis
of his motion was, in essence, the “manifest injustice”
prong of the common law motion establish by the Nebraska
Supreme Court in State v. Gonzalez, supra. The trial court
denied Mamer’s motion and he appealed.
The main issue in the case was whether or not Mamer
could have proceeded under the Post Conviction Act to try
to vacate his guilty plea. As Gonzalez held, a common law
motion to vacate is only appropriate if no other post
conviction remedy is available to the movant. The court
124

288 Neb. at 763, 851 N.W.2d at 663-664. The supreme court again reiterated, in
summary fashion, that Padilla is not retroactive in State v. Sandoval, 288 Neb. 754, 851 N.W.2d
656 (2014).
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289 Neb. 92, 853 N.W.2d 517 (2014).

It is beyond dispute that Mamer’s conviction of first degree sexual assault was an
aggravated felony. See INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).
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held that, because Mamer was in state custody for three
weeks following his conviction, he could have proceeded
under the Post Conviction Act and therefore it was proper
for the trial court to grant the State’s motion to dismiss his
common law motion to vacate. Mamer’s argument that he
was not aware of the immigration consequences until the
moment he was released from state custody was unavailing:
Mamer argues in essence that his claim [of
ineffective assistance of counsel] did not
arise until after he was released from
incarceration and knew of the immigration
consequences of his plea–-and thus knew
that his trial counsel’s performance was
ineffective. . . . Mamer views the factual
predicate as including the actual
commencement of removal proceedings,
especially since he lacked representation
while incarcerated to inform him of the
presumptively mandatory deportation law
. . . . Especially when Mamer was advised
by the district court that his plea could have
immigration consequences, Mamer with due
diligence could have discovered his Padilla
claim while still incarcerated. . . . Mamer
plainly knew at the time of trial counsel’s
representation what trial counsel did and did
not advise him of. . . . We conclude that
Mamer’s unawareness of the Padilla
opinion, which was decided before his plea,
does not concern the factual predicate for his
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Such alleged ignorance of Padilla concerns
only the legal significance of the relevant
objective facts. . . . In the exercise of due
diligence—either with or without new
counsel—Mamer could have discovered the
applicable deportation law while
incarcerated.127
This case enunciates a difficult and unforgiving rule.
Here, the defendant alleged that his criminal defense
counsel gave him no advice whatsoever that his guilty plea
carried immigration consequences. He discovered those
127

289 Neb. at 97-100, 853 N.W.2d at 523-524 (emphasis supplied).
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immigration consequences only when ICE arrived to take
him into custody for removal proceedings – the very point
in time at which he was no longer in state custody. Yet,
because he was in state custody for three weeks after his
criminal sentence was imposed, the court held that the
common law motion to vacate was not available to him
because he could have, without input from or assistance of
counsel, filed a post conviction claim under the PostConviction Act during the three weeks he was in state
custody.
The court pins its analysis on two factors. First, it notes
that Mamer was given the general immigration advisement
required by § 29-1819.02 at the time he entered his guilty
plea. Second, it states that the factual predicate for
Mamer’s claim was his knowledge that his defense counsel
did not advise him of the immigration consequences of his
guilty plea. And, the court holds, the fact that Mamer only
later understood the legal significance of this omission by
criminal defense counsel does not mean that he was
unaware of the fact that he was not advised regarding the
immigration consequences of his plea.
The first point is highly problematic, because, in essence, it
holds that a trial court that complies with its statutory duty
under § 29-1819.02 has inoculated trial counsel against an
ineffective assistance claim.128 Other courts, citing both
general principles and formal standards of practice, have
disagreed with this conclusion, holding that the Sixth
Amendment obligation mandated by Padilla is not affected
or ameliorated by a general immigration advisement
delivered by the court at the time it accepts a guilty plea.129
128

This is not the first time the supreme court has hinted at this interpretation. See also
State v. Barrera-Garrido, 296 Neb. 647 (2017) and State v. Armendariz, 289 Neb. 896 (2015), in
which the supreme court implies that advice by the court may cure the failure of counsel to
comply with their Strickland obligations. However, both of those cases were decided before the
U.S. Supreme Court decided the Lee case, so their conclusions are subject to question.
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See, e.g., United States v. Orocio, 645 F.3d 630, 646 (3d Cir. 2011), overruled on
other grounds by Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013): “The gist of the government’s
argument is that these two [court] colloquies, in tandem, put Mr. Orocio on notice that he could
be removed. With that notice, the government argues, Mr. Orocio should have prepared
arguments on appeal or filed a § 2255 petition. The question under Strickland and Hill, however,
is not whether Mr. Orocio had later access to remedies, but whether he would have pled guilty at
all.” See also, Commentary, Standard 14.3-2, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, 3d ed. (1999): “Although the court must inquire into the
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The second point puts unrepresented defendants in an
untenable position of not only needing to be aware of naked
facts giving rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, but also of the legal significance of those facts.
Under the court’s holding, it was enough that Mr. Mamer
knew that he was not advised of the immigration
consequences of his guilty plea. Given his knowledge of
what his counsel did not advise him, the court held that he
could have, through the exercise of due diligence, brought
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim before he knew
that ICE wanted to deport him.130 This rationale puts
defendants who have received no advice regarding
immigration consequences of their guilty plea in the nearly
impossible position of having to discover those
consequences on their own.
(f)

State v. Merheb.

In State v. Merheb,131 the court held that a defendant whose
conviction was final before Padilla was not entitled to
vacate his guilty plea, since the U.S. Supreme Court in
Chaidez held that Padilla is not effective retroactively.
Again, though, there was not explicit analysis by the court
as to whether the result might be different under a purely
state analysis done pursuant to a Danforth analysis.

defendant’s understanding of the possible consequences at the time the plea is received under
Standard 14-1.4, this inquiry, is not, of course, any substitute for advice by counsel. The court’s
warning comes just before the plea is taken, and may not afford time for mature reflection. The
defendant cannot, without risk of making damaging admissions, discuss candidly with the court
the questions he or she may have. Moreover, there are relevant considerations which will not be
covered by the judge in his or her admonition.” See also, United States v. Rodriguez-Vega, 797
F.3d 781 (9th Cir. 2015).
Ironically, the court correctly states that the prejudice element of Mamer’s claim
relates to the decision of whether or not to plead guilty, not to whether he was subject to being
deported as a result of the guilty plea. 289 Neb. at 100, 853 N.W.2d at 524. Yet at the time
Mamer chose to plead guilty, he was not in possession of the legal knowledge regarding the
immigration consequences of that plea, because trial counsel never advised him of those
consequences.
130
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290 Neb. 83, 858 N.W.2d 226 (2015).
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(g)

State v. Jerke.

In State v. Jerke,132 the Nebraska Supreme Court was
invited to revisit its holding in Mamer under facts very
similar to those in Mamer.
In 2012, Jerke pled guilty to an aggravated felony crime of
violence, and was sentenced by the trial court to a term of
imprisonment of four to six years. At no time did his trial
counsel advise him of the immigration consequences of his
guilty plea. In 2015, while serving his sentence, Jerke
learned that he was not eligible for work release because he
had an “immigration hold” on him. In 2017, after he had
been released from state custody and after being formally
notified that ICE was seeking to deport him, Jerke, through
new counsel, filed a common law motion to vacate his
conviction due to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The State opposed Jerke’s motion at the hearing, arguing
that the common law procedure was not available to him
because he could have brought his claim under the Post
Conviction Act while in state custody. Jerke prevailed on
his post conviction claim at the trial level, arguing that the
State had waived its objection by failing to file a motion to
dismiss. The State appealed, both as to the procedural
issue and as to the merits of Jerke’s common law post
conviction claim.
The supreme court held that the unavailability of either a
statutory vacatur remedy under § 29-1819.02, or under the
Post Conviction Act, is not an affirmative defense that must
be raised by the State but, instead, is a material element of a
defendant’s claim, which must be pled and proved. As to
the merits of Jerke’s claim, the court held that he could
have filed under the Act while still in state custody, and
that the common law remedy was therefore not available to
him:
Jerke argues that the “logical effect” of
Mamer is “to place an obligation on an
untrained defendant to generate the
wherewithal to perform as a more competent
attorney than his actual attorney, and to do
132

302 Neb. 372, 923 N.W.2d 78 (2019).
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so from within the confines of prison at a
time when he has no reason to suspect a
problem to begin with.”
Jerke’s argument mischaracterizes our
holding in Mamer. Most notably, Mamer did
not hold that the factual predicate of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim exists
at a time when a defendant has “no reason to
suspect there was a problem.” To the
contrary, Mamer held that the factual
predicate could have been discovered
through the exercise of reasonable diligence
once the defendant was advised by the trial
court, pursuant to § 29-1819.02(1), that a
conviction may result in immigration
consequences. Mamer reasoned that from
and after the time of that advisement, the
defendant knew of a possible problem with
his immigration status and, with the exercise
of due diligence, could have discovered and
raised the ineffective assistance of trial
counsel argument during the period of
incarceration.
Id. at 384, 923 N.W.2d at 86. In other words, the court
stuck by its guns and refused to revisit its holding – and the
underpinnings of that holding – announced in Mamer.
As it did in Mamer, the court implied, in the quoted
language above, that the general advisement by the trial
court of possible immigration consequences cures any
failure by trial counsel to inform a client of immigration
consequences. That is a troubling implication. And, in
the opinion of this author, it is wrong.133 Interestingly, the
Eighth Circuit, about a month after Jerke was decided,
handed down an opinion that seems to contradict, or at least
temper, the Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding on this
point.
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See footnote 128, supra. The mischief that this implication has created has found its
way into holdings by the Nebraska Court of Appeals that have, without analysis, assumed the
correctness of this conclusion. See, e.g., State v. Gonsalez, 2019 WL 7369233 (December 31,
2019); State v. Diaz, 2019 WL 3936274 (August 20, 2019).
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(h)

Dat v. United States.

In Dat,134 in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
client, an LPR since the mid-1990’s, was charged with two
counts of Hobbs Act robbery. He pled guilty to one count,
but before pleading guilty, Mr. Dat specifically asked his
criminal defense counsel about the possible immigration
consequences of his guilty plea. His defense counsel then
“spoke to an immigration specialist,” after which he
advised Mr. Dat that his plea would not result in his
removal from the U.S. because “he was a long-tenured
lawful permanent resident, not an ‘illegal immigrant.’”
Thereafter, Mr. Dat rejected two plea agreements with
“strong deportation language,” and accepted one that
acknowledged “there are or may be collateral consequences
to any conviction to include but not limited to
immigration,” relying on his counsel’s assurance that his
guilty plea would not affect his immigration status.
Because Mr. Dat was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
of 78 months, and because the crime to which he pled
guilty was a crime of violence, the offense was clearly an
aggravated felony crime of violence under INA §
101(a)(43)(F), subjecting him to mandatory removal from
the U.S.
Once he learned of this, Mr. Dat moved to vacate his
conviction under 28 U.S.C. §2255 (federal habeas),
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court
denied his petition without holding a hearing on it, finding
that he was advised of the immigration consequences by his
plea agreement, his Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty, and
the colloquy with the court during the hearing at which his
guilty plea was accepted. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
reversed and remanded.
The Eighth Circuit had no trouble finding deficient
performance by trial counsel under Strickland’s first prong,
since, under Padilla, the advice that conviction of an
aggravated felony would not affect Mr. Dat’s immigration
status was clearly and obviously incorrect.
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920 F.3d 1192 (8th Cir. 2019).
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The court found that whether Mr. Dat had been prejudiced
by his counsel’s deficient performance to be “a closer
question.” The court held that if Dat could prove that he
would have rejected the plea offer and insisted on going to
trial but for counsel’s immigration advice, that would show
prejudice under Strickland’s second prong. The court
noted that the Supreme Court, in the Lee case, held that
factors such as a client’s history in the U.S., his family
circumstances, and his gainful employment all signal strong
connections to, and desire to remain in, the country. As a
result, the court held that, “At this stage, sufficient evidence
support’s [Dat’s] assertions of prejudice.”135
The court then addressed the government’s argument that
the combination of the plea agreement, the Petition to Enter
a Plea of Guilty, and the colloquy with the court at the
hearing at which his guilty plea was accepted made it
impossible for Dat to show prejudice. The circuit court
demurred:
However, his counsel’s alleged misadvice
specifically undermined these equivocal
warnings. They informed Dat of a general
possibility of immigration consequences.
They do not necessarily contradict or correct
his counsel’s alleged misadvice he would
not suffer those consequences in his case.
Compare Doe, 915 F.3d at 913 (counsel’s
misadvice—that deportation was not a
mandatory result of the guilty plea—not
remedied where judge asked if defendant
understood he “may be deported” and did
not inform him of the “mandatory
consequences” of his plea to an aggravated
felony), and United States v. Akinsade, 686
F.3d 248, 254 (4th Cir. 2012) (“general and
equivocal admonishment” that defendant’s
plea “could lead to deportation” was
“insufficient to correct counsel’s affirmative
misadvice that [defendant’s] crime was not
categorically a deportable offense”), with
United States v. Fazio, 795 F.3d 421, 428
(3d Cir. 2015) (any error in counsel’s failure
to inform defendant his guilty plea subjected
135

Id. at 1195.
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him to automatic deportation was cured by
plea agreement and district court’s “in-depth
colloquy,” both of which “made clear that
[defendant] was willing to plead guilty even
if that plea would lead to automatic
deportation”). The record here is
inconclusive whether the plea documents or
district court remedied counsel’s
misadvice.136
On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing
and once again denied Dat’s habeas claim. On appeal, the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Dat’s
habeas claim, finding his trial counsel’s testimony that she
advised Dat he “could” face immigration consequences that
“could” make him deportable was objectively reasonable
and therefore did not prejudice him.137 The Eighth Circuit
justified this interpretation of Padilla in the following way:
In Padilla, the Supreme Court held that
counsel must advise the defendant that “his
conviction would make him ‘deportable’
under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) if he
pleaded guilty, not that deportation or
removal was either mandatory or certain.”
United States v. Ramirez-Jimenez, 907 F.3d
1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam). Cf.
Chaidez, 568 U.S. at 345-46, 133 S.Ct 1103
(stating that under Padilla, “criminal
defense attorneys must inform non-citizen
clients of the risks of deportation arising
from guilty pleas.”) (emphasis added). An
alien with a deportable conviction may still
seek “relief from removal by providing
evidence that he is eligible for asylum,
withholding of removal, or relief under the
Convention Against Torture.” RamirezJimenez, 907 F.3d at 1094. These
“immigration law complexities” should
“caution any criminal defense attorney not
to advise a defendant considering whether to
plead guilty that the result of a post136

Id. at 1195-1196.
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conviction, contested removal proceeding is
clear and certain.” Id.138
Despite its shortcomings, the December, 2020 opinion in
Dat does not retreat from the notion that a court’s duty to
give a general advisement does not relieve criminal defense
counsel from their obligation to comply with their Sixth
Amendment obligations under Padilla. In other words,
Dat reaffirms the argument that a court’s general
advisement is no substitute for defense counsel’s obligation
to discuss, with some particularity, the immigration
consequences a client may face if convicted of the offense
with which the client is charged.
(5)

Miscellaneous Considerations.

Practical Application
What does all of this mean in practice? Although reasonable
minds can differ, it seems prudent for defense counsel to
investigate, understand, and advise a client at least with respect to
the following:139
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What is remarkable about this re-interpretation of Padilla, aside from the incentive it
provides to defense counsel to give immigration advice so equivocal as to be functionally
meaningless and worthless, is the blatantly false notion that a person convicted of an aggravated
felony and sentenced to 78 months in prison is eligible for either asylum or withholding of
removal, given the prohibitions in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i) (providing that a non-citizen
convicted of an aggravated felony has been convicted of a “particularly serious crime,” thereby
disqualifying that person from receiving asylum) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B) (providing that a
non-citizen who has been convicted of an aggravated felony and sentenced to at least 5 years’
imprisonment has been convicted of a “particularly serious crime” that precludes the non-citizen
from qualifying for withholding of removal). Additionally, equating the phrase “would make
him deportable” with the phrase “could make him deportable” rewards imprecise legal advice at
precisely the time when full and accurate advice is needed by the client. Particularly in the
context of Dat’s argument (that counsel had a duty to tell him if the plea would result in his
removal), sanctioning the use of the word “could” in place of the word “would” feels like a
bridge too far – especially given that Dat was convicted of an aggravated felony.
139

In fact, as discussed earlier, the Iowa Supreme Court, by virtue of its holding in the
Diaz decision, requires much more than this.
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(1) The immigration status of the client.140 This is information
that should be obtained at the initial interview. And it may not be
enough to know simply “citizen” vs. “non-citizen,” although at
least that rudimentary piece of information must be obtained.
Rather, counsel should try to find out precisely what is the
immigration status of the client.141
(2) The potential inadmissibility consequences of the contemplated
plea.
(3) The potential deportability consequences of the contemplated
plea.
(4) Whether the crime with which the client is charged is an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
(5) Whether the conviction would imperil any form of relief from
removal for which the client would otherwise be eligible.142
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The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 38 N.E.3d 278
(2015), held that failing to inquire about the immigration status of a client is per se ineffective
assistance of counsel:
Just as the ordinary physician must take a history from the patient before rendering a
diagnosis, so, too, must the ordinary criminal defense attorney make a reasonable inquiry
of his or her client regarding the client’s history, including whether he or she is a citizen
of the United States. . . . Unless a criminal defense attorney knows whether a defendant is
a United States citizen, the attorney cannot properly evaluate the likelihood that the
defendant will face immigration consequences, investigate potential avenues of relief,
minimize such consequences through plea negotiations, or understand how highly the
defendant values staying in the United States. Id. at 289-290.
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As discussed later, different immigration statuses carry different immigration
consequences.
This line of inquiry is required by the Nebraska Supreme Court’s holding in State v.
Gonzalez, supra. Recall that in that case the client was already in removal proceedings when
she was convicted of the welfare fraud offense because she was in the country without
documentation. One reading of the holding is that Gonzalez’s trial counsel was ineffective in
not advising her of the fact that her plea would imperil her eligibility to apply for cancellation of
removal for non-permanent residents under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), which is a form of relief from
removal for certain individuals who are not permanent residents of the United States.
142
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Some commentators also urge that the following advice may be
required by Padilla:143
(6) Whether the conviction would result in mandatory detention of
the client by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).144
(7) Whether the conviction would preclude the client from
demonstrating “good moral character.”
Not Just for Defense Counsel
Although the basis for the holding in Padilla is clearly the Sixth
Amendment, the Supreme Court stated that everyone involved in
the criminal process has an interest in seeing that non-U.S. citizen
defendants are properly advised regarding the potential
immigration consequences of guilty pleas:
[I]nformed consideration of possible deportation
can only benefit both the State and noncitizen
defendants during the plea-bargaining process. By
bringing deportation consequences into this process,
the defense and prosecution may well be able to
reach agreements that better satisfy the interests of
both parties. As in this case, a criminal episode
may provide the basis for multiple charges, of
which only a subset mandate deportation following
conviction. Counsel who possess the most
rudimentary understanding of the deportation
consequences of a particular criminal offense may
be able to plea bargain creatively with the
prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and
sentence that reduces the likelihood of deportation,
as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that
automatically triggers the removal consequence.
At the same time, the threat of deportation may
provide the defendant with a powerful incentive to
plead guilty to an offense that does not mandate that
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See, e.g., Kathy Brady and Angie Junck, How Much to Advise: What are the
Requirements of Padilla v. Kentucky (Practice Advisory published by the Defending Immigrants
Partnership, April 20, 2010 http://immigrantdefenseproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/07/how_much_to_advise.pdf (last visited May 25, 2021).
144

In my experience, this is often the most important consideration for many non-citizen

clients.
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penalty in exchange for a dismissal of a charge that
does.145
Immigration Implications
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)146 has held that a
successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim that results in the
vacatur of a conviction means that there is no longer a
“conviction” for immigration purposes.147 As a result, a client
who was deportable solely because of such a conviction is no
longer deportable. Padilla claims will therefore have large
consequences in both the criminal and immigration law realms.
Helpful Padilla Resources
Immigration Consequences of Criminal Activity, by Mary E.
Kramer. Ms. Kramer is an immigration and criminal defense
attorney practicing in Miami and has worked and written in this
area for years. Her book is published by the American
Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), and was last updated in
2021 (9th edition).
Norton Tooby is a California practitioner who has also practiced
and written extensively in this area for a number of years. He has
several publications, some oriented to California law and some
oriented to federal law. You can access those publications on his
website: http://nortontooby.com/.
Finally, there are a number of organizations who have developed
practice advisories on the Padilla decision and who generally have
resources available to help criminal defense lawyers in this area.
Some of those organizations are:
Immigrant Defense Project
https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/
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559 U.S. at 373.
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See section II.C.2., infra, for a discussion of the BIA.
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Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec. 878 (BIA 2006). Compare with Matter of
Pickering, 23 I&N Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), holding that a conviction that is vacated as the result of
post conviction events such as rehabilitation does not affect the immigration consequences of
that conviction.
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Immigrant Legal Resource Center
www.ilrc.org
National Immigration Project of the National Lawyers
Guild
www.nationalimmigrationproject.org
E.

General Immigration Resources.

The following is a non-exhaustive list of general immigration resources on immigration
and criminal law that practitioners may find useful. Because this area is becoming
increasingly important, new materials are appearing all the time, and practitioners are
encouraged to keep abreast of new publications and electronic resources.
Immigration and Nationality Act The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) is
codified in Title 8 of the United States Code. In addition to being available from the
usual sources, including online services such as Lexis and Westlaw, the Act is published
by a number of commercial publishers. Note that the section numbers of the Act and the
section numbers as codified in Title 8 of the United States Code are not numerically
identical.148 There is a version of the INA available on the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Service’s (USCIS) web page.149
Federal Regulations Regulations implementing the INA are scattered about various
titles of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.). Most relevant implementing
regulations are located in Title 8 of the C.F.R. Conveniently, the sections of the
regulations found in Title 8 of the C.F.R. match the sections of the INA that they
implement, at least for the most part.150 Thus, for example, the regulations
implementing § 212 of the INA are located at 8 C.F.R. § 212.
As with the Act itself, the USCIS website contains an accessible version of Title 8 of the
C.F.R. The Government Printing Office (GPO) publishes annually a hard copy version
of the C.F.R. However, as with the Act, the regulations are also available through
various commercial vendors. Some of the commercial versions of the C.F.R. are
updated more frequently than every year, and contain subject matter indices that are
helpful in locating pertinent sections.
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For example, § 212 of the Act deals with grounds of inadmissibility. However, in
Title 8 of the United States Code, § 212 of the Act is codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1182.
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https://www.uscis.gov/ (last visited May 28, 2021).
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On February 28, 2003, some of the C.F.R. provisions were relocated in connection
with the merger of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) into the Department
of Homeland Security. Those provisions remain in Title 8 of the C.F.R., but the section
numbers may not exactly correspond to the section numbers of the INA that they implement.
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Precedent Opinions of the Attorney General and Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
For many immigration cases, the BIA is the highest level of administrative review within
the Department of Justice. As a result, precedent decisions of the BIA are controlling
(absent any contrary opinions of a federal circuit court or the U.S. Supreme Court) on the
Service151 and on Immigration Judges. The Attorney General has the option of
“certifying” BIA decisions to his/her office and issuing opinions that carry more authority
than BIA decisions on the same topic.152
The BIA issues a number of decisions each year, but only those designated as
“precedent” opinions are published and binding agency-wide. Before January 1, 2001,
new precedent opinions were issued in slip opinion form, and given an interim number.
These opinions were called “interim decisions” and were initially cited by the number
given to each opinion.153 When these opinions were later issued in bound volumes, they
were called “I&N Decisions,” and were given a new citation.154 Since January 1, 2001,
BIA precedent decisions are given both an interim decision number and an I&N citation
when they are issued.155 In mid-2021, I&N decisions were being published in volume
28.
BIA decisions are available from many sources. Perhaps the most convenient is the
virtual library on the EOIR’s official website.156 Of course, BIA decisions are also
available through other online databases, such as Lexis and Westlaw.
Immigration Law and Crimes This very helpful one-volume treatise is published by the
Thomson/West Group and written by Dan Kesselbrenner and Lory D. Rosenberg. It
provides a thorough and thoughtful discussion of most of the general issues regarding
immigration consequences of criminal proceedings.
The term “Service,” includes all divisions of what was formerly Immigration and
Naturalization (INS), most of which are now a part of DHS. Today, those subdivisions include,
inter alia, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Border Protection (CBP).
151

152

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h). See, e.g., Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 271
(A.G.2018).
153

For example, the decision issued by the BIA on March 13, 1998, was initially cited
as follows: Matter of M-D-, Int. Dec. #3339 (BIA 1998).
154

The M-D- decision has been issued in the bound volume of BIA decisions and is now
correctly cited as follows: Matter of M-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1180 (BIA 1998).
155

As an example, the BIA decision in Matter of M-J-K, was issued by the BIA on June
29, 2016. The interim decision number of the case is 3866, but the official cite is 26 I&N Dec.
773 (BIA 2016).
156

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/ag-bia-decisions (last visited May 25, 2021).
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Bender’s Immigration Bulletin This publication by LexisNexis (Matthew Bender) is an
immigration periodical that is issued twice a month. It contains topical articles, columns
written by experienced immigration practitioners, news on recent immigration
developments, case digests, and Federal Register publications relating to immigration
law. Criminal law practitioners may find it helpful because it frequently contains
articles on issues involving immigration consequences of specific types of crimes.
Immigration Law and Procedure This is a multi-volume comprehensive treatise on
immigration law published by Matthew Bender under the auspices of Lexis-Nexis and
authored by Gordon, Mailman & Yale-Loehr. Many consider it to be the definitive
treatise on immigration law and procedure.
Kurzban’s Immigration Law Sourcebook This is essentially an annotated outline of
immigration law written by Ira Kurzban, a long-time immigration practitioner from
Miami. Because it is organized by topic and includes legal citations relating to specific
issues of immigration law, it is a good resource to help locate a quick answer to a specific
question. It is published by the American Immigration Council.
II.

IMMIGRATION AGENCY STRUCTURE.
A.

Historical Overview.

Before March 1, 2003, all matters relating to immigration of non-U.S. citizens were
handled by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). In the pre-March 1, 2003,
world, the United States Attorney General was charged with the administration and
enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and all other laws relating to
immigration and naturalization of aliens.157
On November 25, 2002, the Homeland Security Act of 2002158 became effective. That
Act effected a massive restructuring of the federal agencies administering the
immigration system in the United States. Most importantly, for purposes of this Guide,
it abolished the INS as of March 1, 2003.159 On that date, most of the responsibilities for

An “alien” is defined by the INA as any person who is not a citizen or national of the
United States. INA § 101(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3). A “national” of the U.S. is a person
who is either a U.S. citizen or who owes permanent allegiance to the U.S. INA § 101(a)(22), 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(22).
157

158

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, Nov. 25, 2002.

159

Although the INS officially ceased to exist as of March 1, 2003, even as of 2016,
retooling of that agency was still occurring. Thus, one still finds numerous references to the
INS in statutes, regulations, directives, etc. To address this problem, Congress included
transition and savings provisions in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 that provided that any
reference to the INS in statute, regulation, directive, etc., shall be deemed to refer to the
appropriate official or component of the new DHS. See §§ 1512(d) and 1517, Pub. L. No. 10764

administering immigration services and enforcement in the United States shifted to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the bureaus that operate under its aegis.
At this time, there are essentially four federal agencies that have responsibilities relating
to immigration: the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the
Department of State, and the Department of Labor. Most of the discussions in this
Guide will relate to the first three agencies.
An organizational chart for the DHS is found on its website.160 A brief description of
each federal entity involved with various functions of the former INS161 follows.
B.

The Department of Homeland Security.

This Department was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Title I, § 101.162
The Act gives the DHS broad authority to secure the borders and interior of the United
States against terrorist attacks. Section 102 of the Act163 provides that the DHS is to be
headed by a Secretary of Homeland Security, who is appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate.164
There are several bureaus under the DHS umbrella that have responsibilities over
immigration matters. Three are of particular interest: U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services.
1.

United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

As described on its website, the CBP’s mission is stated as follows: “To safeguard
America’s borders thereby protecting the public from dangerous people and
materials while enhancing the Nation’s global economic competitiveness by

296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002).
160

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0402_dhs-organizationalchart.pdf (last visited June 14, 2022).
161

The term of art used by most federal employees to refer to the former INS is “legacy

INS.”
162

Codified at 6 U.S.C. § 111. The DHS website is found at: http://www.dhs.gov/ (last
visited June 14, 2022).
163

6 U.S.C. § 112.

164

To determine who is the current Secretary of DHS, go to
https://www.dhs.gov/secretary (last visited June 14, 2022).
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enabling legitimate trade and travel..”165 What this means, among other things, is
that CBP inspects166 individuals who seek to enter the United States from
abroad.167 Thus, those seeking to enter the U.S. at any port of entry will be
questioned and inspected by employees of the CBP. It is they who will
determine if a non-citizen ought to be allowed to enter the U.S.168
2.

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

ICE describes its mission as follows: “[T]o promote homeland security and public
safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of federal laws governing
border control, customs, trade and immigration.”169 For immigration purposes, it
is in charge of interior enforcement of immigration laws. Because it is in charge
of interior enforcement, ICE, and specifically its Office of Enforcement and
Removal Operations, is the federal entity with which most immigrants in
Nebraska will find themselves dealing if they face or find themselves involved in
removal proceedings.170
Of greatest interest to Nebraska practitioners, ICE has its local presence primarily
in Omaha at the DHS facility.171 The address of that facility, which houses not
only local ICE personnel but also the Omaha United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) Field Office172 and the Omaha Immigration
Court,173 is 1717 Avenue H, Omaha, Nebraska 68110. There are also ICE
branch offices located in: Sioux City, Iowa; Cedar Rapids, Iowa; Grand Island,
Nebraska; and North Platte, Nebraska.
165

https://www.cbp.gov/about (last visited June 14, 2022).

“Inspect” is a term of art that means, in essence, that the CBP interviews those who
seek to enter the U.S. in order to determine if they have legal authority to enter and should be
admitted to the U.S.
166

167

In the pre-Homeland Security world, Customs Inspection was part of the Treasury
Department.
168

The CBP’s website is located at: www.cbp.gov/ (last visited June 14, 2022).

169

The ICE website is found at: www.ice.gov (last visited June 14, 2022).

170

See section IV., infra, for a discussion of removal terminology and procedure.

171

The Field Office to which the Omaha ICE office reports is the Minneapolis-St. Paul
Field Office located in Bloomington, Minnesota. See https://www.ice.gov/contact/field-offices
(last visited June 14, 2022) for a nation-wide listing of ICE Field Offices.
172

See section II.B.3, infra, for a discussion of USCIS.

173

See section II.C.1., infra, for a discussion of the Immigration Courts.
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At last check, there are three Assistant Field Office Directors for ICE in Nebraska
and Iowa. There are also 11 Supervisory Detention and Deportation Officers
who work under the Field Office Directors.
ICE also operates detention facilities across the U.S. in which those involved in
removal proceedings are held,174 either pending a hearing before an Immigration
Judge or following a hearing and pending removal from the United States.175 In
Nebraska, the three primary detention facilities are the Douglas County Jail in
Omaha, the Cass County Jail in Plattsmouth, and the Hall County Jail in Grand
Island.176
The local ICE offices also have one other category of employees who play a large
role in immigration proceedings, particularly removal proceedings. Those
individuals are trial attorneys who work for the Office of the Principal Legal
Advisor (OPLA) in the local Offices of Chief Counsel.177 Attorneys in the
Office of Chief Counsel represent ICE before the Immigration Judges and, in
general, prosecute removal proceedings on behalf of the government.178
Attorneys representing clients involved in removal proceedings interact frequently
with attorneys in the Office of Chief Counsel.
In the Omaha District ICE Office, Mr. Darrin Hetfield is currently the Deputy
Chief Counsel for ICE and presides over an office of several attorneys.
3.

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS).

Section 451 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 established, within DHS, a
bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services.179 The responsibility of the
USCIS is to process applications for immigration benefits filed by U.S. citizens or
non-citizens. For example, if a U.S. citizen marries a non-citizen and wishes to
get immigration benefits for the non-citizen spouse, she or he would file the
appropriate petition or application with the USCIS. Or if an employer wishes to
174

A listing of the major detention facilities operated by ICE is found at:
https://www.ice.gov/detention-facilities (last visited June 14, 2022).
175

See section IV., infra, for a discussion of removal proceedings.

176

Further information on each county jail, as an ICE detention facility, can be found on
the ICE website dealing with detention facilities cited above.
More information on OPLA can be found at its website: https://www.ice.gov/aboutice/opla (last visited June 14, 2022).
177

178

See section IV.B., infra., for a more detailed discussion of removal proceedings.

179

The website for the USCIS is found at: www.uscis.gov/ (last visited June 14, 2022).
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bring a non-citizen employee to the United States to work, the appropriate
petition/application would be filed with the USCIS.
a.

Service Centers.

There are five USCIS Service Centers and one National Benefits Center in
the United States. The Service Centers are located in: Mesquite, Texas;
Laguna Niguel, California; Saint Albans, Vermont; Arlington, Virginia;
and Lincoln, Nebraska. The National Benefits Center is located in Lee’s
Summit, Missouri. The Service Centers and Benefits Center receive the
vast majority of applications for benefits that are filed with the USCIS.
The staff at the Service Centers review the applications to make certain
that they warrant approval. In the event a follow-up, in-person interview
is required, Service Center staff forward applications to local USCIS field
offices.
It is important to note that the Service Centers and Benefits Center are
strictly “mail order” operations. They handle only applications that are
mailed in to them and are not accessible to the public in general.180
The jurisdictions of the Service Centers used to be divided along
geographic lines, but increasingly each Service Center is handling
certain types of applications, regardless of where the applicant lives within
the U.S.
The local field offices of the USCIS and the Service Centers are not in
close communication with each other, even if they are in close physical
proximity to one another. Therefore, clients who have problems with a
Service Center will need to address their concerns directly to the Service
Center –- the local field office normally will not be able to assist with such
problems. And the reverse is also true.
b.

District and Field Offices.

In 2003, USCIS inherited the field office structure of legacy INS, which
consisted of three regions and 33 districts nation-wide.181 However, in
November 2006, USCIS re-structured its field offices in an attempt to
distribute the workload more evenly among its offices nation-wide.182
Currently, the USCIS field office serving Nebraska immigrants is located
180

The volume of mail handled by each Service Center is mind-boggling. Reliable
reports are that each Center handles tens of thousands of pieces of mail each day.
181

See background information, 71 FR 67623 (November 22, 2006).

182

Id.
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in Omaha, Nebraska at 1717 Avenue H. The Omaha Field Office is
within the Kansas City District Office’s jurisdiction.183
The Omaha Field Office is where in-person interviews take place in
connection with applications for benefits. In such a case, an individual
goes to this office if she or he has received an appointment letter
instructing him or her to go to this office.
The Omaha Field Office also contains an Application Support Center
(ASC). The ASC is the division of USCIS that takes biometrics
(fingerprints and photographs) of individuals in connection with
applications for immigration benefits.
C.

Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).

The Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is a division of the United States
Department of Justice which has its headquarters in Falls Church, Virginia. It is headed
by a director. The EOIR is divided into several sub-organizations.184
The EOIR contains two major components that deal with immigration matters: the Office
of the Chief Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).185
1.

Office of the Chief Immigration Judge.

The Chief Immigration Judge is responsible for the general supervision, direction
and scheduling of the Immigration Judges.186 At the present time, there are
approximately 465 Immigration Judges who serve in various of the 69 different
Immigration Courts nation-wide.187

183

71 FR 67624 (November 22, 2006). The Kansas City District also contains the
USCIS field offices in Des Moines, Iowa; Kansas City, Missouri; St. Louis, Missouri; and St.
Paul, Minnesota.
184

A breakdown of the organizational structure of the EOIR is found at
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-organization-chart (last visited June 14, 2022).
185

There are other divisions of the EOIR that deal with immigration matters, but these
two divisions are most commonly encountered by those involved in criminal proceedings.
186

8 C.F.R. § 1003.9.

187

For a complete listing of all Immigration Courts and the Immigration Judges
assigned to each court, go to: https://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoir-immigration-court-listing (last
visited June 14, 2022).
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The Immigration Courts are essentially administrative trial courts in which
individuals appear who are facing removal from the United States. Once a
charging document is filed with an Immigration Judge by ICE, the Immigration
Judges have jurisdiction to determine whether or not a person is removable from
the U.S., and also have jurisdiction over most requests for relief from removal that
are asserted.188
The Immigration Judges also have jurisdiction to hear requests to reduce bonds
from those who are being held by ICE subject to posting a bond.189
2.

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).

The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), inter alia, hears appeals from most
decisions made by Immigration Judges.190 As such, it is the final administrative
level of consideration available in most cases in which the government seeks to
remove a non-citizen from the United States. The Board is currently comprised
of 23 permanent members and 8 temporary board members.191 There are also
Temporary Board members designated from time to time in order to alleviate the
workload of the regular Board members.192
The BIA can take summary action on appeals (either dismissing or affirming
them),193 can issue opinions that have no precedential value, or can issue
“precedent opinions,” which are binding on all Immigration Judges nation-wide
unless a Judge is deciding a case in a circuit where a U.S. Circuit Court has
established a contrary point of law.194 The BIA’s website includes a virtual law
library with a link to precedent decisions issued by the BIA.195

188

8 C.F.R. § 1003.14.

189

8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 236.1(d), 1236.1(d). See section IV.C., infra, for a more
complete discussion of bond issues in the immigration context.
190

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b).

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/board-of-immigration-appeals-bios (last visited July 19, 2022).
191

192

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(4).

193

Dismissing, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(2); affirming, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4).

194

8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g).

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Virtual Law Library,
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/virtual-law-library (last visited July 14, 2022).
195
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III.

DETERMINING THE IMMIGRATION STATUS OF CLIENTS.
A.

Generally.

In light of Padilla, every criminal law practitioner must now ascertain the immigration
status of each of his or her clients. Failure to make this fundamental inquiry would
certainly be Exhibit #1 in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by a client who was
not advised of possible immigration consequences of criminal proceedings.196
Attachment 2 is a questionnaire developed to gather information necessary not only to
determine the immigration status of a client, but also the information necessary to advise
a client of possible immigration consequences of criminal proceedings. If you gather the
information this questionnaire seeks, you should have most of the information necessary
to advise a client about possible immigration consequences of the charges he or she faces,
or to which he or she is contemplating pleading guilty.
Obviously, if a client is a U.S. citizen, then most of the issues discussed in this Guide are
not germane, since a criminal conviction carries no immigration consequences for U.S.
citizens.197 However, it is very important to inquire about a client’s immigration status
at the beginning of representation, since it could alter to a significant extent the strategy
employed in representing the client. The following sections discuss various categories
of immigration status.
Because there are so many different types of immigration statuses, it is impossible to
address all of them in the following sections of this Guide. I have attempted to list some
of the more common types of statuses, or at least those I believe may be most frequently
encountered by practitioners. However, practitioners should always ask to see all
documents relating to immigration status that a client may have, in order to determine

196

See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lavrinenko, 38 N.E.3d 278, 288-289 (Mass. 2015).

197

This technically is not true, although certainly a U.S. citizen cannot be removed from
the country as the result of criminal proceedings. However, the Adam Walsh Child Protection
and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 594 (July 27, 2006), provides, inter alia,
that U.S. citizens who have been convicted of a “specified offense against a minor” cannot
petition to bring a relative or fiancé to the U.S. unless there is a finding that such U.S. citizen
will pose no harm to such relative or fiancé. INA § 204(a)(1)(A)(viii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii); the list of offenses that will cause problems includes kidnapping (unless
committed by a parent or guardian); false imprisonment (unless committed by a parent or
guardian); solicitation to engage in sexual conduct; use of a child in a sexual performance;
solicitation to practice prostitution; video voyeurism as defined in 18 USC § 1801; possession,
production or distribution of child pornography; criminal sexual conduct; use of the Internet to
facilitate or attempt such criminal conduct; and any conduct that, by its nature, is a sex offense
against a minor. 42 U.S.C. §16911(7).
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whether a client has some sort of immigration status in the U.S. and, if so, what that
status is and how it might affect decisions to be made in the criminal case.198
It is possible that clients may have more than one immigration status at a time.199
Because the immigration consequences will affect some types of non-citizens more than
others, it is important to try to determine all immigration statuses of your clients. If you
have doubts about the implications of your clients’ immigration status(es), you should
consult with an immigration practitioner.
B.

United States Citizens.
1.

Overview.

As mentioned above, with the exception of Adam Walsh Act200 concerns, if your
client is a U.S. citizen, then you can put this Guide down and concentrate only on
the criminal aspects of the case. If the client is a U.S. citizen, then ICE cannot
remove him or her from the U.S. due to a criminal conviction.
There is an important qualification to the foregoing statement. Under certain
circumstances, a client who obtained U.S. citizenship through naturalization can
have their citizenship status revoked for reasons set forth in the Act.201 If your
client acquired their citizenship through naturalization, you should do some
further investigation to see if there is any risk that the criminal activity in which
they are alleged to have been involved might imperil their citizenship status.202

If your client is not on ICE’s radar screen, however, you should think long and hard
about trying to contact USCIS or ICE to request any of their documentation about the client. If
there are other ways to obtain immigration documentation about the client, they should be
explored before contacting the immigration authorities.
198

199

For example, a client may have an asylum claim pending but also be a recipient of
Temporary Protected Status. See sections III.H. and III.I.1., infra.
200

See footnote 197, supra.

201

INA § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451.

202

See, e.g., United States v. Nunez-Garcia, 31 F.4th 861, (4th Cir. 2022), in which a
naturalized citizen’s U.S. citizenship was revoked by the U.S. District Court as part of the federal
criminal conspiracy drug case in which he was convicted. The revocation was based on the fact
that the defendant had willfully misrepresented on his naturalization application that he had
never knowingly committed a crime or offense for which he had not been arrested when, in fact,
at the time he filled out his naturalization application, he knew that he had been engaged in drug
trafficking.
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2.

How to Determine if Your Client is a U.S. Citizen.

How do you know if your client is a U.S. citizen? U.S. citizenship can be
obtained in four main ways: (1) birth in the United States, (2) naturalization, (3)
derivatively through one’s parents, and (4) birth abroad if at least one parent was
a U.S. citizen. Each of these methods is discussed in greater detail below.203
While some of these contingencies may seem like they would happen
infrequently, you should make certain to ask your client about them –- they may
be more common than you think.
a.

Birth in the United States and Documents to Prove Status.

A person who is born in the United States204 who is subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States is a U.S. citizen.205 It does not matter
what the parents’ immigration status is; if the person is born in the U.S.
and is subject to its jurisdiction, that person is a U.S. citizen.206
Additionally, a person of unknown parentage found in the United States
while under five years of age (a “foundling”) is also a U.S. citizen, unless,
before such a person attains the age of 21, he or she is shown not to have
been born in the U.S.207
The most obvious way to prove birth in the U.S., and thus demonstrate
U.S. citizenship, is by producing a certified copy of a U.S. birth certificate.
A U.S. passport is also conclusive evidence of U.S. citizenship. There
203

Brent Wolzen, an immigration lawyer practicing in Lincoln, wrote an excellent
article on how to determine whether your client is a U.S. citizen. Brent’s article was published
in the October 2010 issue of The Nebraska Lawyer, which is available online. Brent Wolzen,
U.S. Citizens: Do We Know One When We See One?, Nebraska Lawyer (Oct. 2010),
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.nebar.com/resource/resmgr/nebraskalawyer_2010plus/2010/octobe
r/TNL-1010d.pdf (last visited June 16, 2022).
“United States,” when used in the Immigration and Nationality Act, includes the
continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
INA § 101(a)(38); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(38).
204

205

INA § 301(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a).

The language “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” in § 301(a) of the INA is meant to
exclude from citizenship those people born in the U.S. whose parent is a foreign diplomatic
officer accredited to the United States. Such people are lawful permanent residents but are not
U.S. citizens. 8 C.F.R. §§ 101.3, 1101.3.
206

207

INA § 301(f); 8 U.S.C. § 1401(f).

73

may also be other documents that can be used to demonstrate birth in the
U.S., but the nuances of secondary forms of proof are beyond the scope of
this Guide. However, if you believe that your client was born in the
United States, and is therefore a United States citizen, you should gather
all forms of proof that would tend to demonstrate that fact.
b.

Naturalization (and Documents).

Naturalization is the process by which people who were not U.S. citizens
at birth attain U.S. citizenship. Generally speaking, in order to obtain
U.S. citizenship through naturalization, a person must have been a
permanent resident (i.e., have had a “green card”) for a period of at least
five years (three years in the case where the person obtained permanent
residency as the result of marriage to a U.S. citizen) and must file an
application for citizenship with the USCIS.208
The qualifications for and steps involved in becoming a U.S. citizen
through naturalization are beyond the scope of this Guide. However,
once a person gains citizenship through naturalization, he or she will be
given a certificate of naturalization. Although an example of a certificate
of naturalization could formerly be found on the USCIS website, that is no
longer the case. However, if you do a Google search, you can find
websites that will give you examples of naturalization certificates.209
c.

Derivative Citizenship (and Documents).

The Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (CCA) became effective February 27,
2001.210 That Act, inter alia, amended section 320 of the INA211 by
allowing certain children born outside of the United States to obtain
citizenship automatically through their parents.212

208

The statutes dealing with naturalization are found in the INA beginning with § 310
(8 U.S.C. § 1421).
209

For example, https://www.immihelp.com/sample-certificate-of-naturalization-uscitizenship/ (last visited June 16, 2022).
210

Pub. L. No. 106-395, 114 Stat. 1631 (Oct. 30, 2000).

211

8 U.S.C. § 1431.

212

The USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 12, Part H, Chapter 4, has a chapter that
discusses the concept of derivative citizenship fully. The Policy Manual also has a chart that
helps to determine if a child has acquired citizenship after birth. https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/volume-12-part-h-chapter-4 (last visited June, 16, 2022).
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In order to benefit from the CCA, a child must meet the following
conditions:
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

At least one parent is a U.S. citizen (by birth or naturalization);
The child is under 18 years of age;
The child was lawfully admitted to the U.S. as a permanent
resident (i.e., has a “green card”) and is residing in the U.S. in the
legal and physical custody of the citizen parent; and
If the child is adopted, the adoption must be final.213

Most beneficiaries of this provision are foreign-born children who are
adopted by U.S. citizens and who enter the U.S. as permanent residents.
Such children automatically become U.S. citizens upon entry into the U.S.
under the above-referenced provisions.
Any child who met all these requirements as of the effective date of the
CCA (February 27, 2001) automatically obtained U.S. citizenship.
However, the Act is not effective retroactively, meaning that children
who met these requirements before the effective date of the CCA did
not automatically acquire citizenship as the result of its provisions.
Children who automatically acquire U.S. citizenship through their parents
may file Form N–600 with the USCIS to get a certificate of citizenship.
The certificate of citizenship looks very similar to the certificate of
naturalization.214 Such children may also obtain a U.S. passport
evidencing their citizenship status.
More information on the CCA can be found on the USCIS website.215
d.

Birth Abroad if at Least One Parent was a U.S. Citizen (and
Documents).

Some people who were not born on U.S. soil are U.S. citizens because one
or both of their parents were U.S. citizens. Therefore, even though a
child was born outside the United States, he or she may, in fact, be a U.S.
citizen, depending on the immigration status of his or her ancestors.

213

INA § 320, 8 U.S.C. § 1431.

214

An example can be found on the USCIS website:
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/guides/N-560.pdf (last visited June 16,
2022).
215

https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-h-chapter-4 (last visited June

16, 2022).
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The current statutory provisions governing the granting of U.S. citizenship
to children born outside of the U.S. are found at INA § 301(c), (d), (e), (g)
and (h).216 However, determination of whether a person born outside the
U.S. obtained U.S. citizenship through one of his or her parents is a
complex determination, because most often it depends upon the law of
U.S. citizenship that was in effect at the time of the person’s birth.217
As an example of how complex this area of law is, consider the
application of INA § 301(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(h), which became effective
on October 25, 1994, and applied retroactively.218 The purpose of this
amendment was to convey citizenship retroactively to any person born
outside of the United States before noon (EST) on May 24, 1934, to a U.S.
citizen mother and non-citizen father if, prior to the person’s birth, the
mother resided in the U.S.219 One effect of this amendment was to make
Winston Churchill a U.S. citizen retroactively, because his mother was a
U.S. citizen who resided in the United States before his birth.
To reiterate, it is important when determining whether a client might be a
U.S. citizen to go back several generations. If any of the person’s
ancestors were U.S. citizens, there is a possibility that the client, even
though born abroad, might be a U.S. citizen.
As with children who automatically acquire citizenship through their
parents, individuals who are U.S. citizens born abroad may either apply
for a certificate of citizenship through the USCIS, or for a U.S. passport or
some other government-issued document evidencing their U.S.
citizenship.
e.

Loss of Citizenship.

There are limited circumstances in which a person can renounce his or her
216

8 U.S.C. § 1401(c), (d), (e), (g) and (h).
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As in the case of derivative citizenship, the USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 12, Part
H, Chapter 3, and attendant charts, assist in determining if a person who was born outside of the
U.S. is a citizen. https://www.uscis.gov/policy-manual/volume-12-part-h-chapter-3 (last visited
June 16, 2022).
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See § 101, Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4305 (Oct. 25, 1994).
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Prior to the amendment, only U.S. citizen fathers could transmit citizenship to
children born before May 24, 1934, if such children were born outside the U.S. to one citizen
parent and one non-citizen parent. If the mother was the U.S. citizen and the father was the noncitizen parent, no such transmittal of citizenship could occur. See Wauchope v. U.S. Dep’t of
State, 985 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1993) for a discussion of this issue.
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citizenship, or it can be revoked.220 Although you may run into such a
case, the probability of encountering a client whose U.S. citizenship has
been renounced or revoked is very low. Generally speaking, it is much
easier for someone to lose his or her citizenship if it was acquired
derivatively or as the result of naturalization, rather than through birth in
the U.S.
Renunciation of citizenship is extremely rare and can only be
accomplished by committing one of the acts listed by statute.221 The
issue of renunciation usually would arise in connection with some
proceeding in which the person’s citizenship becomes an issue, and
normally would involve either the State Department or the DHS. Most
clients know if they have been the subject of renunciation proceedings.
Revocation, by contrast, is normally handled through the courts.
Generally speaking, a person’s citizenship can be revoked if that person,
during the course of naturalization proceedings, engaged in some sort of
fraud to obtain his or her citizenship, or was in some way ineligible for
citizenship.222 Again, most clients know if they have been the subject of
proceedings to revoke citizenship acquired through naturalization. But
ask, just to be sure.
C.

Legal Permanent Residents (and Documents).

A legal permanent resident (LPR) is a non-citizen who, in general, has the right to remain
in the U.S. for as long as she or he wishes. LPRs are entitled to work in the U.S.
incident to their status, meaning they do not need a separate document indicating their
right to work. There are many avenues by which a person can become an LPR, but the
LPRs most often encountered are ones who obtained their status as the result of a
qualifying relationship to a U.S. citizen or another LPR.
LPRs have many aliases: “permanent residents,” “permanent resident aliens,” “resident
aliens,” “green card holders,” and so forth. All of these phrases mean that the person is
an LPR.
Do not make the mistake of assuming that because the word “permanent” appears in the
220

However, as discussed earlier, that’s not to say it can never happen. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hamed, 976 F.3d 825 (8th Cir. 2020), where a person’s naturalized citizenship
was revoked because of misrepresentations he made on his application for naturalization.
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INA § 349(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a). One example of an act of renunciation is
obtaining naturalization in a foreign country after reaching the age of 18. INA § 349(a)(1), 8
U.S.C. § 1481(a)(1). Other acts are listed in the subsequent subsections of the statute.
222

INA § 340, 8 U.S.C. § 1451.
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title describing an LPR’s status, he or she cannot be deported from the U.S. Any person
who is not a citizen can, under certain circumstances, be deported -- even an LPR who
has lived virtually his or her entire life in this country. An LPR who has spent 50 years
in the U.S. but is convicted of a deportable criminal offense is in just as much peril of
being put into deportation proceedings as one who has lived here only five months. The
only way one can prevent deportation consequences is to become a U.S. citizen.
All LPRs will have a document they can show you to verify their status. That document
is the Permanent Resident Card. The current USCIS form number for the Permanent
Resident Card is I-551. Some clients may have the older version of the card, which is
legacy INS form I-151. However, only the I-551, containing an expiration date, is valid
proof of LPR status.223 Until 2010, the “green card” was not actually green. However,
the Department of Homeland Security now issues I-551 cards that are green in color,
perhaps as a concession to the I-551’s street name. Examples of “green cards,” both
historical and current, can be found on the USCIS website.224
The I-551 card has a metallic strip and is designed to function similarly to a credit card.
By scanning this card, immigration and law enforcement and service agencies are able to
learn information about the card holder through their computer database.
The information on the front of the Permanent Resident Card contains the client’s date of
birth, alien registration number (an eight-digit number preceded by the letter “A”), and
the date on which the Permanent Resident Card expires. It is important to understand
that, although a Permanent Resident Card is valid for only ten years at a time, once the
card expires it does not mean that the person loses her or his status as an LPR. It simply
means that the person needs to acquire an updated Permanent Resident Card in order to
have a current document verifying his or her status. LPR status can only be revoked as
the result of administrative proceedings that comply with statutory and regulatory
requirements and procedural due process – simple expiration of the Permanent Resident
Card is not sufficient to revoke someone’s LPR status.
D.

Conditional Permanent Residents (and Documents).

Some non-citizens are granted LPR status on a conditional basis, and are referred to as
Conditional Permanent Residents (CPRs). Such individuals have the same status as
LPRs for purposes of living and working in the U.S. These individuals are referred to as
“conditional” because they have been processed for permanent residence status within 24
months of their marriage to a U.S. citizen. The Immigration and Nationality Act
requires that such persons be given a conditional status, which the non-citizen and spouse
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See commentary at 72 FR 46922-01 (August 22, 2007).
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USCIS, Form I-9 Acceptable Documents, https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/form-i9-acceptable-documents (last visited June 16, 2022). USCIS began issuing a new version of the
“green card” on May 1, 2017.
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must jointly petition USCIS to remove at the end of the 24-month period. If the
condition is successfully removed, the person will become a full-fledged LPR.225
CPRs will also have a Permanent Resident Card, but the card will indicate on its face, at
least to the trained eye, that the bearer is merely a CPR. Probably the easiest way to tell
that someone is a CPR is to look at the expiration date on the Permanent Resident Card.
If the expiration date is two years from the date of issue, as opposed to 10 years, then the
person is a CPR.
Unlike non-conditional permanent residents, however, a CPR must timely petition to
remove the conditions on his or her status. If she or he does not, then his or her status is
revoked as of the second anniversary of his or her being granted CPR status.226 What
this means is that if you have a client whose Permanent Resident Card was only good for
two years after the date of issuance, and those two years have passed and the client does
not have a new green card, that client is likely out of status and subject to being removed
from the U.S. If the client is in removal proceedings due to his or her CPR status being
terminated, it is possible for the client to ask for the Immigration Judge to grant
permanent resident status as part of the relief sought in removal proceedings.227 If you
encounter a client in this situation, you should explore what the status of the removal
proceedings are, to determine if there is a possibility that his or her permanent resident
status may be granted by the Immigration Judge.
E.

Non-Immigrants (and Documents).

Non-immigrants are individuals who are in the U.S. on a temporary basis. Such
individuals are entitled to remain in the U.S. for as long as their status authorizes them to
be here. They are required to leave the U.S. once their status expires. They are not
entitled to remain in the U.S. on a permanent basis. Some non-immigrants are entitled to
work and some are not -- it depends on what category of non-immigrant a person is.
There are a number of non-immigrant categories under the INA.228 Examples include
tourists, business visitors, professionals employed as temporary workers, students,
fiancées of U.S. citizens, performers, foreign government representatives, certain witness
informants, trafficking victims, victims of certain types of criminal activity, certain
family members of LPRs who have been waiting more than three years for an entry visa,
and so forth.
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See INA § 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a; 8 C.F.R. Parts 216 and 1216.
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INA § 216(c)(2)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(A).
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INA § 216(c)(2)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(B).
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See INA § 101(a)(15), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15), for a list of non-immigrant categories.
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In the old days, non-immigrants were issued a paper Form I-94 by the CBP at the time
they entered the U.S. The I-94 is frequently referred to as an “Arrival/Departure
Record.” The date and place of admission, the status in which the person was admitted,
and the date until which the person has been given permission to remain in the U.S. all
appeared in the upper right section of the paper I-94. Today, however, all of the arrival
and departure information is stored electronically and can be accessed online.229
Non-immigrants from Mexico may also have a Border Crossing Card (BCC), sometimes
referred to as a “laser visa.” Border Crossing Cards allow their holders to enter the U.S.
without obtaining an I-94 if they remain within 25 miles of the U.S./Mexican border upon
entry (55 miles in New Mexico and 75 miles in Arizona).230 An example of a BCC can
be found on page 9 of a 2012 CBP publication entitled CBP Rail APIS Document
Guidance.231 Although on their faces, BCCs state that they are valid for 10 years at a
time; this does not mean that the holder can remain in the U.S. for 10 years. In fact,
BCCs allow the holder to remain in the U.S. only for periods of up to 30 days at a time
after which they must leave the U.S.232
F.

Parolees (and Documents).

At present, there are two main types of parole: (1) so-called humanitarian parole and (2)
parole in place (PIP).233
Humanitarian parole. One who has been granted humanitarian parole has been allowed
to enter the U.S. physically, but under the law, the person has not effected an “entry” as
defined in the INA.234 As the cited statute indicates, the benefit of humanitarian parole
229

A more complete description of how the I-94 information is now stored and accessed
can be found on the CBP website: U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Arrival/Departure Forms:
I-94 and I-94W, https://www.cbp.gov/travel/international-visitors/i-94 (last visited June 16,
2022).
230

8 C.F.R. § 235.1(h)(1)(iii).

231

U.S. Customs & Border Protection, CBP Rail APIS Document Guidance,
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/apis_doc_3.pdf (last visited June 16, 2022).
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8 C.F.R. § 235.1(h)(1)(iii). As seen from the regulation, under some circumstances
the period of authorized stay is as short as 72 hours.
233

As of the date of the latest version of this Guide (June, 2022), blanket grants of
parole are being used for two main categories of non-citizens: Afghan evacuees who were
brought to the U.S. in the wake of the U.S. troop pullout in Afghanistan in 2021, and Ukrainian
citizens who have left Ukraine in the wake of the Russian invasion of their country. Both
groups have received the status of parolees for a period of two years from the date of their entry.
234

INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).
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is extended only in cases involving urgent humanitarian concerns or significant public
benefit.235 And once the purpose of the parole is served, the non-citizen must leave the
U.S.
Parole in place (PIP). This is a much newer form of parole, and is available to spouses,
minor children and parents of U.S. citizen military personnel. The benefit of PIP is to
allow military family members the ability to adjust status from within the U.S. if they
were not admitted pursuant to law.236 A qualifying family member of a U.S. citizen
military member can ask for PIP in order to achieve lawful permanent resident status
while remaining physically inside the U.S.237
One who has been paroled into the U.S. will have a document issued by the CBP
indicating she or he was given parole.
G.

Refugees (and Documents).

Technically, refugees are a category of non-immigrants.238 However, they are discussed
separately here because of their unique situation.
Refugees are people who have been identified as victims of persecution in their home
countries on account of their race, religion, national origin, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion.239 This determination is made by the U.S. government
before entry into the U.S. Refugees thus enter the U.S. with the status of a “refugee,”
which is a term of art under the INA. Refugees are entitled to adjust their status to that
of an LPR once they have resided in the U.S. for at least one year.240
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An example of when parole would normally be granted is to allow a non-citizen to
undergo necessary medical treatment.
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Under INA § 245(a) (8 U.S.C. § 155(a)), a person cannot apply to become a
permanent resident while remaining in the U.S. unless he or she was “inspected and admitted or
paroled into the United States. . .”
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A detailed discussion of PIP can be found in the USCIS policy memo implementing
it: USCIS, Discretionary Options for Military Members, Enlistees and Their Families,
https://www.uscis.gov/military/discretionary-options-for-military-members-enlistees-and-theirfamilies (last visited June 16, 2022).
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In the world of immigration law, there are only two types of non-citizens:
immigrants and non-immigrants.
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INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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INA § 209, 8 U.S.C. § 1159.
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Persons who enter the U.S. as refugees are issued Form I-94 by the admitting CBP officer
on which is stamped: “Admitted as a Refugee Pursuant to section 207 of the Act. If
you depart the United States you will need prior permission to return. EMPLOYMENT
AUTHORIZED.”241
H.

Asylees (and Documents).

As with refugees, asylees are technically non-immigrants. These are people who
initially enter the U.S., either with or without documentation, and then assert that they
qualify for asylum as the result of fitting the definition of “refugee” found in INA
§ 101(a)(42).242 If they can prove this assertion they are granted asylum and have the
status of “asylee.”
There are two methods by which a person may be granted asylee status, and therefore two
different types of documents that you should look for to verify this status.
1.

Affirmative Asylum Recipients (and Documents).

A person seeking asylum can file an “affirmative” asylum application with
USCIS.243 That application is eventually assigned to an asylum officer with the
USCIS, who conducts an interview with the applicant and renders a decision on
the application. If the applicant is granted asylum status, she or he will have one
and possibly two documents evidencing that fact. First, the client should have a
written decision issued by the asylum officer stating that the client was granted
asylum.244 Second, the client may have an employment authorization document
241

See, e.g., Handbook for Employers, Section 6.3 https://www.uscis.gov/i-9central/handbook-for-employers-m-274/60-evidence-of-status-for-certain-categories/63refugees-and-asylees (last visited June 16, 2022). The I-94 may also say “Paroled as a Refugee.
. .” because in the past ICE considered that some refugees were merely paroled into the U.S. and
not actually “admitted.” The BIA has held, however, that since 1997 all refugees are “admitted”
and not paroled into the U.S. Matter of D-K-, 25 I&N Dec. 761 (BIA 2012).
242

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
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An asylum application is filed on USCIS Form I-589. A complete list of USCIS
forms and instructions for completing them can be found on the USCIS website.
https://www.uscis.gov/forms/all-forms (last visited June 16, 2022).
An asylum recipient’s immediate family members (spouse and minor [under age 21
and unmarried] children) may apply for and receive derivative asylum status through the
recipient. This can be done either at the same time the principal applicant requests asylum or
after the principal is granted asylum. If the family members are in the U.S. and included on the
principal applicant’s I-589, then they will receive derivative asylum status once the principal’s
application is approved. If the family members are abroad, the principal applicant files USCIS
Form I-730 to bring them to the U.S. as derivative asylees. In such case, the documents of the
family members would look slightly different from that of the principal recipient, but they
244
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(EAD). Although asylees are authorized to work in the U.S. incident to their
status as asylees,245 many of them apply for and receive an EAD as evidence of
their status and right to work. The document also serves the dual purpose of
being a government-issued photo i.d., which clients find helpful to have. An
example of an EAD can be found on the USCIS website listing types of
documents acceptable for verifying employment authorization in the U.S.246
2.

Defensive Asylum Recipients (and Documents).

Asylum applications can also be pursued before Immigration Judges in the
context of removal proceedings. Asylum is one form of relief from removal that
eligible clients may seek.247
If a client is successful in pursuing a defensive asylum application, she or he will
have a copy of the Immigration Judge’s decision granting asylum, which will take
the form of a boilerplate court order with the appropriate boxes checked, and
signed by the Immigration Judge. As with affirmative asylum recipients, clients
who have received asylum from an Immigration Judge may also have an EAD
indicating that they are asylum recipients.
I.

Special Categories.

There are several different programs administered by the USCIS that allow non-citizens
to remain in the U.S. and, in some cases, receive employment authorization, but do not
grant them any “official” immigration status. Some of those programs are discussed
below.

nonetheless should clearly indicate that the bearer has the status of an asylee.
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8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(5).
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USCIS, Form I-9 Acceptable Documents, https://www.uscis.gov/i-9-central/form-i9-acceptable-documents (last visited June 16, 2022). EADs are granted to individuals who fall
into one of the regulatory “pigeon holes” authorizing them to work. For example, a person who
has been granted asylum is authorized to work pursuant to the provisions in 8 C.F.R. §
274a.12(a)(5). That regulatory reference appears on the EAD issued to such a person. If a
client has an EAD, you can therefore get a clue as to the immigration status of the client by
looking at the regulatory category listed on the EAD.
247

Relief from removal is akin to an affirmative defense to a removal proceeding. If
the immigrant is successful in obtaining relief from removal, that will prevent his or her
deportation. Relief from removal works procedurally much like an affirmative defense in the
sense that the immigrant has the burden of pleading and proving eligibility for the particular
form of relief from removal she or he seeks.
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1.

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) (and Documents).

The Temporary Protected Status program allows the Secretary of the Department
of Homeland Security to permit non-citizen nationals from designated countries to
remain in the U.S. on a temporary basis until it is safe for such persons to return
to their home countries.248 Generally speaking, countries are designated by the
Secretary because of ongoing armed conflict, natural disaster, or some other such
condition.249
Clients who have received a grant of TPS are authorized to remain in the U.S.
until the Secretary terminates the TPS designation for their country, and are
authorized to work.250 However, such individuals do not receive any sort of
permanent permission to remain in the U.S. At such time as the TPS designation
is either terminated or allowed to expire by the Secretary, such TPS recipients
must leave the U.S.251
Clients who are granted TPS receive written notification of such a grant. The
form on which a client requests TPS is USCIS Form I-821, so the written
approval notice will mention approval of that form. Additionally, TPS recipients
will usually have an EAD. The category on the EAD indicating that the client is
a TPS recipient is § 274a.12(a)(12).
If you have a client who has received TPS, you must analyze his or her case
differently in terms of deportation risks from other clients. TPS recipients
will lose their TPS status if they are convicted of (1) any felony, (2) two or
more misdemeanors, or (3) a “particularly serious crime.”252
2.

Applicants for Immigration Benefits (and Documents).

As a general proposition, most non-citizens who have applied for immigration
248

See INA § 244, 8 U.S.C. § 1254, for a general description of the TPS program.
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In the case of Haitians, for example, TPS status was initially granted in January,
2010, because of the damage wrought by the earthquakes in that country. As of the date of the
latest revision to this Guide, TPS has again been made available to Haitians, as well as to
Ukrainians and other countries currently on the USCIS website.
250

INA § 244(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(f).

251

A current list of countries that have received TPS designation by the Secretary can
be found on the USCIS website: USCIS, Temporary Protected Status,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited June 16, 2022).
252

INA § 244(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 154a(c)(2)(B). See section V.E.2., infra, for a
discussion of what constitutes a “particularly serious crime.”
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benefits are permitted to remain in the U.S. until the USCIS adjudicates their
eligibility for the immigration benefits for which they have applied. Examples
are clients who have applied for adjustment of status (inter alia, those who have
married U.S. citizens and have applied to get their green cards), those who have
filed applications for asylum, and those who have filed applications for benefits
under the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA),253 among
others. The mere filing of an application for immigration benefits does not
confer immigration status on a client, but again, as a practical matter, most clients
are permitted to remain in the U.S. until the benefit application is adjudicated.
If a client has filed an application for immigration benefits, she or he should have
a receipt from the USCIS (USCIS Form I-797C) indicating that the application
has been received. An example of a receipt notice can no longer be found on the
USCIS website, but can be found with a Google search.254 In some cases, an
applicant for benefits is authorized to seek employment authorization and will
have an EAD.255
3.

Deferred Action Recipients (and Documents).

Deferred action is essentially a grant of administrative discretion by which an
otherwise removable non-citizen will not be removed from the U.S. Those who
are granted deferred action do not have any sort of permanent status, but even
though they are otherwise removable from the U.S., they will not be removed. In
addition, they are eligible to apply for work authorization.256
The current state of deferred action is, to put it charitably, in disarray. A memo
from DHS addressing the issue of deferred action was issued on November 20,
2014, by the Secretary of DHS. In this memo, the Secretary briefly reviews the
history of deferred action.257 Since granting deferred action is a matter of
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Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2193 (Nov. 19, 1997).
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See, for example, Lirian J. Rosenfeld, Getting Your Green Card - I-797 Approval
Notice Stage, PassRight, https://www.passright.com/green-card-i797-approval-notice/ (last
visited June 16, 2022).
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For example, applicants for adjustment of status may receive employment
authorization pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(9). Applicants for NACARA benefits can
receive employment authorization under § 274a.12(c)(10). Applicants for asylum can, after
their applications have been pending for at least 150 days, receive employment authorization
under § 274a.12(c)(8).
256

8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).

U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to Certain Individuals
Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents,
257
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discretion, there was historically no official form on which application for it was
made. Instead, the request for deferred action was, in most cases, directed to the
local district director of the USCIS or ICE.258 That is still the case with
“generic” forms of deferred action, but other types of deferred action have
become more formalized.
a.

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA).

Given how much it has been in the news for the past several years, this is
probably the most well-known type of “formal” deferred action. It was
established in 2012, and essentially amounts to a grant of deferred action
to a group of individuals who have been deemed to be of very low priority
for removal from the U.S.
DACA recipients request deferred action by filing USCIS Form I-821D.
A grant of DACA deferred action is indicated on USCIS Form I-797,
which looks much like the receipt notice, Form I797C, discussed in the
previous section of this Guide. In addition, DACA recipients are eligible
to receive an EAD, with category (c)(14) indicated on the face of the
EAD.
The details of the DACA program, together with the application process,
are available on the USCIS website.259
As with TPS recipients, if your client is a DACA recipient, the
immigration consequences of any criminal convictions must be analyzed
differently. DACA recipients can lose their status if they are convicted at
any time of a felony, a “significant misdemeanor,” or of three or more
misdemeanors of any type. They can also lose their status if they
otherwise pose a threat to national security or public safety.260
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action_1.pdf (last
visited June 16, 2022). The memorandum, along with the companion enforcement priority
memo issued by Secretary Johnson on the same day, are must-reads, not only because of the
background they give of deferred action, but also because of the discussion of ICE’s current
removal priorities. As mentioned earlier (see discussion in section I.B.1, supra), the parameters
of prosecutorial discretion are ever-changing, whether as the result of a change in administrative
policy or litigation.
258

Legacy INS used to have an Operations Instruction (O.I. 244.1a(22)) setting forth
guidelines to consider in determining whether to grant deferred action. Although that O.I. was
repealed in 1997, deferred action still exists.
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USCIS, Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA),
https://www.uscis.gov/DACA (last visited June 14, 2022).
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As set forth on the website cited in the previous footnote, for purposes of DACA, a
86

b.

VAWA Deferred Action.

If an abused spouse, child or parent of an LPR files a self-petition in order
to obtain permanent resident status on his or her own, without the
assistance of the abuser,261 and if the petition is approved but the
petitioning victim cannot immediately obtain a permanent resident card
because a visa number is not available due to visa quota limits,262 USCIS
will normally grant the beneficiaries of such petitions deferred action and
employment authorization until a visa number becomes available to the
VAWA recipient.263 A recipient of this type of deferred action will also
have a Form I-797, indicating that she has been granted deferred action.
She may also have an EAD under category (c)(14).
c.

Prosecutorial Discretion/Administrative Closure.

Another type of case in which it used to be possible to see a grant of
deferred action were cases in which a client in removal proceedings had
been granted prosecutorial discretion/administrative closure by ICE. The
contours of this type of deferred action were discussed in the priorities
enforcement memo issued by DHS Secretary Johnson on November 20,
2014. However, by virtue of President Trump’s Executive Order 13768,
issued on January 25, 2017,264 former Secretary Johnson’s memo has been
“significant misdemeanor” is a crime that is a misdemeanor as defined by federal law
(specifically, one for which the maximum term of imprisonment authorized is one year or less
but greater than five days) and (1) regardless of the sentence imposed, is an offense of domestic
violence, sexual abuse or exploitation, burglary, unlawful possession or use of a firearm, drug
distribution or trafficking, or, driving under the influence; or (2) if not an offense listed in (1)
above, is one for which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of more than 90 days.
The sentence must involve time to be served in custody, and therefore does not include a
suspended sentence.
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See INA § 204(a)(1)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(B)(ii).
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This would only be the case where the abusing spouse or parent is a LPR, since there
is no visa waiting period for spouses or minor children of U.S. citizens.
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INA § 204(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II). See also the very brief
explanation under the “Working in the United States” tab on the USCIS VAWA site: USCIS,
Battered Spouse, Children and Parents, https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/battered-spousechildren-and-parents (last visited June 16, 2022).
Although this proposed amendment to the Adjudicator’s Field Manual has not been formally
adopted, it is still USCIS’ policy to grant deferred action to LPR VAWA applicants.
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82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
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rescinded. On April 23, 2022, ICE’s Office of Principal Legal Advisor
(OPLA), issued a memorandum regarding ICE’s new enforcement and
removal priorities.265 As you can see, the status of deferred action, as it
relates to enforcement priorities of ICE, varies widely depending on who
is running the show.
One form that prosecutorial discretion has taken with respect to clients
involved in removal proceedings is “administrative closure.” Under this
arrangement, an immigration judge could order a case to be
administratively closed, meaning that it would remain pending on the
court’s docket, but would be in a state of perpetual continuance – in other
words, it would not be put back on the court’s active docket absent an
affirmative order from the court. However, the status of administrative
closure was dealt a severe blow as the result of a decision authored by
Attorney General Sessions in Matter of Castro-Tum.266 In that opinion,
the Attorney General found no legal authority for the general program of
administrative closure, and forbade Immigration Judges from granting
administrative closure except in cases where it is authorized by a
regulation or a previously judicially-approved settlement agreement.
Attorney General Merrick Garland, however, vacated the Castro-Tum
opinion,267 and therefore the standards for granting administrative closure
have reverted to what they were before Castro-Tum was decided.
As with TPS recipients, it is important to analyze the immigration
risks of criminal proceedings differently for this group than for other
types of non-citizens. Since the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is,
well, discretionary, it is likely that any type of criminal conviction will
imperil the ability of someone to continue to receive deferred action as the
result of prosecutorial discretion or administrative closure.
Recipients of deferred action should have a letter or some sort of
communication from ICE stating that they have been approved for
deferred action. Additionally, most recipients of deferred action will
have an EAD, with the category (c)(14) noted on the EAD.
Recipients of administrative closure should have a copy of an Immigration
Judge’s order granting them administrative closure. In such cases, it is
important to determine what type of relief from removal, if any, those
clients had pending when their removal cases were administratively
265

https://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/opla/OPLA-immigrationenforcement_guidanceApr2022.pdf (last visited June 14, 2022).
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27 I&N Dec. 271 (AG 2018).
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Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326 (AG 2021).
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closed. For example, some clients may have been pursuing defensive
asylum claims when their removal cases were administratively closed. In
such cases, you will need to be sensitive to the way in which a criminal
case will affect their continued ability to pursue their asylum case (along
with the attendant employment authorization).
4.

Voluntary Departure Recipients (and Documents).

Non-citizens may be granted voluntary departure, either before removal
proceedings are commenced against them, during proceedings, or at the
conclusion of proceedings.268 Those granted voluntary departure have agreed to
depart the U.S. by a certain date, in lieu of either being placed into removal
proceedings or in lieu of having a removal order entered against them. A grant
of voluntary departure is advantageous to most non-citizens since being placed in
removal proceedings or being ordered removed by the Immigration Court carries
certain penalties with regard to future attempts to enter the U.S.269 Leaving as a
result of voluntary departure carries fewer, if any, such penalties.
Those who have been granted voluntary departure will have some type of
documentation of that fact, either issued by a USCIS or ICE officer, or perhaps by
an Immigration Judge. Most of those granted voluntary departure are not eligible
to receive an EAD.270
5.

Cancellation of Removal Recipients (and Documents).

Certain non-citizens who are in the U.S. without documentation are eligible, in
the course of removal proceedings,271 to apply for a form of relief from removal
called “Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain
Nonpermanent Residents.”272 Available solely as a defense to removal
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INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c.

269

For example, a non-citizen in the U.S. who is ordered removed generally is barred
from re-entering the U.S. for a period of 10 years. INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).
Individuals granted “extended” voluntary departure or voluntary departure under the
Family Unity Program are eligible to receive an employment authorization document. See 8
C.F.R. § 274a.12(a)(11) and (13).
270

271

Removal proceedings used to be called deportation or exclusion proceedings,
depending on the client’s status at the time such proceedings were begun. See the discussion at
section IV.A.1., infra.
272

INA § 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
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proceedings, this relief, if granted, confers permanent resident status on a
previously undocumented person.273
A previously undocumented person who has received a grant of cancellation of
removal will have a written decision from an Immigration Judge granting such
relief. As mentioned earlier, the grant of relief makes the person an LPR. The
format of the written decision will be similar, if not identical, to that of a written
decision granting a defensive asylum application.274 Eventually, the person will
receive a Permanent Resident Card (I-551), but that may take some time to
process administratively after the hearing before the Immigration Judge.
Because a non-citizen is authorized to work incident to status as an LPR, she or he
cannot obtain an EAD. The person may have an EAD in his or her possession
that was issued while the cancellation application was pending. If so, the
regulatory category on the EAD would be § 274a.12(c)(10).
6.

Those Released on Orders of Supervision (OSUP) (and Documents).

Some respondents who have been in removal proceedings have had final orders of
removal entered against them, but nevertheless cannot be removed to their home
country by ICE, normally because ICE cannot secure travel documents from the
appropriate foreign governments. Clients from South Sudan, Laos, and Somalia
are examples of those who may face this situation, because governments of those
countries either repatriate very few of their citizens each year from the U.S., or
repatriate none at all.
Some in this situation are eligible for release from ICE custody under what ICE
calls an “order of supervision (OSUP).”275 This is similar to an OR bond in the
criminal context –- such individuals are released into the community but are
required to report to ICE on a periodic basis so that ICE can keep track of them.
Individuals who have been released under orders of supervision are authorized to
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There is also a form of cancellation relief available to permanent residents who are in
removal proceedings. See INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). That type of cancellation is
not discussed here since, if a permanent resident receives this type of relief, she or he will simply
maintain status as a permanent resident and therefore will have an I-551 (“green card”) to
document that status.
274

See section III.H.2., supra.
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INA § 241(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3). See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678
(2001), for a discussion of the constitutional limitations on indefinite detention of individuals
who cannot be removed to their home countries. See also Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596
U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 1827 (2022), holding that there is no statutory requirement to give a
respondent a bond hearing once they have been held for at least six months.
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apply for an EAD.276 Obviously, such persons have no formal immigration
status in the U.S., but are here simply until such time as their removal from the
U.S. can be accomplished.
Individuals released under orders of supervision will have some documentation
from ICE granting their request to be released. Also, as indicated above, they
will likely have an EAD with the regulatory category of § 274a.12(c)(18).
The analysis of immigration consequences of criminal convictions for those in
this category is different than that for other types of non-citizens. Since
those who have received an OSUP from ICE must check in with ICE periodically,
ICE will monitor their criminal history. Any type of conviction may jeopardize
their ability to remain out of custody on an OSUP.
7.

Individuals Granted Stays of Removal (and Documents).

There are several scenarios in which a non-citizen might have been ordered
removed from the U.S., but is the beneficiary of a stay of the removal order.
Some examples follow.
--A respondent in removal proceedings who has received a negative
decision from an Immigration Judge has the right to file an appeal to the
BIA, which, in most cases, is the last stop administratively.277 In such
instances, there is an automatic stay of removal pending decision of the
case by the BIA.278
--Respondents who are appealing removal orders to federal court or who
are challenging removal orders in some way other than by direct appeal
can apply to such courts for stays of execution of the removal order until
the case is decided.
--Local directors of ICE have authority to grant administrative stays of
removal, usually where significant humanitarian concerns are present.279
Obviously, since respondents can be the beneficiaries of stays of removal in many
different ways, they could have different documents. And just as obviously,
276

8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(18).
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8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b). Decisions of the BIA may be referred to the U.S. Attorney
General for further review, (8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)).
278

8 C.F.R. § 1003.6.

279

8 C.F.R. §§ 241.6, 1241.6. Recipients of prosecutorial discretion, discussed in
section III.I.3.c., supra, may have been granted stays of removal.
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being the beneficiary of a stay of removal does not grant someone any long-term
immigration status in the U.S.
J.

Undocumented Individuals.

These are individuals who have either entered the U.S. without any documentation at all,
without proper documentation, or who initially entered the U.S. with proper
documentation but have remained beyond the period they were authorized to stay in the
U.S.280
A frequently-encountered acronym in the area of undocumented individuals is “EWI.”
These initials stand for “entry without inspection,” and are used to describe those
individuals who physically entered the U.S. without documents and without being
inspected and admitted by a CBP officer at the time of their physical entry.
Obviously, undocumented individuals who entered without inspection will have no
legitimate documentation of any kind to verify their status.281 If they entered with
inspection but have remained beyond the time authorized, they will have documents that,
on their face, indicate their status has expired. Such individuals are subject to being
removed from the U.S. at any time.
IV.

REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS.
A.

History and Terminology.

The purpose of this section of the Guide is not to turn criminal practitioners into
immigration lawyers. Rather, it is to provide some general background and information
on the workings of the U.S. immigration system regarding removal proceedings.
Hopefully this information will assist criminal law practitioners in advising their nonU.S. citizen clients.
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An example of this last category is a visitor who remains in the U.S. after the period
of authorized stay indicated on his or her I-94. In terms of non-immigrants, in most cases the
date by which the person must leave the U.S. is indicated on the I-94, which is the document
given to the person by a CBP officer at the time of entry into the U.S. A visa (which appears in
a non-citizen’s passport and which is issued by a U.S. consular officer abroad) is like a
permission slip to seek admission to the U.S. The visa may be good for several years beyond its
issuance date, but that does not mean the non-immigrant is authorized to stay in the U.S. until the
visa expires – that date is found on the I-94.
281

But they may very well have illegitimate documents indicating that they have some
status, either because the documents belong to someone else who has status, or because the
documents are fabricated. Depending on the quality of such documents and the honesty of the
client, you may not know that they are without documentation. So you have to ask and hope
they tell you the truth.
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1.

Historical Forerunners of Removal Proceedings.

As discussed earlier,282 Congress made two massive changes to the INA in 1996:
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA). Those
two Acts, especially IIRIRA, changed both substantive law and terminology in
the area of removal proceedings. Before IIRIRA was enacted, there were
essentially two types of proceedings in which legacy INS sought either to exclude
non-citizens from the U.S. or deport those who were already here: exclusion
proceedings and deportation proceedings.
a.

Exclusion Proceedings.

In exclusion proceedings, legacy INS sought to exclude people from the
U.S. who were seeking entry into the country. These proceedings were
used if a person had not yet physically entered the U.S. In essence,
exclusion proceedings were used to keep people out who were at ports of
entry but whom legacy INS believed were excludable because a provision
of law did not permit them to enter the U.S.283 Exclusion proceedings
were also used in cases where immigrants had been paroled into the U.S.
but had not been formally admitted.284 In such cases, parolees were not
considered to have effected an entry into the U.S. and were therefore
subject to exclusion proceedings. Although non-citizens were entitled to
hearings in exclusion proceedings, the procedural safeguards were not as
stringent as those in deportation proceedings, since such non-citizens had
not yet entered the U.S.
b.

Deportation Proceedings.

The second type of proceeding was known as a deportation proceeding, in
which legacy INS sought to deport someone from the U.S. who had
already physically entered the country. Thus, people who were
physically present in the U.S., regardless of whether they had entered
legally or not, were put into deportation proceedings if they were
deportable under existing law.285 One who had physically entered the
282

See section I.B.1., supra.
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The grounds of exclusion were formerly found in § 212(a) of the INA (8 U.S.C.
§ 1182), and included things such as certain communicable diseases, certain crimes, being Nazi
persecutors, and so forth.
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See section III.F., supra, for a discussion of the concept of “parole.”
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The grounds of deportation in the statute, then found at § 241 of the INA (8 U.S.C.
§ 1251), included those who had entered the U.S. without documents, those who had been
convicted of certain crimes, those who had overstayed their periods of authorized stay, and so
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U.S. and who was deportable was entitled to a deportation proceeding
regardless of how many times she or he had previously been deported.
Deportation proceedings, although still administrative proceedings, were
more formal procedurally than exclusion proceedings, and afforded
respondents more due process rights than did exclusion proceedings.
2.

Current Terminology.

Since April 1, 1997, all proceedings either to keep someone out of the U.S. who
wants to enter or to remove someone who has already entered are called by one
name: “removal” proceedings.286 Although IIRIRA was signed into law on
September 30, 1996, most of its provisions did not become effective until April 1,
1997. Therefore, generally speaking, pre-IIRIRA law applies to clients whose
exclusion or deportation cases were filed before April 1, 1997, and post-IIRIRA
law applies to clients whose removal cases were initiated on or after April 1,
1997. The discussion in later sections of this Guide is based on post-IIRIRA law.
Why bother with this discussion? Because, although proceedings now have only
one name, there are still substantive differences between grounds that make a
person “inadmissible” (i.e., a person who either has never entered the U.S. or has
physically entered, but without being inspected and given permission to enter),
and those that make a person “deportable” (i.e., someone who entered legally and
with inspection). And, depending on your client’s immigration status, she or he
may have to worry only about grounds of inadmissibility, only about grounds of
deportability, or, potentially, about both.287 Today, the grounds of
“deportability” are found in INA § 237 (8 U.S.C. § 1227), while the grounds of
“inadmissibility” are found in INA § 212 (8 U.S.C. § 1182).
Here is another important point: IIRIRA changed the definition of “entry.” To
be precise, it eliminated this term from the INA and replaced it with the concept
of “admission.” With the advent of IIRIRA, a client who has physically entered
the U.S. “illegally” (i.e., without documents and without being inspected by a
CBP officer) has not, under post-IIRIRA law, effected a legal entry.288
Therefore, such a person, even if encountered in the interior of the U.S., will be

forth.
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See, e.g., INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
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See the discussion in section V.B.2., infra.
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See INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). The statute also sets forth other
occasions on which a person is deemed to be seeking “admission” to the U.S.
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charged with being inadmissible under § 212(a) of the INA289 rather than with
being “deportable” under § 237 of the INA.290 As a result, if you are
representing a non-citizen client who has entered the U.S. without inspection,
your analysis of immigration consequences should focus on § 212 of the INA,
rather than on § 237.
B.

Removal Proceedings.

At present, there are essentially five different types of removal proceedings: “regular”
removal proceedings, administrative removal proceedings, reinstatement removal
proceedings, judicial removal proceedings, and expedited removal proceedings. Each
type of proceeding is summarized below.
1.

Regular Removal Proceedings.291

“Regular” removal proceedings are those removal proceedings that will be heard
before an Immigration Judge pursuant to § 240 of the INA.292 This is the type of
removal proceeding that clients in Nebraska most likely will encounter.
The statute provides, inter alia, that Immigration Judges shall conduct
proceedings for deciding the inadmissibility or deportability of a non-citizen
under INA §§ 212(a) and 237(a), respectively.293 Thus, a client who is
physically present in the country, whether or not the client has been “admitted” to
the U.S., will most often face an Immigration Judge, who will determine whether
or not the client should be removed from the U.S. pursuant to any of the listed
statutory grounds. Following is a summary outline of the procedures involved in
a § 240 removal proceeding.
a.

Initiation of Proceedings.

Although several officials have authority to place an individual in § 240
removal proceedings,294 most often it is an ICE officer working for the
289

8 U.S.C. § 1182.

290

8 U.S.C. § 1227.
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The Immigration Court Practice Manual is an excellent source of information about
the nuts and bolts of practice before Immigration Courts. It can be found on the EOIR website:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1258536/download (last visited June 16, 2022).
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8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
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INA § 240(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a).

294

8 C.F.R. §§ 239.1(a), 1239.1(a).

95

local Field Office who does so. One is placed in removal proceedings by
the issuing of a Notice to Appear (NTA).295 Unless the respondent
consents to being removed from the U.S. without benefit of a hearing,296
the issuance of an NTA begins a string of events that will result in an
Immigration Judge determining whether or not the person is inadmissible
to or deportable from the U.S.
b.

Detention During Proceedings.

ICE has the authority to detain anyone who is placed in removal
proceedings, and is required to detain certain individuals who are in
proceedings.297 Because the issues of pre-hearing and post-hearing
detention are complicated, they are discussed more fully in a later
section.298
c.

Master Calendar Hearing.

The first hearing at which the allegations in the NTA are addressed is the
Master Calendar Hearing.299 At this hearing, the non-citizen is expected
to respond, by admission or denial, to each of the factual allegations in the
NTA, as well as to the charge(s) of inadmissibility or deportability.
Master Calendar Hearings are akin to docket calls -- several hearings are
scheduled for each session. Immigration Judges determine the order in
295

INA § 239, 8 U.S.C. § 1229. One example of a NTA is found at
https://immigrantjustice.org/for-attorneys/legal-resources/file/sample-notice-appear (last visited
June 16, 2022).
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INA § 240(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(d).
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INA § 236(a) and (c), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and (c).

298

See section IV.C., infra.
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There can be a long lapse of time between the issuance of a NTA and the time of the
Master Calendar Hearing, at least for those clients who are not detained by ICE. Most NTAs,
when first issued, do not even contain a date or time for the Master Calendar Hearing, instead
indicating that the date and time are “To Be Set.” More recently, because of litigation
challenging the sufficiency of such indefinite notices (see, e.g., Niz-Chavez v. Garland, ___ U.S.
___, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021)), NTAs may include “made up” dates and times that are not “real”
dates and times, but act only as placeholders until an actual date and time is set. This is because
although (normally) an ICE officer issues the NTA, the Immigration Court schedules the Master
Calendar Hearings, and the NTA-issuing officer does not have access to the Immigration Court’s
docket calendar. For non-detained cases (see section IV.C., infra, for a discussion of detention
issues), initial Master Calendar Hearings can take place well after the NTA is issued.
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which they wish to call the cases, usually beginning with those who are
represented by counsel.
Unless the hearing is being conducted by an Immigration Judge who is not
on site, whichever Immigration Judge is hearing the case will be present in
person in one of the courtrooms.300 If a person is not represented by
counsel, the judge normally will, at the person’s request, continue the
Master Calendar Hearing to give him or her an opportunity to secure
counsel.301 Although a non-citizen has a statutory right to be represented
by counsel, such representation must be at no expense to the
government.302 If the respondent is represented by counsel, counsel can
file a motion with the appropriate Immigration Judge requesting that the
Master Calendar Hearing be held by conference call among the
Immigration Judge, the District Counsel, and the respondent’s counsel,
thus obviating the need for the respondent’s physical presence in Omaha.
However, unless the Immigration Judge specifically waives the
respondent’s appearance at the hearing, he or she must be present in
counsel’s office.
If, at the Master Calendar Hearing, the respondent neither contests the fact
that she or he is inadmissible/deportable nor seeks any waiver of
inadmissibility or relief from deportation, the Immigration Judge will enter
an order finding the respondent removable (inadmissible or deportable,
depending on the situation). In such a case, the respondent would usually
waive appeal and the order would become final and enforceable
immediately. The ICE District Office is charged with enforcing such an
order. ICE officials may take the respondent into custody very soon after
the hearing concludes or allow him or her some time to report for removal,
depending on the equities of the situation.303
300

The Immigration Court entry is on the north side of the USCIS/ICE building in
Omaha. More information on the Court can be found on the EOIR website:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/omaha-immigration-court (last visited June 16, 2022).
301

The statute (INA § 239(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)) provides that a Master
Calendar Hearing shall not be held sooner than 10 days after the service of the NTA, so that a
respondent has an opportunity to secure counsel. In the Omaha District, hearings involving
non-detained respondents rarely happen immediately after the 10-day period. In the event they
do, the judges have historically been very reasonable about continuing the hearing to allow the
person the chance to secure representation.
302

INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362.

303

Although discussion of the equities considered by ICE is beyond the scope of this
Guide, they generally coincide with the types of equities that will result in a favorable bond
determination in a criminal law context: i.e., ties to the community, background of the client,
financial circumstances, and so forth. Obviously, the primary concern of ICE is that the person
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d.

Individual Calendar (Merits) Hearing.

If the respondent either (1) denies any of the essential factual allegations,
or the charge(s) of inadmissibility/deportability in the NTA, or
(2) admits that she or he is inadmissible or deportable but seeks either a
waiver of inadmissibility or some other form of relief from removal, the
Immigration Judge will schedule an Individual Calendar Hearing, also
known as a Merits Hearing. At this hearing, the issues raised by either
the denial(s) or the request(s) for waiver/relief will be resolved.
Individual Calendar Hearings are scheduled for dates and times certain -the date and time are reserved solely for the individual respondent’s case.
At this stage of the proceedings, there will be another delay. Depending
on the nature of the case, the complexity of the issues involved, the time
required for the presentation of evidence, and the judge involved, it may
be a year or longer between the final Master Calendar Hearing and the
Individual Calendar Hearing in cases in which the respondent is not
detained (i.e., held in custody) by ICE.
Individual Calendar Hearings are essentially short trials at which exhibits
are offered and testimony taken on the issue(s) under consideration.
Pursuant to the Immigration Court Practice Manual, counsel must submit
supporting documents and briefs to the Immigration Judge at least 15 days
before the Individual Calendar Hearing.304 Because the proceedings are
administrative, the formal Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply at the
hearing.
Frequently, the Immigration Judge announces his or her decision on the
same day the Individual Calendar Hearing takes place. Both the noncitizen respondent and ICE may have the right to appeal the Immigration
Judge’s decision administratively and/or judicially, depending on the type
of case.
2.

Administrative Removal Proceedings.

Administrative removal proceedings are those that take place pursuant to § 238(b)
of the INA.305 Such proceedings are used by ICE against those who are either

will actually report for removal when the time comes.
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Immigration Court Practice Manual, § 3.1(b)(ii).

305

8 U.S.C. § 1228(b).
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not LPRs or who have Conditional Permanent Resident status (CPR)306 if such
individuals have been convicted of an aggravated felony.307
Administrative removal proceedings are begun when the appropriate federal
officer issues a Notice of Intent to Issue a Final Administrative Deportation Order
(Notice of Intent) and serves it on the non-citizen.308 The facts that must be
present in order to permit the use of administrative removal are limited, and will
be cited in the Notice of Intent: (1) the person is, in fact, an non-citizen, (2) the
person is not an LPR or is a CPR, (3) the person has been convicted of an
aggravated felony and such conviction is final,309 and (4) the person is deportable
as a result of the aggravated felony conviction.310 The Notice of Intent is issued
on Form I-851.311
The respondent has 10 calendar days from the date the Notice of Intent is served
on him or her (13 calendar days if service is by mail) to respond to the Notice.312
If there is no timely response, or if the respondent concedes that she or he is
deportable, then the officer issues a Final Administrative Removal Order on Form
I-851A.313 The removal order can be executed once 14 days pass, unless the
respondent waives the 14-day waiting period.314
If the person submits a timely response to the Notice of Intent contesting some of
the facts, the issuing officer must decide whether, nevertheless, the charges in the
Notice of Intent are sustained by clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence in
the record. If the issuing officer makes that determination, she or he issues the
Final Administrative Removal Order.315 If, on the other hand, the non-citizen’s
306

INA § 238(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(2). See section III.D., supra, for a discussion
of Conditional Permanent Resident status.
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INA § 238(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(b)(1). See section V.D.6., infra, for a discussion
of what crimes constitute an aggravated felony.
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8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(1).
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See section V.D.2., infra, for a discussion of the term “conviction” under the INA.

310

8 C.F.R. § 238.1(b)(1).
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Id.
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8 C.F.R. § 238.1(c)(1).
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8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(1).
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8 C.F.R. § 238.1(f)(1).
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8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2)(i).
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response raises a genuine issue of material fact, then the officer may either obtain
additional evidence or convert the proceedings into “regular” removal
proceedings under § 240 of the INA.316 If the officer finds that the person is not
amenable to removal under § 238(b), then she or he must terminate the
administrative removal proceedings finally and, where appropriate, begin
“regular” removal proceedings under § 240.317
3.

Reinstatement Removal Proceedings.

Section 241(a)(5) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(5)) provides that if a noncitizen physically re-enters the U.S. without authorization after having been
previously ordered removed, or after having voluntarily departed under an order
of removal, she or he is not entitled to a “new” removal proceeding. Instead, the
previously-entered removal order is reinstated from its original date. It cannot be
reopened or reviewed in any way, nor can a non-citizen apply for any relief from
the reinstated removal order, with very limited exceptions.
This means, as the regulation details,318 that a person subject to reinstatement
removal proceedings has no right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge. The
issues in a reinstatement proceeding are very limited: (1) was the person subject
to a prior removal order? (2) is this the same person who was previously ordered
removed? and (3) did the person re-enter the U.S. without authorization? If these
three elements are established, then the person will be removed by reinstating the
previous removal order, unless she or he is eligible for benefits under the Haitian
Refugee Immigrant Fairness Act of 1998,319 the Nicaraguan and Central
American Relief Act,320 or has a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in the
country to which he or she will be removed.321
4.

Judicial Removal Proceedings.

Section 238(c)322 of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)) lays out a procedure by which
United States District Courts can enter removal orders against deportable non316

8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2)(ii).

317

8 C.F.R. § 238.1(d)(2)(iii).

318

8 C.F.R. § 241.8.
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Section 902, Div. A, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (Oct. 21, 1998).

320

Section 202, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 111 Stat. 2160 (Nov. 19, 1997).

321

8 C.F.R. § 241.8(d) and (e).

322

Because of a Congressional drafting mistake, there are actually two sections 238(c)
in the INA. This discussion involves the second of those two sections.
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citizens. Originally enacted in 1994 as part of the Immigration and Nationality
Technical Amendments Act,323 section 238(c) was again amended by AEDPA
and IIRIRA in 1996.
As it currently stands, § 238(c) allows a U.S. District Court judge to enter a
judicial order of removal against one who is deportable under § 237(a)(2)(A) of
the INA. The statute lays out the procedure that must be followed, which
includes the filing, by the U.S. Attorney’s office, of a notice of intent to request
judicial removal. Such a notice must be filed before the beginning of a trial or
entry of a guilty plea.324 An additional filing, containing the factual allegations
regarding alienage and identifying the crimes that make the person deportable,
must be made at least 30 days before the date for sentencing.325
A district court can consider requests for relief from removal by the respondent.326
If the request for a judicial order of removal is denied by the district court, ICE
can still seek a removal order through administrative proceedings, which can
include the basis for the removal order sought from the district court.327
5.

Expedited Removal Proceedings.

Expedited removal proceedings are those conducted pursuant to the provisions of
INA § 235.328 Historically, these proceedings were used only with respect to
those encountered at or within 100 miles of ports of entry, and therefore most
non-citizens in Nebraska were not subject to expedited removal proceedings.
But the Trump Administration sought to change that practice. 329
The main differences between “regular” removal proceedings under § 240 and
expedited removal proceedings under § 235 are the speed at which the
323

Pub. L. No. 103-416, 108 Stat. 4322 (Oct. 25, 1994).
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INA § 238(c)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(A).
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INA § 238(c)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(B).
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INA § 238(c)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(2)(C).
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INA § 238(c)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1228(c)(4).
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8 U.S.C. § 1225.
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On July 23, 2019, the DHS published notice of its intention to expand expedited
removal to apply to all persons who cannot prove that they have been in the United States for at
least two years, regardless of where they are encountered in the U.S. by ICE. This would have
been a significant expansion of the use of expedited removal proceedings. On March 21, 2022,
the Biden Administration formally withdrew the July 23, 2019 notice. 87 FR 16022 (March 21,
2022).
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proceedings move, the formality of the proceedings, and the right to appeal
negative decisions.
Expedited removal proceedings can apply to those who are physically present in
the U.S., but who did not enter with inspection (EWIs).330 Nevertheless, if an
EWI client can demonstrate to the appropriate federal officer that she or he has
been physically present in the U.S. for a period of at least two years, then the
expedited removal procedures will not apply.331 Expedited removal proceedings
do not apply to those who are natives or citizens of countries in the Western
Hemisphere with whose government the U.S. does not have full diplomatic
relations and who arrive by aircraft at a port of entry.332
The essence of expedited removal proceedings is that the federal officer
examining either (1) an arriving non-citizen, or (2) a person who EWI’d who does
not convince such officer that she or he has been in the U.S. for at least two years,
can order that person removed from the U.S. without further hearing or review if
the officer finds the person to be inadmissible because of document fraud or
because such person has no valid entry documents.333 If such a person expresses
a desire to apply for asylum, the examining officer must refer the person to an
asylum officer for a determination of whether he or she has a “credible fear” of
persecution that might qualify him or her for a grant of asylum.334
Except with respect to those who claim asylum or who claim to be permanent
residents of the U.S., there is no right of administrative appeal from an order of
removal under § 235, and collateral attacks on such orders are also restricted.335
There are slightly modified procedures that apply to those whom the inspecting
officer believes are inadmissible on the basis of security and related grounds.336
C.

Detention of Non-Citizens.

The INA and implementing regulations discuss when and under what conditions ICE may
or must detain non-citizens in its custody. The provisions regarding detention of non330

INA § 235(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1).
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INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) and (II), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) and (II).
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INA § 235(b)(1)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(F).

333

INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
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INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii).

335

INA § 235(b)(1)(C) and (D), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C) and (D).

336

INA § 235(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c).
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citizens vary depending on the category of non-citizen involved and the stage of
immigration proceedings in which the non-citizen is involved. For example, those
arriving at ports of entry, those charged with crimes, those convicted of crimes, and
suspected terrorists all are subject to being detained by DHS officials under various
statutory provisions. And, depending on the situation, such individuals can be detained
before removal proceedings are begun, during the pendency of proceedings, or after the
conclusion of proceedings. Because few Nebraska practitioners will deal with clients
who are arriving at a port of entry or are suspected terrorists, this discussion focuses on
detention of those already present in the U.S. who have been either charged with or
convicted of crimes.
The statutory and regulatory provisions regarding detention of non-citizens are complex,
and have been the subject of a number of legal challenges in the courts, both on
constitutional and statutory bases. The discussion here of detention provisions and
procedures is necessarily truncated, since it is not the goal to explore all the nuances of
detention in the immigration system. Rather, the hope is to provide basic information to
criminal law practitioners in order to help them understand, in a general way, how the
DHS detention process works and how that process might impact strategy decisions to be
made in the context of representing a non-citizen in a criminal case.
1.

Detention Before Commencement of Immigration Proceedings.

Generally speaking, only federal officers can arrest and detain non-citizens who
are suspected of being immigration violators.337 Although the INA has a
provision allowing the federal government to enter into written agreements with
state authorities to arrest and detain suspected immigration violators,338 no such
agreement exists in Nebraska at the present time.
From 2008-2014, ICE instituted its “Secure Communities” program. In 2014,
Secure Communities was replaced by the “Priority Enforcement Program.” That
program, like its predecessor, was essentially a data sharing initiative. All
individuals booked by local law enforcement agencies were fingerprinted, and
those fingerprints were sent to the FBI’s data base. Under the Priority
Enforcement Program, the FBI automatically sent fingerprints in its data base to
ICE so ICE could check those prints against its data base. Any person identified
by ICE through this procedure whom ICE believed was removable from the U.S.
was put into removal proceedings. In 2017, the Trump Administration revived
the Secure Communities program,339 but President Biden revoked that Executive
Order on the day he took office.340 So, as usual, things are up in the air.
337

INA § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a).
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INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g).
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Section 10, Executive Order 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).

340

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/25/2021-01768/revision-of103

If a state or local law enforcement agency suspects that a person in its custody
may be someone present in the U.S. without proper documentation, that agency
normally contacts ICE to see if ICE is interested in interviewing the person.
Depending on the perceived exigency of the circumstances and the availability of
resources, ICE will either interview the person over the phone or send someone to
interview the person in order to determine whether ICE wishes to initiate removal
proceedings. There may be occasions on which ICE will indicate to the law
enforcement agency that it is not interested in initiating removal proceedings
against the person, even if it determines that she or he may be present in the U.S.
without authorization, but this is now far less common than it used to be,
particularly with the advent of the Trump Administration.
While law enforcement agencies are always free to contact ICE about suspected
undocumented individuals they encounter, one provision of the INA requires a
response from ICE to inquiries from law enforcement. Section 287(d) of the
INA341 provides that in the case of an individual arrested by a federal, state or
local law enforcement agency for a drug offense, if that agency has reason to
believe that the person is not lawfully present in the U.S., ICE must “promptly”
determine whether or not to issue a detainer to detain such a person, upon the
request of the law enforcement agency. However, as mentioned above, the
regulations authorize ICE to issue detainers to detain non-citizens in the custody
of law enforcement agencies,342 even if such detainers are not requested by law
enforcement, and ICE is doing that with increasing frequency. Current
information about ICE detainers, and the form ICE uses to request a detainer, can
be found on the ICE website.343
ICE detainers are issued by ICE to the custodian or a law enforcement agency
holding a non-citizen. They request that the law enforcement agency advise ICE,
before releasing the person, of the person’s pending release so that ICE can make
arrangements to take custody of the individual.344
These forms do not, by their explicit terms, impose any restrictions on the rights
of those in state custody to participate in programs offered by the institution in
which they are confined. However, as a practical matter, once ICE serves one of
these forms on either a state or local law enforcement agency, many institutions
civil-immigration-enforcement-policies-and-priorities (last visited June 16, 2022).
341

8 U.S.C. § 1357(d).
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8 C.F.R. § 287.7.
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https://www.ice.gov/identify-and-arrest/detainers/ice-detainers-frequently-askedquestions (last visited June 16, 2022).
344

8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a).
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have their own policies regarding what types of programs and activities are
available to those subject to ICE detainers.345 The important thing to remember
is that any restrictions are caused not by the forms themselves, but instead by the
policy of the institution holding someone with respect to whom a form has been
issued.
As mentioned above, § 287(d) of the INA346 only requires action on a requested
detainer if the individual is arrested because of a controlled substance violation.
Again, however, as a practical matter ICE will now issue request forms to anyone
it views as a removal priority. The safest assumption to make is that if your client
is being held by state officials and s/he is not a U.S. citizen, ICE is likely to be
notified and will proceed to send a detainer form to the state custodian.
If you represent a client in such a situation (i.e., ICE has sent a detainer form to a
detention facility in which your client is being held), the analysis of whether to
pursue a bond regarding the state charges gets complicated. Here’s why. If the
client posts a bond on the state criminal case, he will still have to deal with the
issue of the ICE request. Once ICE finds out that the client is to be released on a
state bond, it will ask local law enforcement to hold the client until it can take the
client into custody.347 “Taking the client into custody” could include ICE asking
the local law enforcement agency to continue holding the client in the local
facility, or it could mean ICE physically removing the client to a federal detention
facility located remotely from the county in which the client faces criminal
charges.348
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Both immigration and criminal defense attorneys with whom we have spoken relate
that clients subject to these ICE notifications in county and state facilities are often ineligible,
pursuant to institutional policy, to access such programs as community work release or other
programs in which they might otherwise participate. However, a number of Nebraska counties
now no longer honor ICE requests, fearing legal liability. At last check, those included
Douglas, Hall, Lancaster and Sarpy Counties.
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8 U.S.C. § 1357(d).
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The regulation (8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d)) requires a criminal justice agency to hold a
client, at ICE request, for a period of not more than 48 hours, excluding holidays and weekends,
once ICE has determined to take custody of the client. The Nebraska immigration practitioners
to whom we talked reported that the 48-hour rule is not always observed, that is, individuals are
frequently held more than 48 hours. Of course, the appropriate legal response to this is to file a
habeas corpus action, seeking release of the client. As a practical matter, however, once a
habeas action is filed ICE normally issues a Notice to Appear, which thereby cures the illegality
of continued detention.
348

A list of ICE detention facilities can be found at https://www.ice.gov/detentionfacilities (last visited June 16, 2022).
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In any event, the client, having made state bond, then must, if she or he is to be
released, post another bond in an amount to be determined by ICE if the client is
bondable at all.349 The most favorable outcome is that the client is ICEbondable, posts the required bond, and is released. Less favorable outcomes
include the client’s being unable to post the amount of the ICE bond350 or not
being bondable at all. Under these less favorable scenarios, the client will then
either continue to sit in the original custodial facility or will be transferred to a
remote ICE facility until the removal process sorts itself out. If this comes to
pass, the client has essentially wasted the money involved in putting up the state
bond.
There is another important factor: if the client bonds out on the state charge but
is unable, for whatever reason, to bond out on the immigration charge, the time
spent in the custodial facility in ICE custody will not count toward “time served”
with respect to any sentence imposed in the underlying state case. So again,
whether to advise a client to pursue a bond on a state charge is something that
ought to be carefully considered if ICE has placed a detainer on the client.
2.

Detention After Commencement of Immigration Proceedings.

Once ICE issues and serves a Notice to Appear on a non-citizen, thereby placing
him or her in removal proceedings, ICE will more often than not, in the cases of
one who is charged with or convicted of crimes that render him or her removable
from the U.S., take the person into custody. The discussion here is divided into
two parts: (1) detention of respondents during removal proceedings but before an
administrative decision on the removal charges and (2) detention of respondents
against whom a final order of removal has been entered.
a.

Detention of Respondents During the Pendency of Removal
Proceedings.

The enactment of IIRIRA in 1996 drastically changed the rules of the
game regarding detention of non-citizens charged with or convicted of
crimes. Section 236 of the INA351 is the provision of law bearing most
directly on detention of individuals during removal proceedings.
Subsection (a) of § 236 provides that ICE can detain a person pending a
decision on whether the person is to be removed from the U.S. The
statute gives ICE the discretion to release the person either on bond in an
amount of at least $1500 or on “conditional parole,” which amounts to
349

See the following section for a discussion of bonds in the immigration context.
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All ICE bonds are cash bonds only; no percentage bonds exist.
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8 U.S.C. § 1226.
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allowing an individual who is otherwise inadmissible to the U.S. to be
present in the U.S. under certain conditions. One released on bond or
conditional parole cannot get employment authorization unless he or she is
a permanent resident or has some other means of qualifying for an
employment authorization document.
Subsection (c) of § 236 is the mandatory detention provision of the INA
with which those charged with or convicted of crimes will most often have
to deal. That subsection provides, inter alia, that those who are either
inadmissible or deportable as the result of committing some crimes must
be detained by ICE and cannot be released except in very limited
circumstances.352
The only non-citizens involved in criminal proceedings who are not
subject to the mandatory detention provisions of § 236(c) are the
following: (1) those removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)353 because of a
conviction of one crime involving moral turpitude committed within five
years of entry for which a sentence of one year or longer could be
imposed; (2) those removable under § 237(a)(2)(A)(iv)354 because of a
conviction of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 758 relating to high speed flight
from an immigration checkpoint; and (3) those removable under

352

INA § 236(c)(1) and (2); 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) and (2). The limited circumstances
under which such individuals can be released essentially include situations in which release is
necessary to provide protection to witnesses or those otherwise cooperating with investigations
into major criminal activities. There have been two major cases decided by the BIA interpreting
§ 236(c)(1). The first, Matter of Rojas, 23 I&N Dec. 117 (BIA 2001), construed the language in
the statute that says DHS must take an individual into custody “when the alien is released” from
non-DHS custody. The BIA in Rojas held that the “when released” language does not require
DHS to take the person into custody immediately upon release from incarceration (in Rojas, the
person had been released from state custody two days before legacy INS took him into custody).
The Supreme Court upheld that reading in Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 203 L. Ed. 2d 333
(2019), holding that DHS is required to hold, without bond, those who fall under the descriptions
in the statute regardless of how much time has passed from the time they were released from
state custody until the time they are taken into DHS custody. The second, Matter of Garcia
Arreola, 25 I&N Dec. 267 (BIA 2010), made it clear that the only persons subject to mandatory
detention under § 236(c) are those who were convicted of the types of offenses mentioned in
§ 236(c)(1)(A)-(D) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(A)-(D)). In other words, if a person has
committed an offense of the type not described in § 236(c)(1)(A)-(D) and has been released from
non-DHS custody, he or she is not subject to mandatory detention.
353

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

354

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iv).
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§ 237(a)(2)(E)355 because of a conviction of a crime of domestic violence,
stalking, violation of a protection order or child abuse. Every other
person charged with or convicted of a criminal offense is swept into the
mandatory detention provisions of § 236(c).
Two points are especially worth making about § 236(c): (1) anyone who
has committed a criminal offense described in § 212(a)(2) of the INA356
and who has not been inspected and admitted to the U.S. must be detained
under the provisions of § 236(c). This is because such a person is
“inadmissible” under § 212(a) of the INA357 rather than “deportable”
under § 237, and therefore none of the exceptions to mandatory detention
apply to such an individual. This would obviously include all EWIs (i.e.,
those who entered without documentation); and (2) even most permanent
residents who find themselves involved in criminal proceedings will be
subject to the mandatory detention provisions of § 236(c) of the INA.
The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of the
mandatory detention provisions of § 236(c). In Demore v. Kim, the Court
held that Congress was justifiably concerned with assuring that deportable
individuals appeared for their removal hearings and that the mandatory
detention provisions of § 236(c) did not violate the due process provisions
of the Fifth Amendment.358 One of the factors that the Court found was
important in sustaining the constitutionality of § 236(c) mandatory
detention is the availability of an administrative “Joseph” hearing in which
the detained respondent can present evidence that he or she ought not be
subject to mandatory detention.359 Even in the wake of the Demore
decision, non-citizens may, under certain circumstances, be able to
distinguish their cases from the facts in Demore, and therefore argue that
they ought not be subject to mandatory detention. Such an analysis is
beyond the scope of this Guide but is discussed in greater detail by
others.360
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8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
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8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).
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8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
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Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003).

The “Joseph” hearing is named after the Board of Immigration Appeals precedent
opinion establishing the right to such a hearing. See In re Joseph, 22 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 1999).
359
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See, e.g., Dan Kesselbrenner & Lory Rosenberg, Immigration Law and Crimes
§§ 8:9 to 8:21 (section I.E., supra).
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For those detained during the pendency of removal proceedings who are
not mandatory detainees under § 236(c), a local ICE officer will determine
under what circumstances such individuals may be released. If the ICE
officer determines that the person is not a danger to persons or property,
and is satisfied that the person is not a flight risk, the officer may authorize
release of the person during the pendency of removal proceedings.361 The
statute requires that, unless the person is released on conditional parole, a
bond of at least $1500 must be imposed.362
Respondents have a right to request that any bond determination made by
a local ICE officer be reviewed by an Immigration Judge.363 There may
be occasions when an individual has been taken into ICE custody but ICE
has not yet filed the Notice to Appear with the Immigration Court.
Although jurisdiction over the removal proceedings only vests in the
Immigration Court once the Notice to Appear is filed with the Court,364
Immigration Judges do have the authority to hear bond matters before the
Notice to Appear has been filed.365
The types of evidence that Immigration Judges find persuasive in bond
review hearings are generally the types of evidence that judges find
persuasive in criminal proceedings: employment, length of time in the
U.S., community ties, financial situation, family members, prior criminal
and/or immigration violations, the nature of any prior crimes and/or
immigration violations, and so forth. Additionally, Immigration Judges
may be interested in hearing about the possibility that the respondent is
eligible for any relief from removal.366
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8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8).
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INA § 236(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
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8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(a).

364

8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a).
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8 C.F.R. § 1003.14(a).
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There is currently an interesting issue percolating through the courts about who
carries the burden of proof in bond hearings. Must respondents show that they are good
candidates for bond, or must the government show that they are not? The BIA has held that the
burden of proof is on respondents. See Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37 (BIA 2006). But at
least one court has held that placing the burden of proof on respondents violates due process and
the Administrative Procedure Act. Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19 (1st Cir. 2021). But
see Miranda v. Garland, 34 F.4th 338 (4th Cir. 2022), finding no due process violation in the
statutory scheme.
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As of this writing, the Immigration Judge in Omaha who primarily serves
the detained docket is Judge Morrissey. Most immigration practitioners
submit evidence in support of their position in the bond hearing (usually in
the form of an affidavit or other documentary evidence). Although he
varies the procedure from time to time, Judge Morrissey’s usual practice is
to ask respondent’s counsel (if the respondent is represented) to make an
offer of proof regarding what the evidence would be in support of the
respondent’s request for bond or request for a lower bond. If he deems it
appropriate, or if the respondent is not represented, Judge Morrissey will
question the respondent and will ask the “usual” questions; i.e., when did
the respondent come to the U.S., where does s/he live and with whom, is
s/he married, does s/he have children, what is the immigration status of
any immediate family members present in the U.S., what criminal record
does the respondent have, etc.
A respondent may also ask for a second bond review hearing before an
Immigration Judge, but such a request must be in writing and will be
granted only if the respondent shows that his or her circumstances have
materially changed since the first bond review hearing.367
Either side has a right to appeal the Immigration Judge’s bond
determination. If the bond is reduced by the Immigration Judge and ICE
decides to appeal, the regulations provide for an automatic stay of the
bond reduction decision if the original bond was set at $10,000 or more.368
In 2018, the Supreme Court held, in Jennings v. Rodriguez,369 that those
who are being detained under INA § 236(c)370 are not entitled to bond
hearings or to a presumptive limit on the length of their detention.371 The
Court held that, unlike the statutory language in INA § 241372 it
considered in its 2001 Zadvydas opinion (discussed in the next section),
the statutory language in § 236(c) is not ambiguous, and therefore it would
be inappropriate to use the principle of constitutional avoidance to either
limit the amount of time a person can be held in detention or to require a
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8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e).
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8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(i)(2).
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138 S. Ct. 830.
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8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).

371

Section 235(b) proceedings.

372

8 U.S.C. § 1231.
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bond hearing, when the unambiguous statutory language does not address
either of these things.373
b.

Detention After Entry of Removal Order.

In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court held that there are limits to how long the
government can detain non-citizens against whom final orders of removal
have been entered.374 Specifically, Zadvydas held that those against
whom final removal orders have been entered can only be detained for six
months. After that, such individuals must be released unless it is
reasonably foreseeable that they can be removed to another country.
This issue arises in cases where individuals are citizens of countries who
traditionally do not repatriate their citizens at the request of the U.S.
government. Although Zadvydas only applied to one who had been
formally admitted to the U.S., in 2005 the Supreme Court extended its
ruling in Zadvydas to those who are inadmissible under § 212375 of the
INA.376
In response to the Zadvydas decision, the Attorney General promulgated
regulations implementing the decision and laying out the procedures that
must be followed when respondents against whom final orders of removal
have been entered request release from custody.377 Those against whom
final removal orders have been entered who are released under postZadvydas procedures do not have any immigration status in the U.S., but
they are eligible to receive employment authorization.378 Of course, if
such individual’s removal becomes practicable, he or she will be required
to report for removal.
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Jennings, supra., 183 S. Ct. at 842. The Court also held that those being held under
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1) and (2) (those applicants for admission who either assert asylum claims or
believe they are entitled to enter for some other reason) likewise can be held without a time
limitation and are not entitled to bond hearings.
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See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005).
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V.

POSSIBLE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS.
A.

Overview.

This part of the Guide sets forth, in some detail, various categories of immigration
consequences that may attach to criminal proceedings. It begins with an overview of
some general considerations and also describes some immigration concepts with which
state criminal law practitioners need to be familiar. Following that, it reviews various
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability that presently exist under the Immigration
and Nationality Act and ancillary case law as a consequence of criminal proceedings. It
ends with a discussion of “critical categories” in a criminal law/immigration context; that
is, those various points along the spectrum of immigration law at which immigration
consequences for non-citizens become more severe.
As mentioned at the beginning of the Guide and at the beginning of the statutory
analysis charts, it would border on malpractice to simply consult the statutory
analysis charts without reading this Guide first, and in conjunction with using the
charts. That is because, while the charts identify some of the immigration
consequences for non-citizen criminal defendants, there are nuances that turn on
the exact immigration status of any particular client. Immigration consequences
for a DACA recipient are very different than those for permanent residents.
Recipients of Temporary Protected Status need to worry about different factors
than those who have been granted asylum. And so forth. The bottom line is to be
careful when using the criminal analysis charts, and to make certain you know the
precise immigration status of your client before engaging in your own independent
analysis of the immigration consequences your client is facing.
B.

General Considerations.
1.

Legal Hierarchy.

When reading cases that interpret provisions of immigration law, it is important to
understand the legal hierarchy of case law precedent and how it affects an
individual client’s immigration case.
Generally speaking, in the context of removal proceedings taking place in the
interior of the country, and not at the border or at a port of entry, the hierarchy is
as follows:
(1) A local immigration officer, usually one working for ICE, writes up a Notice
to Appear (NTA) placing the client into removal proceedings.
(2) Once the NTA is filed with the Immigration Court and proceedings commence
before an Immigration Judge, any decision issued by an Immigration Judge in that
particular client’s case is binding on the local officer.
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(3) Either the respondent or DHS may, in most cases, file an appeal of a decision
by an Immigration Judge to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals (BIA). A “nonprecedent” decision issued by the BIA is the binding law of the case; in other
words, the BIA decision binds each entity below it in the hierarchy (i.e., the local
officer and the Immigration Judge) with respect to the case in question.
(4) If, in connection with an appeal to the BIA from a decision by an Immigration
Judge, the BIA issues a “precedent” opinion (the BIA decides which opinions to
designate as precedent opinions), such an opinion is binding on all Immigration
Judges and Service officers nation-wide, except for those in a circuit in which
contrary circuit court authority exists. Such a decision represents controlling
agency authority on the question(s) addressed in the opinion.
(5) Under certain circumstances, a case may be “certified” to the Attorney
General in order that an opinion be issued relating to the issues that were litigated
before the BIA. Any such opinion issued by the Attorney General is binding in
the case in question and, in general, establishes agency policy on the issue(s)
discussed.
(6) Some, but not all, agency decisions can be appealed to the appropriate court of
appeals. Circuit court opinions are binding on the BIA and DHS for the circuit
in which the opinion is issued. For example, in cases decided by Immigration
Judges involving clients residing in Nebraska, any Eighth Circuit opinions on
point control in any contrary BIA authority or decisions by the Attorney General
in “certified” cases.379
(7) Of course, any United States Supreme Court opinions are the final word on
the issues addressed in the opinion.
2.

Inadmissibility vs. Deportability.

The legal concepts of inadmissibility and deportability are important to
understand when considering possible immigration consequences your clients
379

The focus is on circuit courts rather than federal district courts because district courts
are not normally part of the direct appeals process in removal proceedings. See INA §
242(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2), requiring that appeals of final administrative decisions be filed
with the court of appeals for the judicial circuit in which the Immigration Judge completed the
proceedings. Since many Immigration Courts now conduct hearings via televideo conference,
the Immigration Judge is frequently located in one city and the respondent and counsel are
located in another city. For venue purposes, the hearing is deemed by EOIR to be taking place
at the location where the case is docketed for hearing. See Operating Policies and Procedures
Memorandum for the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OPPM) 04-06
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2004/08/25/04-06.pdf (last visited June 16,
2022). IIRIRA purported to eliminate review by courts of appeal in many types of removal
cases. See INA § 242(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)).
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may face as the result of criminal proceedings. Although there is considerable
overlap between the grounds for inadmissibility and deportability, the legal tests
are not identical. Additionally, many clients should be concerned with both the
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability, as will be further discussed below.
Finally, the acts which trigger immigration consequences differ between grounds
of inadmissibility and deportability, and practitioners and clients should be aware
of those differences in order to make informed decisions when formulating
defense strategy.
a.

Inadmissibility.

Before the enactment of IIRIRA in 1996, the term “inadmissibility” did
not exist. Rather, the focus was on whether someone was “excludable”
from the United States.
The issue of excludability arose at the point in time at which an individual
was standing at the U.S. border, either literally or figuratively,380 and
sought to enter the country. If such an individual was deemed to be
excludable under one or more of the provisions of former § 212(a) of the
INA, then the person would be barred from entering the U.S. However,
once a person effected an actual physical entry into the U.S. (other than by
being paroled into the U.S. or being granted some other official
permission to enter that did not constitute a formal entry), he or she was
no longer subject to grounds of exclusion, but then became subject to any
applicable grounds of deportation, which were located in another section
of the INA.
IIRIRA changed all that. The concept of “excludability” was replaced
with the concept of “inadmissibility.” Now, mere physical presence in
the U.S. does not mean that a person has effected an entry. Rather,
anyone who has not been “admitted” or who has not gained “admission”
into the U.S. is subject to being removed from the U.S. under the grounds
of inadmissibility set forth in INA § 212(a).381 And an individual has not
been “admitted” unless she or he has lawfully entered the U.S. after
inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.382 Similarly,
those who have been paroled into the U.S. or permitted to land temporarily
380

Under the pre-IIRIRA concept of exclusion, for example, a person who had been
paroled into the U.S. had not effected a legal entry. Thus, even though such a person might be
physically present in the U.S., his or her immigration inspection was deferred until a future date
at which time she or he was still subject to be “excluded” just as though he or she was physically
standing at a port of entry.
381

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).

382

INA § 101(a)(13)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A).

114

as alien crewmen have not been “admitted.”383 Even legal permanent
residents (LPRs) who go abroad only briefly may be subject to grounds of
inadmissibility under certain circumstances.384
What this definition of “admission” means, among other things, is that
those who came into the U.S. without being inspected and authorized to
enter by an immigration officer are subject to being removed from the
U.S. on the basis of one or more grounds listed in § 212(a) of the INA,
rather than on the basis of grounds of deportability in § 237(a) of the INA.
Thus, any non-citizen involved in criminal proceedings who came into the
U.S. without inspection and authorization and who is physically present in
the U.S. without documents will face the possibility of being removed
from the U.S. because of one or more of the grounds appearing in §
212(a)(2) of the INA. In such cases, it is that statute, and not § 237(a) of
the INA, with which you and your client must be concerned.
b.

Deportability.

The grounds of deportability are set forth in § 237(a) of the INA.385 As
the introductory language to § 237(a) makes clear, the grounds of
deportability apply to those “in and admitted to” the United States. Thus,
in order to be subject to one or more of the grounds of deportability in
§ 237(a), one must have been “admitted” to the U.S., as that term is
defined in § 101(a)(13) of the INA.386
The grounds of deportability dealing with criminal offenses appear at
§ 237(a)(2) of the INA.
c.

Being Concerned About Both Inadmissibility and
Deportability.

Given the foregoing discussion, the issues seem to be relatively simple:
those involved in criminal proceedings who are present in the U.S.
because they have been admitted with inspection and have some valid
immigration status need to worry about grounds of deportability in
§ 237(a)(2), while those who did not enter with inspection and who are
present without immigration status must worry about the grounds of
inadmissibility under § 212(a) – right? Wrong. Unfortunately, the world
383

INA § 101(a)(13)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(B).

384

INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C).

385

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).

386

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).
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of immigration law is not that simple. Because IIRIRA re-vamped the
definition of “admission,” even clients who are permanent residents may
be affected by criminal grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2).
As an illustration of this point, consider the improbable case of Jesus
Collado-Munoz.387 Mr. Collado-Munoz, a native of the Dominican
Republic, became a permanent resident of the United States in 1973. In
July, 1974, he was convicted of the crime of sexual abuse of a minor, as
the result of engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with his thengirlfriend, who was under the age of majority. As a result, Mr. Collado
was sentenced to three years’ probation. Shortly before the effective date
of IIRIRA (April 1, 1997), Mr. Collado left the U.S. to visit the
Dominican Republic, his native country, for two weeks. When he
attempted to re-enter the U.S., using his Permanent Resident Card, on
April 7, 1997, he was refused admission due to his 1974 conviction, which
the legacy INS contended rendered him inadmissible under the postIIRIRA version of § 212(a)(2) of the INA.388 Mr. Collado argued that the
Fleuti doctrine389 held that, because he was a permanent resident, he was
not seeking “admission” to the U.S., and therefore he was not subject to
the grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2). The legacy INS argued
that the change made by IIRIRA, which defined “admission” as set forth
in § 101(a)(13) of the INA,390 repealed the Fleuti doctrine.
The BIA agreed with the legacy INS’ argument and held that the plain
language of § 101(a)(13) now defines when an individual is seeking
admission, and that the Fleuti case, which interpreted a prior version of the
statute, was no longer applicable to a situation like that of Mr. Collado.
As a result, the BIA held that Mr. Collado was subject to the grounds of
inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2) despite the fact that the crime of which
he had been convicted was over 24 years old.
This remained the law until 2012, at which time the United States
Supreme Court decided Vartelas v. Holder.391 Like Mr. Collado-Munoz,
387

In re Collado, 21 I&N Dec. 1061 (BIA 1998).

388

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).

389

See Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963). Briefly, Fleuti held that a short-term
departure from the U.S. by a non-citizen who is a lawful permanent resident constitutes a “brief,
innocent and casual” departure and, as a result, such a person is not subject to any statutory
grounds of exclusion upon return to the U.S. because the person is deemed not to have broken
his physical presence in the U.S. by a “brief, innocent and casual” departure.
390

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).

391

566 U.S. 257 (2012).
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Mr. Vartelas was a long-time LPR: he gained his permanent resident status
in 1989. In 1994, he pled guilty to conspiring to make a counterfeit
security (a felony) and served a four-month jail term as the result of his
conviction. He traveled to Greece to visit his parents in 2003, and tried to
return to the U.S. one week later. However, Customs and Border
Protection considered him to be a non-citizen seeking admission to the
U.S., under the Collado-Munoz rationale, and he was placed in removal
proceedings based on the fact that his 1994 conviction made him
inadmissible. The Supreme Court held that the definition of
“admissibility” in INA § 101(a)(13)392 does not apply retroactively,
contrary to what the BIA held in Collado-Munoz, and that Mr. Vartelas
was therefore not someone seeking admission, and could use the Fleuti
doctrine to come back in to the United States as a returning LPR. So any
LPR who leaves the U.S. and seeks to come back, so long as his or her
departure was “innocent, casual and brief,”393 does not have to worry
about a pre-April 1, 1997, conviction subjecting him or her to the grounds
of inadmissibility. But LPRs who have convictions of April 1, 1997, or
later still have to worry about the Collado-Munoz trap. The holding in
Vartelas only applies to convictions that pre-date IIRIRA’s effective date.
As the Collado and Vartelas cases show, even clients who are permanent
residents may need to be concerned with grounds of inadmissibility, and
not just with grounds of deportability, at least with respect to convictions
of April 1, 1997, or later. Even someone who is a permanent resident will
be subject to the grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2) of the INA
once he leaves the U.S. and attempts to re-enter the country if he is
392

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).
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It is important to note that Vartelas did not hold that a non-citizen with a pre-April 1,
1997, conviction is never deemed to be seeking admission upon returning to the U.S. It only
held that those who are LPRs and whose departures satisfy the Fleuti doctrine are not deemed to
be seeking admission. Since Collado-Munoz was decided in 1998, most of us have forgotten
how to determine if a departure is “innocent, casual and brief.” We will now have to re-learn
what that phrase means, at least for pre-IIRIRA convictions. The two cases – Fleuti and
Vartelas – give us some guidance. In Fleuti, the non-citizen went to Tijuana, Mexico for a few
hours, and then returned to the U.S. In Vartelas, the non-citizen went to visit his parents for
about a week. Both of those were “innocent, casual and brief” departures. Because this legal
test involves assessing the totality of the circumstances, it is difficult to draw any bright lines, but
we would be very nervous about LPR clients staying away for more than six months, regardless
of the ties they retain to the U.S. in their absence, and regardless of the expressed purpose of
their trips. Of course, since the test is phrased in the conjunctive, even a short trip may be
something other than “innocent” or “casual,” and therefore make Fleuti inapplicable. As the
Court pointed out in Fleuti, courts are capable of deciding this issue on a case-by-case basis.
Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 462. At least for pre-April 1, 1997, convictions, we will be back to that caseby-case world.
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convicted of a crime that falls under § 212(a)(2) of the INA.394 Such a
person, unless she or he has been granted a waiver of inadmissibility
pursuant to § 212(h) of the INA395 or § 240A(a) of the INA,396 will not be
able to return to the U.S. after a trip abroad.397
d.

Interaction of Federal and State Law.

Interestingly, the only mention of immigration in the U.S. Constitution
relates to Congress’ authority to establish a uniform rule of
naturalization.398 But the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that
the authority to either admit individuals to the U.S. or exclude them from
the U.S. is a fundamental act of sovereignty reserved to the United States
federal government as a sovereign nation.399 Therefore, the statutory and
regulatory scheme governing immigration is found at the federal level.
When it comes to the issue of whether a person is inadmissible or
deportable because of state criminal proceedings, however, things become
a bit more nuanced. Of course, federal law applies to determine if the
person is either inadmissible or deportable, but in applying federal law, the
immigration decision-maker has to look to the state offense to determine if
its elements meet the federal definition at issue.
For example, suppose that ICE charges a lawful permanent resident with
being deportable due to his conviction, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-310, of
assault in the third degree. ICE alleges that such a conviction is for a
“crime involving moral turpitude” which the client committed within five
394

See INA § 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C).

395

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

396

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).

The BIA has held that it is the government’s burden of proof to show that a returning
LPR is an applicant for admission. In other words, the government must prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that one of the six exceptions of INA § 101(a)(13)(C) (8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13)(C)) applies to a returning LPR. And the BIA has held that an LPR “engages in
illegal activity after having departed the United States” by trying to smuggle someone into the
U.S. at a port of entry as the LPR is attempting to enter the U.S. Such an LPR is deemed to be
seeking admission under § 101(a)(13)(C)(iii), and therefore is subject to the grounds of
inadmissibility. Matter of Guzman Martinez, 25 I&N Dec. 845 (BIA 2012).
397

398

U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

399

See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950);
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
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years of his last entry into the U.S. and that the maximum possible
sentence was a year, since the assault was not the result of a fight or
scuffle entered into by mutual consent.
An Immigration Judge considering this case will need to apply a federal
definition -- “crime involving moral turpitude” –- to determine if the client
is deportable as ICE has charged. However, in making his or her
determination, the Immigration Judge will have to consider the elements
of the offense described in the Nebraska statute to determine if those
elements of the state crime meet the federal definition of “crime involving
moral turpitude.” Thus, federal definitions of inadmissibility and
deportability must be applied to the elements of state crimes. As a result,
decision-makers in immigration cases involving state criminal convictions
analyze both federal and state law.
C.

Grounds of Inadmissibility.
1.

Overview.

Section 212(a) of the INA400 contains the classes of those who are ineligible to be
admitted to the United States. Said another way, § 212(a) contains the grounds
of inadmissibility. There are several grounds under which a person may be
found to be inadmissible. However, this Guide will focus only on those grounds
of inadmissibility that result from criminal convictions or criminal conduct.
Most of the grounds of inadmissibility relating to criminal convictions are found
in § 212(a)(2) of the INA.
2.

Health-Related Grounds of Inadmissibility: Alcohol and DrugRelated Offenses.

The INA provides that one who seeks admission to the U.S. and who is
determined (1) to have a physical or mental disorder and behavior associated with
the disorder that may pose, or has posed, a threat to the property, safety, or
welfare of the applicant for admission or others, (2) to have had a physical or
mental disorder and a history of behavior associated with the disorder, which
behavior has posed a threat to the property, safety, or welfare of the admission
applicant or others and which behavior is likely to recur or to lead to other
harmful behavior, or (3) who is determined to be a drug abuser or addict, is
inadmissible to the U.S.401

400

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).

401

INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) and (II), § 212(a)(1)(A)(iv); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I) and (II), § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv).
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Although these grounds of inadmissibility are not, strictly-speaking, criminal
grounds of inadmissibility, they are often implicated by criminal behavior induced
or accompanied by alcohol or drug dependance. Because of that, criminal
defense counsel needs to be aware that alcohol-related or drug-related offenses
have the potential to make a client inadmissible not because of the crime itself,
but because the crime may, in the eyes of immigration decision-makers, represent
the manifestation of an alcohol or drug abuse problem.
Just to underscore the point that alcohol-related offenses are not criminal grounds
of inadmissibility, consider that the BIA has held that the offense of driving under
the influence is not a crime involving moral turpitude.402 This is true even if the
DUI conviction is at the felony level due to multiple prior DUI convictions.403
The rationale for this holding is that the existence of a certain level of blood
alcohol content is not, in and of itself, a morally turpitudinous act: it is more in the
nature of a regulatory offense.404
Often, clients who are currently in the U.S. without documents, and who wish to
obtain documents, must leave the U.S. and go through consular processing in their
home countries in order to re-enter the U.S. with inspection. Their applications
for entry visas are adjudicated by consular officers of the Department of State.
One of the tools guiding consular officers’ adjudications is the Foreign Affairs
Manual (FAM).405
The FAM states that, while alcoholism is not specifically referred to in the statute
as a health-related disorder, alcoholism is a medical disorder.406 Consular
officers are directed to refer a visa applicant to a “panel physician” (i.e., one
whom the State Department has authorized to do medical examinations) in three
circumstances:
(1) they have a single alcohol-related arrest or conviction within the last
five years;
402

Matter of Torres-Varela, 23 I&N Dec. 78 (BIA 2001).

403

Id.

404

However, the BIA has held that if a person drives under the influence knowing that
his driver’s license has been suspended in violation of Arizona law, he is engaged in culpable
conduct and has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Lopez-Meza, 22
I&N Dec. 1188 (BIA 1999). The Lopez-Meza case involved both drunk driving and driving
under suspension.
U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), https://fam.state.gov/ (last
visited June 16, 2022).
405

406

9 FAM 302.2-7(B)(3), paragraph a.
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(2) they have two or more alcohol-related arrests or convictions within
the last 10 years; or
(3) there is any other evidence to suggest an alcohol problem.407
Despite the language of both the FAM and the cable, it is our experience that if a
visa applicant falls into any of the categories set above, the consular officer will
often simply find that he or she is inadmissible. The FAM gives DHS the
authority to grant a waiver of this ground of inadmissibility, but it is highly
discretionary.408 If no waiver is granted, the final determination cannot be
appealed. Under such circumstances, the only recourse is to file another visa
application and seek a different determination, or simply wait until the appropriate
time passes and then re-apply for a visa.409 Often, the second option is the only
realistic one. Obviously, this can work a severe hardship on clients, who may
have to wait outside the U.S. for an extended period of time.
The Department of Homeland Security has a similar requirement for applicants
with whom it is dealing in the U.S., such as applicants for adjustment of status.410
As a practical matter, it is easier to make certain that formal procedures are
followed in the adjustment of status context, because applicants are physically
present in the U.S., where immigration counsel has more of an opportunity to
advocate effectively for them.
So-called “DUI-drug” cases (driving under the influence of a controlled
substance) could also implicate this particular ground of inadmissibility. In fact,
any offense that has an alcohol or drug overlay to it (domestic assault, driving,
etc.) has the potential to trigger this health-related ground of inadmissibility.
Certain types of immigration clients are, in fact, subject to losing their status
based on a single DUI conviction. For example, a client who has received
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) status will lose that status if the
client is convicted of a single DUI offense. Such an offense is considered to be
407

Id. at paragraph b.

408

9 FAM 302.2-7(D).

409

The appropriate time that must pass for a visa applicant to show remission
presumptively is one year. 9 FAM 302.2-7(B)(2), paragraph b. But the FAM makes clear that,
even after one year, a finding of remission is not guaranteed. Id.
See Danielle L.C. Beach, ‘Twas the Season to be Jolly: the Immigration
Consequences of Excessive Libations, 87 No. 17 Interpreter Releases 873, 877 (2010), discussing
a January 16, 2004, memorandum issued by W. Yates entitled “Requesting Medical ReExaminations: Alien Involved in Significant Alcohol-Related Driving Incidents and Similar
Scenarios.”
410
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at least a “significant misdemeanor” which will cause DACA status to be
revoked.411
Finally, in 2016, the State Department adopted a policy whereby it declared it has
the authority to “prudentially” revoke the non-immigrant visa of any non-citizen
who has been arrested for a DUI offense.412 This is obviously a grave concern
for any client who is a non-immigrant –- a visitor, a student, a temporary worker,
etc. Revocation of such a client’s visa makes the client immediately removable
from the U.S. If the client has left the U.S. and is seeking to re-enter the country
(for example, a foreign student who has traveled home during a break), that client
will be denied admission.
In short, if your client is charged with any type of offense that involves drugs or
alcohol, both you and your client need to understand the possible inadmissibility
ramifications, and take any steps realistically possible to ameliorate those
ramifications.
3.

Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude.
a.

Definition.

Any non-citizen who (1) is convicted of a “crime involving moral
turpitude,” (2) admits having committed a crime of moral turpitude, or (3)
admits committing acts that constitute the essential elements of a crime
involving moral turpitude is inadmissible.413 Convictions for attempts to
commit such crimes or conspiracies to commit such crimes also render a
person inadmissible.414
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See the National Security and Public Safety Guidelines section of the DACA page on
the USCIS website: https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/consideration-of-deferred-action-forchildhood-arrivals-daca (last visited June 16, 2022).
412

9 FAM 403.11-5(B)(U)c. https://fam.state.gov/FAM/09FAM/09FAM040311.html
(last visited June 16, 2022).
413

INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i).

Id. Note that categories (2) and (3) do not require a conviction – they simply
require that the person admits either committing a crime or admits to committing acts which an
officer concludes constitutes the essential elements of a crime that renders the person
inadmissible. Thus, even those who have not been convicted of crimes may be inadmissible,
depending on what admissions they make and under what circumstances those admissions are
made. For a further discussion of the intricacies of this point, see Kesselbrenner & Rosenberg,
Immigration Law and Crimes, § § 3:2 - 3:6 (2020). For a further definition of “conviction,” see
section V.D.2 of this Guide, infra.
414
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The definition of “moral turpitude” is not found in the INA.415 Because
“moral turpitude” is not defined in the statute, courts have had to supply
the working definition of this term. The most common definition one
encounters defines a “crime involving moral turpitude,” in general, as a
crime that is “inherently base, vile, or depraved, and contrary to the
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or to
society in general.”416 Such a crime has been defined as an act per se
morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong, or malum in se, as opposed
to malum prohibitum, so it is the nature of the act itself and not the
statutory prohibition of it that constitutes an act of moral turpitude.417
b.

The Categorical Approach and “Divisible” Statutes..

Although this discussion is offered in the context of analyzing whether
a crime is a crime involving moral turpitude, the categorical approach
applies any time one analyzes a crime to determine whether it
constitutes an inadmissible or deportable offense. Thus, whether a
crime is an aggravated felony, or a domestic violence offense, or a
firearms offense, or any other type of crime that carries immigration
consequences – in all of these inquiries courts use the categorical
415

One might think this makes the term unconstitutionally vague. And certain courts
seem to agree with that general concept (see, e.g., Zarate v. U.S. Attorney General, 26 F.4th
1196 (11th Cir. 2022), but given a 1951 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court to the contrary
(Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223), most courts (including the Eleventh Circuit in Zarate,
have continued to hold that the term is not unconstitutionally vague. For a nice (and short)
discussion of this issue, see The Elusive Concept of Moral Turpitude, 27 Bender’s Immigration
Bulletin 999 (June 1, 2022).
416

See, e.g., Matter of Franklin, 20 I&N Dec. 867 (BIA 1994), aff’d, 72 F.3d 571 (8th

Cir. 1995).
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Id. So, is this phrase constitutionally suspect because it is too vague? The
Supreme Court, in 1951, said no. Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951). However, given
the Court’s holding in Dimaya that 8 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague (see discussion
in section V.D.6.e.(6), infra.), there may be some doubt about the continued validity of that
holding. There is currently litigation around the country challenging the constitutionality of this
statute, on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Romero v. Sessions, 736 F.
App’x 632 (9th Cir. 2018) (declining to address the issue but finding the vagueness argument
“compelling”); Marmolejo-Campos v. Holder, 558 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(noting that “ ‘moral turpitude’ is perhaps the quintessential example of an ambiguous phrase”);
Arias v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 823, 830, 835 (7th Cir. 2016) (Posner, J., concurring) (noting that the
phrase is “stale, antiquated, ... meaningless[,]” “vague[ ], rife with contradiction, a fossil, [and]
an embarrassment to a modern legal system”). But see Guevara–Solorzano v. Sessions, 891
F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the vagueness argument); Verdugo-Morales v. Sessions, 719
F. App’x 507 (6th Cir. 2018) (rejecting the vagueness argument).
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approach outlined here to determine what type of crime is involved
and what immigration consequences it carries.
Determining whether a client has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude is more complicated than it might first appear. The focus,
courts have repeatedly held, must be on, and only on, determining what
crime the client was convicted of, and then deciding whether, based only
on the elements of that crime, the crime is one involving moral turpitude.
In order to help them make this limited and focused determination, courts
have developed what has come to be known as the “categorical approach”
with respect to “indivisible” criminal statutes – in other words, those
criminal statutes that contain the elements of only one criminal offense.
Courts have also developed an approach to help them determine of which
crime a client was convicted in cases involving “divisible” criminal
statutes – in other words, those statutes that contain elements of more than
one criminal offense. Each of these key concepts is discussed briefly
below. Following that brief discussion, there is a survey of case law
applying these concepts in specific factual and legal settings.
Categorical Approach. When deciding whether a state criminal offense
describes a “crime involving moral turpitude,” (CIMT)418, both
administrative and Article III courts have followed what has come to be
known as the “categorical” and “modified categorical” approaches. And,
as stated above, these approaches are also followed in determining
whether other types of crimes have immigration consequences.
The categorical approach is used in a number of contexts.419 As you will
see, it has particular significance in the immigration context, and will
often be involved when determining whether or not a crime carries
immigration consequences. The focus of the categorical approach, as
explained below in the case law survey, is on what crime a client has been
convicted of, and not what the client actually did in order to be convicted
of the crime in question. That is important in determining the
immigration consequences of a criminal conviction, because immigration
decision-makers must assume, absent evidence in the record of conviction
to the contrary, that a client engaged in the least culpable conduct
necessary to be convicted of any given crime. How this plays out in
practice is illustrated by the cases reviewed in the following subsections.
Divisible Statutes. Another concept explored in the cases discussed
below is that of divisibility of statutes. Many criminal statutes have
418
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For example, this approach is used by courts in cases involving the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA), 8 U.S.C. § 924.
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various subparts to them, whether those subparts take the form of separate
paragraphs, or disjunctive examples, or other grammatical forms.
Sometimes such statutes actually define multiple crimes; in immigration
parlance, those are called divisible statutes. Other times, they define a
single crime, but state alternative means by which that crime can be
committed; in immigration parlance, those are indivisible statutes.
Because the focus of the categorical approach is to determine which crime
a client was convicted of, the courts have fashioned an approach to help
them determine (1) whether a statute is divisible (defines multiple criminal
offenses) or indivisible (unitary) and, if the statute is divisible, (2) which
portion of a divisible statute, and therefore what particular crime, the
client was convicted of. As you read the cases discussed below, you will
see how this plays out in practice and why it is an important concept in
immigration law.
(1)

Taylor v. United States.420

The categorical approach has its roots in the case of Taylor v.
United States, which is actually a criminal case, not an
immigration case. The issue in Taylor was whether a defendant’s
sentence should be enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal
Act.421 That Act allows sentence enhancements in federal
criminal cases where the defendant has previously been convicted
of a “violent felony,” whether such convictions were of state or
federal law. “Violent felony,” in turn, is statutorily defined as,
inter alia, “burglary.” The task the Taylor Court faced was to
determine if the defendant’s two prior convictions in Missouri state
court for second degree burglary matched the federal definition of
“burglary” found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).422 The Court held that, in
determining whether any of the defendant’s prior convictions were
“violent felonies,” it was required to look only to the elements of
the state statutes under which the defendant had been convicted,
and should not look to the particular facts that led to the
convictions.423 In other words, the analysis focuses on the nature
of the crime/conviction itself, and not on the nature of the acts in
which the defendant engaged in committing the crimes. That is
what makes the analysis “categorical” – courts are tasked with
420
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18 U.S.C. § 924.
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Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
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determining if a particular conviction falls within a certain
category of criminal offenses. In this case, the Court had to
determine whether the defendant’s conviction fell in the category
of a “burglary,” as that term is categorically defined under federal
law.
But that presented the Court with another problem – defining what
“burglary” is for purposes of federal law. The reason that was a
dilemma is because Congress did not include a statutory definition
in the ACCA. As the Court pointed out, there is no uniform
definition of “burglary” – various state statutes define it in
different ways. But the Court held that its task was to determine,
for purposes of federal law, what definition of burglary was
appropriate to use. It held that, for federal purposes, the term
cannot be defined by reference to a particular state statutory
definition, since that would result in inconsistent results, depending
on which state statute was involved:
[W]e are led to reject the view of the Court of
Appeals in this case. It seems to us to be
implausible that Congress intended the meaning of
“burglary” for purposes of § 924(e) to depend on
the definition adopted by the State of conviction.
That would mean that a person convicted of
unlawful possession of a firearm would, or would
not, receive a sentence enhancement based on
exactly the same conduct, depending on whether the
State of his prior conviction happened to call that
conduct “burglary.”424
After doing an extensive legislative history review, and an
historical case survey for guidance in how to undo this Gordian
knot, the Court ultimately held that the best approach would be to
adopt the federal “generic” definition of burglary, meaning the
definition of that term that roughly corresponds to the way the term
was defined by the majority of states’ criminal codes at the time
the federal legislation was enacted.425 Using that method, the
Court determined that the federal generic definition of “burglary”
contains these elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or

424

Id. at 590-591.

425

Id. at 589.
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remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a
crime.426
All of the cases that follow Taylor use this same approach: (1)
determine what offense is in play for federal purposes; (2)
determine the elements of the generic federal offense; (3) look to
the elements of the state offense to determine if there is a match
between the state elements and the federal generic elements. The
following cases explore how this scheme plays out in various
contexts.
(2)

Shepard v. United States.427

The test for determining the category of previous state criminal
convictions worked well in Taylor, for various reasons. But how
does a federal court decide what category of offense of which a
defendant has been convicted, and what elements are involved in
such an offense, where the state statute penalizes conduct that is
more inclusive and sweeps broader than the applicable federal
generic offense?
The Supreme Court addressed this issue in Shepard. This case
again dealt with the Armed Career Criminal Act. But the issue in
this case was what documents a court should consult when
determining whether a defendant has been convicted of a specified
category of crime under an overbroad state statute; i.e., one that
sweeps more broadly than the federal generic equivalent statute.
Recall that, under Taylor, the Court held that the only task in
ACCA cases is to determine the type, or category, of offense of
which a defendant had previously been convicted. Generally, that
is done by looking at only the elements of the statute in question.
But if the elements of the state statute under which a defendant is
convicted are broader than the equivalent federal generic offense, it
cannot serve as the basis for a sentence enhancement in federal
court because it does not fall within the category of offense
Congress intended federal courts to use to enhance sentences.
The defendant in Shepard pled guilty to burglary under
Massachusetts state statutes. In his federal prosecution for being a
felon in possession of a firearm,428 the government argued that his
426
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sentence should be enhanced under the ACCA because of his prior
state burglary convictions. Shepard argued that the state burglary
statutes under which he was convicted as a result of his guilty pleas
did not fit the federal generic definition of “burglary” for purposes
of the ACCA, because they criminalized burglary of places other
than dwellings, whereas the federal generic crime of burglary, as
the Court defined it in Taylor, only involved burglary of dwellings.
Thus, the defendant argued, the state statutes were “overbroad” in
the sense that they involved crimes Congress did not intend to use
to enhance the federal crime the defendant had committed.
The government argued that police reports showed that Shepard
had, in fact, burglarized dwellings, which fits the federal generic
definition of burglary. Shepard argued that police reports should
not be considered in determining what crime of which he had been
convicted under state law. Because the Court’s prior decision in
Taylor dealt with a jury verdict, the specific rule it created – that a
sentencing court should look only to the statutory elements of the
state crime, the charging documents, and the jury instructions, did
not work, since there was no trial in Shepard’s case.
The Supreme Court held that the categorical approach it
established in Taylor had not resulted in any action by Congress in
the 15 years since that decision, and thus showed that Congress
acquiesced in its reasoning. That only left the Court to determine
what types of documents should be considered to determine the
category of an offense in cases where no jury trial takes place.
The Court held that only the following types of documents could
be considered to determine what category of crime the defendant
had been convicted of: the charging document, the terms of a plea
agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant
in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the
defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this
information.429
But, as later cases make clear, it is inappropriate to look at any
documents to determine what a defendant did – it is only
appropriate to look at documents when the task is to determine
which portion of a divisible statute the defendant was convicted
under. To stress the point again, the purpose of the categorical
approach is to determine what crime a defendant was convicted of
– not what he actually did. And that is the issue the Board of
Immigration Appeals address in Matter of Ajami.
429

544 U.S. at 26.
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(3)

Matter of Ajami.430

In Ajami, the respondent was convicted of the crime of aggravated
stalking under a Michigan statute with several paragraphs, some of
which required acts of moral turpitude for conviction and some of
which did not. As a result, the BIA looked at the record of
conviction to determine under which paragraph of the statute the
respondent was convicted. After doing so, the BIA decided that
the respondent was convicted under a paragraph of the statute that
required him to act willfully and, therefore, concluded that moral
turpitude was involved.
This is an example of how the “modified categorical approach” is
used – to determine the exact offense involved where the state
criminal statute is divisible; that is, where it contains more than
one freestanding crime.
(4)

Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez.431

In this case, the Supreme Court added an element to the modified
categorical approach adopted by the BIA in Ajami. The issue in
Duenas-Alvarez was whether California’s theft statute was written
broadly enough to include not only traditional “thefts,” but also
crimes that would not meet the federal generic definition of
“theft.” More specifically, the state statute in Duenas-Alvarez
defined “theft” as including being an accessory or accomplice after
the fact.
The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant had not been convicted
of a “theft” offense because the least culpable conduct required for
a conviction theoretically would not have to involve “theft.” In
Duenas-Alvarez, the Supreme Court added an element to the
modified categorical analysis –the “realistic probability” test.
Under that test, Mr. Duenas-Alvarez was required to show that
there was a realistic probability that one could be convicted under
the California statute for engaging in non-theft conduct. And how
was Mr. Duenas-Alvarez to meet this new burden of proof
imposed on him? By providing the decision-maker with an actual
case (which could include his own case) in which the defendant
was prosecuted under the statute for engaging in “non-theft”
conduct. In other words, unless Mr. Duenas-Alvarez could come
forward with an actual case in which a defendant was prosecuted
430

22 I&N Dec. 949 (BIA 1999).

431

549 U.S. 183 (2007).

129

for non-theft conduct, the immigration decision-maker should not
assume that such conduct is realistically prosecuted, and therefore
should not assume it is the least culpable conduct required for
conviction under the statute.432
(5)

Matter of Silva-Trevino.433

Former Attorney General Mukasey threw a bit of a wrench into the
categorical/modified categorical analysis when he issued the SilvaTrevino decision in 2008. This decision articulated circumstances
under which the Attorney General believed it would be appropriate
to take a fact-specific approach to determining whether a defendant
has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
However, former Attorney General Eric Holder vacated this
opinion in 2015, so it is no longer binding authority.434
(6)

Nijhawan v. Holder.435

In Nijhawan, a unanimous Supreme Court held that some statutes
call for a “circumstance-specific” approach, rather than a
categorical approach. In this case, the defendant was convicted,
after a jury trial, of mail fraud, wire fraud, bank fraud, and money
laundering. Although the jury made no specific finding as to the
dollar amount of loss the victim had suffered, at the sentencing
phase of the case, the defendant stipulated that there had been a
monetary loss in excess of $100 million, and the court ordered
restitution in the amount of $683 million.
The government sought to deport the non-citizen defendant,
arguing that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony;
specifically, that he had been convicted of an offense that involves
Several courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have held that the “realistic probability”
requirement does not apply where the statute in question specifically criminalizes particular
conduct. In Gonzalez v. Wilkinson, 990 F.3d 654 (8th Cir. 2021), the Eighth Circuit held that a
non-citizen was not required to show that there was a realistic probability that Florida actually
prosecuted people for the conduct that made the offense of possession of cannabis broader than
the generic federal offense, because the Florida statute expressly criminalized such conduct. In
such cases, there is no need for the client to show that such conduct would actually be
prosecuted.
432
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fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000.436 The defendant argued that the Immigration Court
should use the categorical approach articulated in Taylor in
determining whether he was convicted of an aggravated felony,
and that since the $10,000 limit was not an element of the criminal
offense of which he was convicted, it did not fit the definition of an
aggravated felony. Alternatively, the defendant argued that the
Immigration Court should use the modified categorical approach
and only consult the documents specified in Shepard.
The Supreme Court held that the portion of the aggravated felony
statute specifying the dollar amount of the loss was a nonelemental fact; that is, a fact that it is not necessary for the
government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict
a defendant of the crime in question. As a result, it was
appropriate to look at the specific circumstances under which the
crime was committed:
Subparagraph (M)(i) [of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)]
refers to “an offense that ... involves fraud or deceit
in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds
$10,000” (emphasis added). The language of the
provision is consistent with a circumstance-specific
approach. The words “in which” (which modify
“offense”) can refer to the conduct involved “in” the
commission of the offense of conviction, rather than
to the elements of the offense. Moreover,
subparagraph (M)(i) appears just prior to
subparagraph (M)(ii), the internal revenue provision
we have just discussed, and it is identical in
structure to that provision. Where, as here,
Congress uses similar statutory language and
similar statutory structure in two adjoining
provisions, it normally intends similar
interpretations.437
The Court also rejected the defendant’s argument that decisionmakers must limit the universe of documents they consider to
determine if the specific circumstances were met (i.e., the
monetary amount of the loss) to those articulated in Shepard. The
Court found nothing either unworkable or unfair in allowing
decision-makers to consider, in cases like this, the stipulation as to
436
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the dollar amount of the loss offered by the defendant at the
sentencing hearing.438
(7)

Moncrieffe v. Holder.439

The 2012-2013 Supreme Court term produced two major decisions
regarding the categorical approach to interpreting statutes carrying
immigration consequences as the result of criminal proceedings.
The first of those cases is Moncrieffe.
The defendant in Moncrieffe was involved in a traffic stop where
the police found him in possession of 1.3 grams of marijuana. He
pled guilty to a Georgia state offense of possession with intent to
distribute. Under a Georgia statutory provision, adjudication of
guilt was withheld and Moncrieffe was sentenced to five years of
probation, after which time the charge was to be expunged.440
DHS sought to deport Moncrieffe, who was not a citizen, on the
basis that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony –
specifically, a drug trafficking offense as defined in INA
§ 101(a)(43)(B).441 The Immigration Court, the BIA, and the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals all held that Moncrieffe had been
convicted of an aggravated felony, even though the Georgia statute
under which he was convicted punished the offense as a
misdemeanor, because possession with intent to distribute
constitutes “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance,” as
prohibited by the aggravated felony statute.
Using the categorical approach, the Supreme Court held that
Moncrieffe’s Georgia conviction did not meet the two conditions it
438

Id. at 42-43. The BIA has adopted the circumstance-specific approach in cases
involving the ground of deportability related to a conviction for a crime of domestic violence.
Matter of H. Estrada, 26 I&N Dec. 749 (BIA 2016). In that case, the BIA held that the
circumstance-specific approach is appropriate to determine whether a respondent convicted of
assault committed the crime against his domestic partner. The BIA found the statute, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), to be more like the statute in Nijhawan than like statutes that call for a strict
categorical approach. Additionally, the BIA held that any reliable evidence, including police
reports, could be consulted to determine the status of the victim against whom a “crime of
domestic violence” has been committed.
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must meet in order to qualify as an aggravated felony: (1) the
conduct involved (here, marijuana trafficking) must be prohibited
by the Controlled Substance Act (CSA) and (2) the CSA must
prescribe felony punishment for that conduct.442 The second
requirement comes from the reference in the aggravated felony
statute that a “drug trafficking crime” is one that is defined in 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). But that statute includes a provision that
punishes one type of action at the misdemeanor level, not the
felony level: a case involving distribution of a small amount of
marijuana for no remuneration.443
The Supreme Court held that it was required to use the categorical
approach as set forth by Taylor and its progeny to determine of
what crime Moncrieffe was convicted. And using that approach,
it was foreclosed from asking what Mr. Moncrieffe actually did,
which in this case meant it could not tell what amount of marijuana
was involved, nor whether Moncrieffe received remuneration for
distributing the marijuana. So it had to assume that he was
convicted for the least culpable conduct that would sustain a
conviction under the state statute.
Tipping its hat to the Duenas-Alvarez requirement that there must
be a realistic probability that Moncrieffe could have been
prosecuted for such least culpable conduct (i.e., possession with
intent to distribute when only a small amount of marijuana), the
Court held that he could have been so prosecuted, since Georgia
appellate court opinions reflected such convictions when as little as
6.6 grams of marijuana were involved.444 Taking all of these facts
and precedents into consideration, the Supreme Court held that
Moncrieffe was not deportable as an aggravated felon:
Ambiguity on this point [whether remuneration was
involved] means that the conviction did not
“necessarily” involve facts that correspond to an
offense punishable as a felony under the CSA.
Under the categorical approach, then, Moncrieffe
was not convicted of an aggravated felony.445

442

Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 192.

443

21 U.S.C. § 821(b)(4).

444

Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 194.

445

Id. at 194-195.

133

The Court rejected the government’s argument that this case called
for a circumstance-specific approach like the one it adopted in
Nijhawan:
The monetary threshold [in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(43)(M)(I)] is a limitation, written in to
the INA itself, on the scope of the aggravated felony
for fraud. And the monetary threshold is set off by
the words “in which,” which calls for a
circumstance-specific examination of “the conduct
involved ‘in’ the commission of the offense of
conviction. Locating this exception in the INA
proper suggests an intent to have the relevant facts
found in immigration proceedings. But where, as
here, the INA incorporates other criminal statutes
wholesale, we have held it “must refer to generic
crimes,” to which the categorical approach
applies.446
Thus, Moncrieffe reinforced the Supreme Court’s command that a
categorical approach is to be used when determining of what crime
a person has been convicted.
(8)

Descamps v. United States.447

Descamps can be thought of as the poster child case for defining
how the categorical approach is to be applied. It is worth a careful
read.
This is another Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) case,
although it certainly has applicability in the immigration
context.448 Mr. Descamps was convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The
government, under the ACCA, sought to enhance the penalty
imposed on him due to his prior state convictions for burglary,
446
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There was always some question about whether Supreme Court decisions under the
ACCA applied in an immigration setting, at least in ICE’s view. But that issue has been put to
rest, since the BIA has definitively held that the ACCA analysis regarding the categorical
approach applies in an immigration context. See Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I&N Dec. 349
(BIA 2014), order vacated in part, Matter of Chairez-Castrejon, 26 I&N Dec. 478 (BIA 2015),
adopting the categorical approach articulated in Descamps to the immigration context.
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robbery and felony harassment. The main focus of the Court’s
scrutiny was Descamps’ California state burglary conviction.
Descamps argued that his California state conviction did not fit the
definition of a federal generic burglary offense because the state
statute did not require that he enter the premises unlawfully. But
the lower courts pointed out that the record of conviction
established that Descamps’ crime involved unlawful entry into a
building.449 As a result, the lower courts enhanced Descamps’
sentence under the ACCA.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the categorical
analysis definitely established that California’s burglary statute
swept more broadly than the federal generic definition of burglary,
the lower courts should not have engaged in a modified categorical
approach that involved looking at the record of conviction. The
modified categorical approach, the Court reiterated, is only
resorted to when a divisible statute is involved. And the purpose
of the modified categorical approach is simply to help a court
determine which of various crimes in a divisible statute a
defendant was convicted of – it is NOT used to determine in what
conduct the defendant engaged.450 Referring to its long history (at
least since Taylor was decided in 1990) of using the categorical
approach as a means of determining what crimes a defendant is
convicted of, not what acts he committed, the Court again stressed
that, absent a statute like the one in Nijhawan, what the defendant
actually did is irrelevant where the relevant inquiry is of what
crime he was convicted.
Having come this far, the Court then was left with the task of
defining what is a “divisible” statute. This is a significant
question, especially in the context of immigration law, since the
BIA had held that a criminal statute is “divisible” if one or more
elements of a criminal statute could be satisfied by conduct that
either was deportable conduct or non-deportable conduct.451 But
449

Specifically, at the sentencing hearing in state court, the prosecutor proffered that
Descamps broke into and entered a grocery store. Descamps did not object to this proffer.
To underscore its point, the Court puts the term “modified categorical approach” in
quotation marks, characterizing it not as a genuinely alternative approach, but as “a tool for
implementing the categorical approach, to examine a limited class of documents to determine
which of a statute’s alternative elements formed the basis of a conviction.” Descamps, 570 at
263-264.
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Matter of Lanferman, 25 I&N Dec. 721 (BIA 2012), overruled by Matter of ChairezCastrejon, 26 I&N Dec. 349 (BIA 2014). As an example, suppose a criminal statute proscribes
“assault,” defined elsewhere in the criminal code or in case law, to mean anything from an
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the Supreme Court adopted a definition of “divisible” at odds with
the one accepted by the BIA in Lanferman. The Court held that to
determine whether a statute is truly divisible, a court looks at the
elements in a statute that a fact-finder must unanimously, and
beyond a reasonable doubt, agree exist in order to convict a
defendant of violating the statute. The focus is on the elements of
the criminal offense, not on the facts of the case:
For example, an indivisible statute “requir[ing] use
of a ‘weapon’ is not meaningfully different”—or so
says the Ninth Circuit—”from a statute that simply
lists every kind of weapon in existence ... (‘gun,
axe, sword, baton, slingshot, knife, machete, bat,’
and so on).” In a similar way, every indivisible
statute can be imaginatively reconstructed as a
divisible one. And if that is true, the Ninth Circuit
asks, why limit the modified categorical approach
only to explicitly divisible statutes?
The simple answer is: Because only divisible statutes
enable a sentencing court to conclude that a jury (or
judge at a plea hearing) has convicted the defendant
of every element of the generic crime. A prosecutor
charging a violation of a divisible statute must
generally select the relevant element from its list of
alternatives. . . . And the jury, as instructions in the
case will make clear, must then find that element,
unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt.452
Using this framework, the Court held that the lower courts should
never have looked at any of the documents in the “record of
conviction,” since it was not necessary that they do that in order to
determine of what offense Descamps was convicted. In other
words, the statute under which he was convicted was not divisible.
With this roadmap, the end result of the case was that Descamps’
conviction should not have been enhanced under the ACCA. The
Court summarizes its holding at the end of the opinion:

offensive touching to infliction of severe physical injury. While it is clear that simple assault
(i.e., offensive touching) would not be a crime involving moral turpitude, intentionally inflicting
severe physical harm would be a CIMT. Under the Lanferman view of the world, such a statute
would be divisible, because at least one form of conduct (intentional infliction of severe physical
injury) constitutes deportable conduct.
452
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Descamps may (or may not) have broken and
entered, and so committed generic burglary. But
§ 459 – the crime of which he was convicted – does
not require the factfinder (whether jury or judge) to
make that determination. Because generic unlawful
entry is not an element, or an alternative element, of
§ 459, a conviction under that statute is never for
generic burglary. And that decides this case in
Descamps’ favor; the District Court should not have
enhanced his sentence under ACCA.453
This is all confusing – even at second and third blush. But there is
a resource that will help you understand Descamps’ rationale better
than we ever could. It is a video put together by Maureen
Sweeney at the University of Maryland. After watching it, we are
confident you will have a much better handle on the categorical
approach as set forth in Descamps.454
The history of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court since
Taylor reaffirms the Supreme Court’s insistence on using the
categorical approach to determine what crime an immigrant has
been convicted of.455 Again, the focus is on determining what the
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Maureen Sweeney, Categorical Analysis of Immigration Consequences 7 28 14,
YouTube (July 28, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDA-wVIedT0 (last visited June
16, 2022).
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See, e.g., Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47 (2006) (holding that in order to qualify as a
“drug trafficking offense” under INA § 101(a)(43)(B), an offense must be punishable at the
felony level in federal court); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010) (holding that,
in order for a defendant to have been convicted as a recidivist for purposes of the Controlled
Substances Act, the focus must be on whether the defendant was actually charged and prosecuted
as a recidivist in state court, not whether he might have been so charged and prosecuted);
Johnson v. U.S., 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (holding that where the state statute punishes conduct as
slight as a tap on the shoulder without consent, such an offense cannot qualify as a “violent
felony” for purposes of the ACCA); Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U.S. 798 (2015) (holding that a state
statute that criminalizes possession of a drug that does not appear on the federal drug schedules
incorporated by the Controlled Substances Act does not make a non-citizen defendant deportable
under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(I)); Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016)
(holding that the ACCA does not permit enhancement of a federal sentence when the state court
conviction sought to be used is broader than the federal generic crime, and also definitively
stating that a statute that merely lists alternative facts, as opposed to different elements, is not
divisible).
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elements of the offense are, and not on determining what a
criminal defendant actually did.456
c.

Examples of Crimes That Involve Moral Turpitude and
Crimes That do not Involve Moral Turpitude.

For purposes of illustration only, we have provided below partial lists of
crimes that the BIA and various courts have held either do or do not
constitute crimes involving moral turpitude.457 These lists are provided
for general guidance only. You should make certain to determine
that the BIA has not changed its position on any of these issues and, in
Nebraska, you should also determine what the Eighth Circuit’s
position is for any given crime.
(1)

Partial List of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude.

A partial list of crimes that the Board of Immigration Appeals and
various courts have found to constitute crimes involving moral
turpitude include: murder, rape, robbery, kidnapping, voluntary
manslaughter, some involuntary manslaughter offenses,458
aggravated assaults, mayhem, theft offenses, child abuse, spousal
abuse, and incest. Other crimes that have been held to constitute
crimes involving moral turpitude are: failure to register as a sex
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Shortly after the Mathis decision was released by the Supreme Court in 2016, the
Immigrant Defense Project released a practice advisory on how to analyze cases using the
categorical approach, current through the Mathis decision. It can be found at
https://www.immigrantdefenseproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/MATHIS-PRACTICEALERT-FINAL.pdf (last visited June 16, 2022).
457

This list is taken largely from Ira J. Kurzban, Immigration Law Sourcebook, Chapter
3, § III. C. 1, and Kesselbrenner & Rosenberg, Immigration Law and Crimes, § 6.2(a). These
publications are very helpful in locating authority on the issue of whether or not a particular
crime is a crime involving moral turpitude.
458

The Eighth Circuit has held that conviction of involuntary manslaughter under a
Missouri statute constitutes a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Franklin v.
I.N.S., 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995).
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offender,459 fraud,460 terroristic threats,461 accessory after the fact
to murder,462 “assault plus” crimes (that is, those that involve
assault coupled with some further aggravating element such as
assault with attempt to murder,463 assault with a deadly weapon,464
aggravated assault,465 assault on a domestic partner,466 child
abuse,467 child endangerment,468 sexual conduct with a minor,469
assault on a police officer470), forgery,471 robbery and burglary,472

459

Matter of Tobar-Lobo, 24 I&N Dec. 143 (BIA 2007). But see Totimeh v. Attorney
General, 666 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (declining to follow Tobar-Lobo and collecting cases
criticizing Tobar-Lobo). Also, we are aware of a decision by Judge Fujimoto of the Omaha
Immigration Court holding that failure to register as a sex offender under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 294004(3) is not a CIMT. Matter of ______, A#_________ (January 27, 2011), (redacted copy of
opinion on file with the author). Judge Fujimoto distinguished the Nebraska statute from the
California statute in Tobar-Lobo, noting that the decision in Tobar-Lobo involved a statute that
required willful conduct on the part of the defendant, and also required a showing that he had
previously been advised of the requirement to register. Judge Fujimoto noted that the Nebraska
statute requires neither finding for a conviction. That decision is likely no longer good law in
the Eighth Circuit. See Bakor v. Barr, 958 F.3d 732 (8th Cir. 2020).
460

Izedonmwen v. I.N.S., 37 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 1994).

461

Chanmouny v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 810 (9th Cir. 2004).

462

Cabral v. I.N.S., 15 F.3d 193 (1st Cir. 1994).

463

Clark v. Orabona, 59 F.2d 187 (1st Cir. 1932).

464

Matter of Logan, 17 I&N Dec. 367 (BIA 1980).

465

Pichardo v. I.N.S., 104 F.3d 756 (5th Cir. 1997).

466

Matter of Tran, 21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996). But see Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N
Dec. 968 (BIA 2006).
467

Guerrero de Nodahl v. I.N.S., 407 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1969).

468

Hernandez-Perez v. Holder, 569 F.3d 345 (8th Cir. 2009).

469

Matter of Guevara Alfaro, 25 I&N Dec. 417 (BIA 2011).

470

Matter of Danesh, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988).

471

Matter of A-, 5 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 1953).

472

Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982).
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extortion,473 receipt of stolen property with the knowledge the
property is stolen,474 driving a vehicle in a willful and wanton
manner while trying to evade a police officer,475 falsely obtaining
a Social Security card,476 use of a false driver’s license,477
counterfeiting,478 perjury (usually),479 willful tax evasion,480 drug
offenses where knowledge or intent is an element of the crime (i.e.,
possession with intent to distribute),481 embezzlement,482 and
passing of bad checks if fraud is an element of the offense.483
Additionally, use of a weapon during the course of committing
other crimes may indicate the existence of moral turpitude, thus
making the conviction one of a crime involving moral turpitude.484
And the BIA has held generally that accessory after the fact is a
crime involving moral turpitude if the underlying offense is a
crime involving moral turpitude.485 Also, conviction of an attempt
to commit a CIMT is a conviction of a CIMT even if the
underlying statute does not mention attempt offenses.486
473

Matter of F-, 3 I&N Dec. 361 (BIA 1949).

474

Matter of Gordon, 20 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 1989); Okoroha v. I.N.S., 715 F.2d 380 (8th

Cir. 1983).
475

Matter of Ruiz-Lopez, 25 I&N Dec. 551 (BIA 2011).

476

Lateef v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 592 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 2010).

477

Montero-Ubrii v. I.N.S., 229 F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 2000).

478

Matter of Castro, 19 I&N Dec. 692 (BIA 1988).

479

The BIA has held that a perjury conviction is a crime involving moral turpitude if
materiality is an element, since the common law definition of perjury is the controlling one.
Matter of L-, 1 I&N Dec. 324 (BIA 1942).
480

Wittgenstein v. I.N.S., 124 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 1997).

481

Matter of Khourn, 21 I&N Dec. 1041 (BIA 1997).

482

Matter of Batten, 11 I&N Dec. 271 (BIA 1965).

483

Matter of Khalik, 17 I&N Dec. 518 (BIA 1980).

484

Matter of Logan, 17 I&N Dec. 367 (BIA 1980).

485

Matter of Rivens, 25 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2011).

486

Matter of Vo, 25 I&N Dec. 426 (BIA 2011).
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(2)

Partial List of Crimes Not Involving Moral Turpitude.

A partial list of crimes that various tribunals have found not to
constitute crimes involving moral turpitude includes: simple
assault,487 some involuntary manslaughter offenses,488 malicious
mischief (conviction under Washington statute),489 indecent
exposure,490 most “possession” drug offenses,491 contributing to
the delinquency of a minor,492 passing bad checks where intent is
not an element of the offense,493 inventing a Social Security
number,494 breaking and entering or unlawful entry where intent to
commit a crime involving moral turpitude is not an element of the
offense,495 possession of burglar’s tools,496 joyriding,497 and
carrying a concealed weapon.498

487

Matter of S-, 9 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 1962).

488

Matter of Lopez, 13 I&N Dec. 725 (BIA 1971); but see Franklin v. I.N.S., 72 F.3d
571 (8th Cir. 1995).
489

Rodriguez-Herrera v. I.N.S., 52 F.3d 238 (9th Cir. 1995).

490

Matter of H-, 7 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 1956). The same case also held that a
conviction of gross indecency under Michigan law would be a crime involving moral turpitude.
491

Matter of Abreu-Semino, 12 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1968).

492

Matter of P-, 2 I&N Dec. 117 (BIA 1944), but see Matter of Garcia, 11 I&N Dec.
521 (BIA 1966), holding that taking indecent liberties with a minor is a crime involving moral
turpitude.
493

Matter of Zangwill, 18 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 1981), overruled on other grounds, Matter
of Ozkok, 19 I&N Dec. 546 (BIA 1988).
494

Matter of ______, A#_______ (BIA February 7, 2011), (redacted copy of opinion on
file with author).
495

Matter of G-, 1 I&N Dec. 403 (BIA 1943).

496

Matter of Serna, 20 I&N Dec. 579, (BIA 1992) (citing United States ex rel. Guarino
v. Uhl, 107 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1939) and Matter of S-, 6 I&N Dec. 769 (BIA 1955)).
497

Matter of M—, 2 I&N Dec. 686 (BIA 1946).

498

Matter of Granados, 17 I&N Dec. 726 (BIA 1979).
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d.

Statutory Exceptions.

There are two statutory exceptions to the “crimes involving moral
turpitude” ground of inadmissibility: (1) juvenile offenses and (2) the
“petty offense” exception.
(1)

Juvenile Offenses.

The INA provides that a person who commits what would
otherwise be a crime involving moral turpitude is not inadmissible
if (1) the crime was committed when the person was less than 18
years of age, (2) if confined for the crime, the person has been
released from confinement and (3) such commission and/or release
from confinement took place more than five years before the date
the person applies for a visa or for admission to the U.S.499
The juvenile offense exception of the statute applies if the juvenile
was charged and prosecuted as an adult under state law. It does
not apply if the case simply involved a juvenile adjudication in
Juvenile Court, because such an offense is not “conviction” of a
“crime.”500 There is also some authority for the proposition that
the provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act501 preclude
a finding that any crime committed by a juvenile under age 16 is a
crime involving moral turpitude, even if the juvenile was tried as
an adult.502
(2)

“Petty Offenses.”

If a non-citizen commits only one crime involving moral turpitude
that involves a maximum possible penalty of one year or less and
499

INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(I).

500

Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000). The BIA has held that a
“youthful trainee” designation under Michigan law is a “conviction” because it did not have the
hallmarks of a juvenile adjudication, which means it must be civil in nature and must be such
that it can neither be deemed a “conviction” ab initio nor ripen into a conviction upon the
occurrence or nonoccurrence of subsequent events. Matter of V-X-, 26 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA
2013).
501

18 U.S.C. § 5031, et seq.

502

See Matter of Ramirez-Rivero, 18 I&N Dec. 135 (BIA 1981). This case involved a
juvenile who was convicted as an adult in a Cuban court. The result might be different if the
juvenile was tried as an adult in a U.S. state court. See, e.g., Vieira-Garcia v. I.N.S., 239 F.3d
409 (1st Cir. 2001).
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if the person was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment in
excess of six months as a result of being convicted of such a crime,
then the person is not inadmissible solely due to committing such a
crime involving moral turpitude.503
Note that if there is an admission of the commission of a crime
involving moral turpitude, but no conviction, the petty offense
exception applies so long as the maximum possible sentence that
could be imposed, in the event of a conviction, was one year or
less. In such a situation, the second part of the statutory equation
(length of actual sentence) is simply disregarded.
Note also that the petty offense exception is available only once.
It applies only to the first CIMT offense. If a client has been
convicted of a previous CIMT, she or he is not eligible for the
petty offense exception.
e.

Waivers.

It is not necessarily the end of the world for a client who has committed a
crime involving moral turpitude to which a statutory exception does not
apply. A waiver of this particular ground of inadmissibility is available to
certain non-citizens, namely, those who committed a prostitution offense
more than 15 years before applying for admission to the U.S. or other
non-citizens inadmissible under certain grounds listed in the waiver statute
who can establish that refusing them admission would result in extreme
hardship to their U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent, son or
daughter.504
A discussion of the procedures involved in applying for a waiver, and the
evidence necessary to obtain one, is beyond the scope of this Guide. We
suggest further exploration of this topic in one of the resources we list in
section I.E., supra.
4.

Multiple Criminal Convictions.

A non-citizen convicted of two or more crimes of any type, if the aggregate
sentences to confinement were five years or more, is inadmissible.505 For
purposes of this ground of inadmissibility, it does not matter if the convictions
were the result of a single trial or if they arose from a single scheme of criminal
503

INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).

504

INA §212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

505

INA § 212(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).
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conduct. So long as the person was convicted of two or more criminal offenses
of any kind, he or she is inadmissible under this provision.
Note the following with respect to this ground of inadmissibility:
(1)

Unlike the ground of inadmissibility regarding crimes involving moral
turpitude, here there must actually be a conviction –- a simple admission
will not suffice.506

(2)

The two or more crimes can be of any type, even crimes not involving
moral turpitude.

(3)

When counting time to determine if the five-year limit has been reached,
one looks to all sentences initially imposed by the court, regardless of any
periods of suspension or deferment.507

(4)

When dealing with sentences of indeterminate length, one looks to the
maximum term imposed to determine the length of the sentence
imposed.508

(5)

As in the case of certain individuals who have committed crimes involving
moral turpitude, a waiver of this ground of inadmissibility is available.509

5.

Drug Offenses.

There are two major categories of drug offenses that will cause non-citizens to be
inadmissible: “general” drug offenses and drug trafficking offenses.
a.

General Drug Offenses.

A non-citizen convicted of, or who admits having committed, or who
admits committing acts that constitute the essential elements of any law or
regulation of a state, the United States, or any foreign country relating to a
controlled substance is inadmissible.510 Attempts and conspiracies, as

See section V.D.2., infra, for a discussion of what constitutes a “conviction” for
purposes of the INA.
506

507

INA § 101(a)(48), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48).

508

Matter of D-, 20 I&N Dec. 827 (BIA 1994).

509

INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

510

INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
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well as actual violations, also make one inadmissible.511
The definition of “controlled substance” is borrowed from 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(6). This includes all drugs listed in the schedules found in 21
U.S.C. § 812. These schedules are updated annually. In addition, a
“controlled substance” also includes those substances listed by the U.S.
Attorney General pursuant to his authority under 21 U.S.C. § 811. The
Attorney General’s list is located at 21 C.F.R. Part 1308.
b.

Mellouli v. Lynch.512

In 2015, the United States Supreme Court decided a case that stresses how
important it is for practitioners to determine if there is a complete match
between the drug schedules of a state and those used by the Controlled
Substances Act. In Mellouli v. Lynch, Mr. Mellouli, a non-citizen, pled
guilty to a misdemeanor drug paraphernalia offense in Kansas state court.
In one of the most bizarre sets of facts one might imagine, the “drug
paraphernalia” Mellouli pled guilty to possessing was his sock, in which
he had hidden “four orange tablets,” which he conceded were a
“controlled substance” as defined under Kansas law, although the exact
type of controlled substance was not specified.513 Because of the
definition of “drug paraphernalia” under Kansas law (“all equipment and
materials of any kind which are used. . . for. . . storing. . . a controlled
substance. . . .514), Mellouli’s sock, into which he had placed the controlled
substance, fit the definition of “drug paraphernalia.”
However, there were nine controlled substances on the Kansas schedules
that did not appear on the schedules related to the federal Controlled
Substances Act. As such, Mellouli’s offense would not have qualified as
a “controlled substances offense” under federal law, even though it did so
qualify under state law. As a result of his conviction, ICE sought to
deport Mellouli under the INA provision that makes it a deportable
offense to be convicted of a crime related to a controlled substance.515
511

Id.

512

575 U.S. 798 (2015). Although the issue in Mellouli was deportability and not
inadmissibility, the analysis works in both contexts.
513

Mellouli admitted, prior to being charged, that the pills were Adderall, but that fact
does not appear in any of the criminal records in the case (perhaps due to a savvy criminal
defense lawyer?).
514

K.S.A. § 21-5701(f).

515

INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).
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Mellouli argued that, using the categorical approach, he had not been
convicted of a crime related to a “controlled substance” as that term is
defined in the Controlled Substances Act. The Immigration Court, Board
of Immigration Appeals, and Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals all rejected
Mellouli’s argument.
But the Supreme Court thought Mellouli’s argument had merit. The
Court held that reference in the deportation statute to the Controlled
Substances Act means that the controlled substance that forms the basis
for removal of a non-citizen must be one listed in the federal schedules.
Because Kansas’ schedules included at least nine drugs not included on
the federal schedules, and because, using the categorical approach, the
Court had to assume that Mellouli was convicted of possessing one of the
drugs not on the federal schedules, he could not be held to have been
convicted of a crime related to a controlled substance “as defined in
section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802).” As a
result, Mellouli was not removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i) due to his
conviction.
This approach does not work in Nebraska, however.516 The Kansas
controlled substance statute was indivisible; that is, it was not an element
of the prosecution’s case to prove which controlled substance Mr.
Mellouli possessed – only that he possessed a controlled substance. In
contrast, in Nebraska, the BIA has held that the prosecution must, as part
of its burden of proof, prove what controlled substance a defendant
possessed in order to obtain a conviction:517
We conclude that § 28-416(3) is divisible vis-à-vis the
controlled substance involved in the offense. Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28-416(3) provides, in pertinent part that a “person
knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled
516

With some exceptions. For example, the Seventh Circuit held that the definition of
“methamphetamine” in the Indiana criminal code is broader than that in the federal criminal
code. Aguirre-Zuniga v. Garland, 37 F.4th 446 (7th Cir. 2022). This also appears to be the
case in Nebraska, at least for purposes of the general prohibition against possessing
methamphetamine. (Compare the definition of methamphetamine in paragraph (c)(3) -“Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and salts of its isomers” -- on Schedule II in Neb. Rev.
Stat. § 28-405 with the same language in the Indiana statute discussed in Aguirre-Zuniga.)
However, for purposes of violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-457 (causing or permitting certain
persons to inhale or have contact with methamphetamine), “methamphetamine” is defined
consistently with the federal definition. So, all of this just goes to show, as my former Professor
John Snowden was fond of saying, “X is Y for the purpose of Z.”
517

See, e.g., Matter of Soto, A# [redacted], (BIA, July 13, 2017) (unpublished opinion
on file with the author).
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substance . . . shall be guilty of a Class IV felony.” Section
[id] Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-405 provides the schedules of
controlled substances. Nebraska state court decisions, the
statute itself, and the conviction records all support the
conclusion that the identity of the controlled substance is an
element which must be proven under § 28-416(3).
Nebraska courts have held that the identity of the controlled
substance involved in an offense must be established. See,
e.g., State v. Watson, 437 N.W.2d 142 (Neb. 1989); State v.
Nash, 444 N.W.2d 914, 919 (Neb. 1989); see also State v.
Clark, 461 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Neb. 1990) (the State must
prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally
possessed the substance). Further, relevant jury
instructions indicate that the prosecution must prove the
type of substance involved, such that the defendant was
aware that it was a controlled substance he possessed.
State v. Heujahr, 540 N.W.2d 566, 572-573 (Neb. 1995)
(finding that the jury was properly instructed that
“possession” of the specifically identified controlled
substance means “either knowingly having it on one’s
person or knowing of the object’s presence and having
control over the object”).518
c.

Waivers.

With the exception of the waiver discussed in the next paragraph, there are
no exceptions to the controlled substance offense ground of
inadmissibility as far as those seeking admission as permanent residents
are concerned. Any non-citizen convicted of, or who admits having
committed, or who admits committing acts constituting the essential
elements of a controlled substance offense is permanently inadmissible to
518

Id., slip op. at pp. 2-3. In Iowa, the argument is more favorable, since the Iowa
controlled substance statutes define a “controlled substance” to include a simulated controlled
substance. Iowa Code Ann. § 124.401(1)(c)(2)(b). That is broader than the federal definition
of a controlled substance found in the federal Controlled Substances Act at 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(2)
(punishing possession of a controlled substance and a counterfeit controlled substance, but not a
simulated substance). And, in fact, the BIA has held that a Mellouli argument works under the
Iowa statute. See, e.g., Matter of Martinez Hernandez, A# [redacted], (BIA March 14, 2018)
(unpublished opinion on filed with the author), holding that the Iowa controlled substance
statutes are violated regardless of whether the substance is a controlled substance, a counterfeit
substance, or a simulated controlled substance. This, the BIA held, makes the Iowa statute
indivisible and overbroad. Unfortunately for Nebraska practitioners, the Nebraska definition
matches the federal one, for the most part (see discussion in footnote 516, supra). See Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 28-416(1), prohibiting possession, distribution, etc., of a “controlled substance” or a
“counterfeit controlled substance,” as those terms are defined in § 28-401.
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the United States as an immigrant. There is a waiver available for this
ground of inadmissibility in limited circumstances for non-immigrants.519
There is the possibility of waiving this ground of inadmissibility in a very
limited circumstance. Anyone who is convicted of a single offense of
simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana is eligible to apply for
the waiver to this ground of inadmissibility.520
d.

Drug Trafficking Offenses.

If an immigration or consular officer knows or has reason to believe that
a non-citizen is engaged in drug trafficking or has trafficked in any
controlled substance, such a person is inadmissible.521 This ground of
inadmissibility also applies to those who aid, abet, assist, conspire or
collude with drug traffickers.522
Note that this ground of inadmissibility does not require a conviction -one is inadmissible even if the DHS or State Department “has reason to
believe” that the person has been engaged in drug trafficking. Thus, even
if charges of drug trafficking are ultimately dismissed, the underlying facts
might be used by the DHS to deny admission to the person.523 “Reason to
believe” equates to the adjudicating officer having probable cause to
believe the person engaged in drug trafficking.524
This particular ground of inadmissibility applies only to drug trafficking
offenses, which do not include simple possession of a controlled
substance.525 However, a conviction of a drug trafficking crime, or
existence of a reasonable belief that a person has possessed a controlled
substance with intent to distribute will implicate this ground of
inadmissibility. And the sweep is broad. Even a single sale of a small
amount of a controlled substance is sufficient to sustain a finding that
519

INA § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5).

520

See the introductory language to INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

521

INA § 212(a)(2)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(i).

522

Id.

523

Matter of Rico, 16 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 1977).

524

Matter of U-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 355, 356 (BIA 2002).

525

A conviction for simple possession, however, will present a problem for the person
under the provisions of INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).
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someone is a drug “trafficker.”526 On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit, in
an unpublished opinion, has held that simply offering to sell a controlled
substance is not a drug trafficking offense because the federal Controlled
Substances Act prohibits only the knowing and intentional distribution of
a controlled substance.527
In 1999, the statute was amended to include certain family members
within its ambit. Now, anyone who is the spouse, son or daughter of an
non-citizen who is inadmissible as a drug trafficker is himself inadmissible
if, within five years of seeking admission, such person (1) obtained any
benefit, financial or otherwise, from the non-citizen’s drug trafficking and
(2) knew, or should have known, that such benefit was the result of drug
trafficking activity.528 The standard that applies to family members is the
“reason to believe” standard that applies to the principal drug trafficker, so
defined family members are inadmissible if a DHS or consular official has
“reason to believe” that such family members are within the statutory
definition.
6.

Prostitution and Commercialized Vice.

This ground of inadmissibility applies both to those who engage in prostitution
themselves and those who participate in some way in prostitution or
commercialized vice.529 Anyone who is coming to the U.S. to engage in
prostitution, or one who has engaged in prostitution within 10 years of the date
she or he seeks admission, is inadmissible.530 This is true even if prostitution is
lawful in the non-citizen’s home country.531
526

See Matter of Roberts, 20 I&N Dec. 294 (BIA 1991), in which the respondent was
convicted of a single sale of what appeared to be a relatively small amount of cocaine.
Davila v. Holder, 381 F. App’x 413 (5th Cir. 2010). Other courts have disagreed
with this holding. See, e.g., Pascual v. Holder, 707 F.3d 403 (2d Cir. 2013).
527

528

INA § 212(a)(2)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(ii).

The term “prostitution” means engaging in promiscuous sexual intercourse for hire.
A finding that one has “engaged” in prostitution requires a consideration of the elements of
continuity and regularity, as opposed to isolated acts. 22 C.F.R. § 40.24(b). Although this
definition applies in an inadmissibility context, the BIA has held that, for purposes of analyzing
whether running a prostitution business is an aggravated felony, the term “prostitution” is not
limited to sexual intercourse, but is defined as engaging in, or agreeing or offering to engage in,
sexual conduct for anything of value. Matter of Ding, 27 I&N Dec. 295 (BIA 2018).
529

530

INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(i).

531

22 C.F.R. § 40.24(c).
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One who, directly or indirectly, procures or attempts to procure or import anyone
for purposes of prostitution is inadmissible.532 As with persons engaging in
prostitution themselves, this bar to admissibility applies if anyone has engaged in
any of these acts within 10 years of seeking admission.
Finally, this ground of inadmissibility applies to anyone coming to the U.S. to
engage in any other commercialized vice, whether or not it involves
prostitution.533
As with drug trafficking, this ground of inadmissibility applies whether or not the
person has actually been convicted of any of the acts described in the statute.
Those deemed inadmissible under this statutory provision can seek a waiver of
inadmissibility.534
7.

Serious Criminal Activity Where a Person has Asserted Immunity
from Prosecution.

If one (1) has committed a “serious criminal offense”535 (2) has been granted
immunity from criminal jurisdiction, (3) as a result of the offense and exercise of
immunity, has left the U.S. and (4) has not later fully submitted to the jurisdiction
of a U.S. court with respect to the offense, then such a person is inadmissible.536
This ground of inadmissibility is usually applied to foreign diplomats who engage
in a serious criminal offense, although the terms of the statute are not limited to
diplomats. Certain non-citizens may qualify to seek a waiver of this ground of
inadmissibility.537

532

INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii).

533

INA § 212(a)(2)(D)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(iii).

534

INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).

535

This term is defined in the INA as including (1) any felony, (2) any crime of violence
as defined in section 16 of title 18 of the United States Code, and (3) any crime of reckless
driving or of driving while intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or prohibited substances
if such crime involves personal injury to another. INA § 101(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(h).
536

INA § 212(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(E).

537

INA § 212(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
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8.

Significant Traffickers in Persons.

This ground of inadmissibility was added by section 111(d) of the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub.L. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464,
October 28, 2000, and was amended by §§ 222(f)(1) and 234 of Pub.L. 110-457,
122 Stat. 5044, Dec. 23, 2008. Two classes of principal non-citizens are
inadmissible under the provisions of the INA regarding trafficking in persons.538
The first class consists of any non-citizen who “commits or conspires to commit
human trafficking offenses” either in the U.S. or outside the U.S. The second
class is comprised of non-citizens whom the DHS or a consular officer knows or
has reason to believe have been knowing aiders, abettors, assisters, conspirators,
or colluders with those who traffic in “severe forms of trafficking in persons.”539
In addition to these two classes of principal non-citizens who are inadmissible, the
statute also provides, akin to the statute on drug trafficking,540 that anyone who
the DHS or consular officer knows or has reason to believe is the spouse, son, or
daughter of a non-citizen who falls in one of the two principal classes described
above, is himself or herself inadmissible if, within the past five years, such
spouse, son, or daughter has obtained any financial or other benefit from human
trafficking activity engaged in by the principal non-citizen.541 In addition, such
spouse, son or daughter is also inadmissible if he or she knew or reasonably
should have known that the financial or other benefit received within the past five
years was the product of illicit trafficking.542
9.

Terrorist Activity.

As one might imagine, this ground of inadmissibility was broadened in the wake
of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. The USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001543 added several provisions to this particular ground of
inadmissibility.

538

INA § 212(a)(2)(H)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 212(a)(2)(H)(i).

539

Id.

540

INA § 212(a)(2)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C)(ii).

541

INA § 212(a)(2)(H)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(H)(ii).

542

Id.

543

Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, October 26, 2001.
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The statute544 is interesting and is worth reading, mainly because of the wide
range of activities it now includes. Because Nebraska criminal practitioners may
not encounter many of these activities, we have not discussed them all here, but
we have set forth some of the categories of non-citizens to which this ground of
inadmissibility applies because they may come into play even in Nebraska state
criminal proceedings.
First, the statute provides that the following categories of non-citizens are
inadmissible on terrorist grounds: (1) those who have engaged in a “terrorist
activity,” (2) those whom the DHS or a consular official knows, or has reason to
believe, are engaged in or are likely to engage in a “terrorist activity,” (3) those
who have, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or serious
bodily harm, incited “terrorist activity,” (4) those who are “representatives” of
certain organizations involved with or linked to terrorism, (5) those who are
members of foreign terrorist organizations, and (6) those who have used their
position of prominence within any country to endorse or espouse terrorist
activity.545
In addition, the statute also makes the spouse or child of such principal noncitizens inadmissible if the activity causing the principal non-citizen to be
inadmissible took place within the past five years546 unless such spouse or child
did not know and should not reasonably have known of the terrorist activity of the
principal non-citizen or whom the DHS or consular officer believes has
renounced such terrorist activity.547
Second, the statute defines “terrorist activity.” Again, the sweep of the acts
included is breathtaking. “Terrorist activity” includes the following acts, and
also includes threats, attempts or conspiracies to do any of the following acts: (1)
the highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance, including an aircraft, vessel or
vehicle, (2) the seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure or continue to
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person or governmental entity
to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the
release of the person held, (3) a violent attack upon an internationally protected
person, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1116(b)(4), or upon the liberty of such a person,
(4) assassination, and (5) the use of any biological agent, chemical agent, nuclear
weapon or device, explosive, firearm or other weapon or dangerous device (other
than for purely personal monetary gain), with the intent to endanger, directly or

544

INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).

545

INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i).

546

Id.

547

INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(ii).
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indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals or to cause substantial damage to
property.548
The statute also defines “engage in terrorist activity,”549 “representative” of a
terrorist organization,550 and “terrorist organization.”551
Given the very broad definition of “terrorist activity,” it is not hard to imagine
that some non-citizens who commit certain acts that most would not think of as
“terrorist acts” might be held to be inadmissible as “terrorists.” For example,
suppose that your client is convicted of domestic assault because he assaulted his
domestic partner using a weapon of some sort.552 Under a literal reading of the
statute, the client has engaged in a “terrorist activity” because he used a weapon,
other than for purely personal monetary gain, with intent to endanger the safety of
another individual.553 Most of us understand that aggravated assault is a bad
thing, but it is counterintuitive to think of such an act as a “terrorist activity.”
This is life under the USA PATRIOT Act. Having said that, however, I am
unaware of a client found to be inadmissible based on the “terrorist activity”
ground for engaging in such behavior. But that does not mean it couldn’t
happen.
There is no waiver available for this ground of inadmissibility.
10.

Misrepresentation.

There are two categories of misrepresentation that make a non-citizen
inadmissible. The first is misrepresentation of a material fact if the purpose of
such misrepresentation is to obtain a visa, other documentation, admission into
the U.S., or any other benefit provided under the INA.554 The second is a false
claim of U.S. citizenship for any purpose related to an immigration benefit or any
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INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).

549

INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(iv).

550

INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(v).

551

INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(vi).
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This type of conviction would also make a client who is currently in the U.S. in
proper immigration status deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
553

INA § 212(a)(2)(B)(iii)(V), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B)(iii)(V).

554

INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).
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benefit under federal or state law.555 The second category of inadmissibility
could certainly come into play if a non-citizen is engaged in an act or is convicted
of an offense involving trying to obtain a benefit under state law (perhaps trying
to get a driver’s license, for example) by falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen.
As with some of the other grounds of inadmissibility, this ground does not require
an actual conviction of the acts set forth, although certainly a conviction would
implicate these provisions of the Act. Certain individuals may be eligible to
apply for a waiver of the first category of misrepresentation listed above,556
however, there is no waiver available regarding the second category of
inadmissibility. Nevertheless, there is a statutory exception. If the false claim to
U.S. citizenship is made by a non-citizen whose parents are or were U.S. citizens,
if the non-citizen permanently resided in the U.S. since reaching age 16, and if the
non-citizen reasonably believed at the time he or she made a false claim of U.S.
citizenship that he or she was a U.S. citizen, then such an individual is not
inadmissible.557
11.

International Child Abductors.

If a U.S. court grants to any person custody of a U.S. citizen who is a “child” and
a non-citizen takes or withholds such a child outside of the U.S. in violation of
such custody order, the non-citizen is inadmissible to the U.S. until such time as
the child is returned to the custodial parent.558 This ground of inadmissibility
does not apply if the child is located in a country that is a signatory to the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.559 This
ground of inadmissibility also applies to those who are spouses, children, parents,
siblings or agents of non-citizens who abduct children in violation of the
statute.560
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INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I). See Matter of Richmond,
26 I&N Dec. 779 (BIA 2016) for the BIA’s take on what it takes to trigger this ground of
inadmissibility.
556

INA § 212(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i).

557

INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II).

558

INA § 212(a)(10)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(C).

559

INA § 212(a)(10)(C)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(C)(iii).

560

INA § 212(a)(10)(C)(ii)(III), 8 U.S.C.§ 1182(a)(10)(C)(ii)(III).
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12.

Aggravated Felons.

“Aggravated felonies” are crimes defined in INA § 101(a)(43)561 and are
discussed more fully in this Guide in the context of deportation.562 They are
discussed briefly here, however, because of the ramifications they have on the
issue of applying for admission to the U.S.
Conviction of an aggravated felony is not a ground of inadmissibility as such, but
it does have admissibility implications. INA § 212(a)(9)(ii)563 provides that an
individual convicted of an aggravated felony is permanently barred from applying
for admission to the U.S. if she or he has been ordered removed under INA
§ 240564 unless, prior to his or her attempting to re-enter the U.S., she or he has
received permission from the U.S. Attorney General to apply for admission.
This provision raises several fine points of immigration law. First, simple
conviction of an aggravated felony does not carry with it the § 212(a)(9)(ii) bar -that only arises if, subsequent to being convicted of an aggravated felony, a noncitizen is ordered removed from the U.S. Of course, anyone convicted of an
aggravated felony will almost certainly be removed from the U.S., so this first
point is almost purely hypothetical. Second, a conviction of an aggravated
felony, together with a subsequent order of removal, is what triggers the bar of
§ 212(a)(9)(ii). Thus, a person’s simply admitting commission of an aggravated
felony will not, in and of itself, trigger the bar.565 Third, although conviction of
an aggravated felony technically does not make a non-citizen inadmissable, such a
person is not even allowed to apply for admission unless he or she has received
advance approval to do so from the U.S. Attorney General. As a practical matter,
then, one convicted of an aggravated felony who is removed from the U.S. as a
result is inadmissible unless he or she gets a stamp of approval from the Attorney
General for permission to try to re-enter the country. Of course, the Attorney
General is unlikely to give such approval any time soon after conviction and
removal.

561

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
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See section V.D.6., infra.

563

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(ii).
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8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
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Remember, however, that admitting to an aggravated felony may render a noncitizen inadmissible under some other subsection of INA § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2),
depending on the type of crime the client admits to committing.
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13.

Miscellaneous Grounds of Inadmissibility.

Other grounds of inadmissibility in the INA relate to espionage, sabotage and
commercial interference,566 foreign policy considerations,567 membership in
totalitarian parties,568 participation in Nazi persecution or general genocide,569
alien smuggling,570 draft evaders,571 aliens previously removed,572 unlawfully
present,573 or unlawfully present after previous immigration violations,574
polygamy,575 and unlawful voting.576 Because Nebraska practitioners are
unlikely to encounter these grounds with any frequency, they are not discussed in
any detail here. However, if you have a non-citizen who is charged with an
offense that may trigger one of these grounds of inadmissibility, you should
investigate the inadmissibility provisions relating to such charges.
D.

Grounds of Deportability.

Section 237 of the INA577 describes the categories of non-citizens who are subject to
being deported from the U.S. As with the categories of non-citizens who are
inadmissible, there are several grounds of deportability not related to criminal convictions
or activity. However, those grounds will not be discussed in this Guide.

566

INA § 212(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A).
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INA § 212(a)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C).
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INA § 212(a)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(D).

569

INA § 212(a)(3)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(E).
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INA § 212(a)(6)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E).
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INA § 212(a)(8)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(8)(B).
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INA § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A).
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INA § 212(a)(9)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B).
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INA § 212(a)(9)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(C).

575

INA § 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A).
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INA § 212(a)(9)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(D).
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8 U.S.C. § 1227.
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As a reminder, “deportation” refers to proceedings to remove non-citizens from the U.S.
who have already been admitted, as defined in INA § 101(a)(13).578 See the discussion
of this point at section V.B.2., supra.
1.

General Considerations.

You will notice that several of the grounds of inadmissibility, or at least the terms
used, overlap with grounds of deportability. The definition of the overlapping
terms used (i.e., “conviction,” “moral turpitude,” etc.) are the same for purposes
of both inadmissibility and deportability. Although the criminal grounds of
deportability under § 237(a)(2) of the INA overlap considerably with the criminal
grounds of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2), they are not identical. Thus, it is
important to read the statutes closely. Some criminal grounds of deportability do
not have a counterpart in criminal grounds of inadmissibility.579 And even those
grounds of inadmissibility and deportability that relate to the same category of
offense may have differences.
As a reminder, your client should be concerned with grounds of deportability if he
or she is in, and was “admitted” to, the United States. To beat a dead horse one
last time, clients who physically entered the U.S. without documents (“EWIs”) are
not subject to grounds of deportability under § 237 of the INA since they were not
“admitted” to the U.S. Rather, if those clients face removal from the U.S., they
will be dealing with one of the grounds of inadmissibility under § 212 of the
INA580 discussed previously.
2.

Requirement of “Conviction.”

Another point worth noting is that nearly all criminal grounds of deportability
require that a “conviction” exist before they apply.581 This is not true for all
criminal grounds of inadmissibility.582 The following sections contain a
discussion of various issues relating to the requirement of a “conviction.”
578

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13).

579

Two examples are the grounds of deportability for firearms offenses, found at INA
§ 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C), and domestic violence offenses, found at INA
§ 237(a)(2)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E), neither of which has an inadmissibility counterpart.
580

8 U.S.C. § 1182.

The two exceptions are the grounds of deportability relating to “drug abusers or
addicts” and those who violate civil protection orders. These grounds of deportability are
discussed in sections V.D.7. and V.D.9., infra.
581

Recall, for example, that the “crime of moral turpitude” ground of inadmissibility
found at INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) applies even if a person admits having committed such an
offense, or admits committing acts that constitute the essential elements of such an offense.
582
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a.

Definition of “Conviction.”

Section 101(a)(48)(A) of the INA583 states that a “conviction” exists if a
formal judgment of guilt has been entered by a court.584 The statute
further provides that a conviction exists even if adjudication of guilt has
been withheld where (1) a factfinder has found the person guilty, the client
has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or the person has admitted
facts sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt and (2) the judge has ordered
some form of punishment, penalty or restraint on the person’s liberty to be
imposed.
It is useful to look at this definition in the context of various types of
Nebraska criminal dispositions to determine whether or not a client has
been “convicted” of a criminal offense for purposes of the INA.
(1)

Pretrial Diversion.

A client who receives pretrial diversion under the provisions of
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3601 to 29-3609 has not been “convicted” of
a criminal offense for immigration purposes because the first
element of the test in INA § 101(a)(48)(A) has not been met –- no
judge or jury has found the client guilty, the client has not entered
a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, nor has the client admitted
facts sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt.585 As a result, any
583

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).

584

The finding of guilt must be made beyond a reasonable doubt. See Matter of
Eslamizar, 23 I&N Dec. 684 (BIA 2004), holding that a defendant found guilty of a “violation”
under Oregon law was not “convicted” of a criminal offense for immigration purposes because
under the statute one could be convicted of a violation under a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard. See also Rubio v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 344 (8th Cir. 2018), holding that convictions for
violating Columbia, Missouri city ordinances are “convictions” for immigration purposes
because the fundamental aspect of a criminal proceeding is whether guilt was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Because that was the burden of proof involved, convictions of municipal
ordinances are “convictions” even though some tribunals consider ordinance violations to be
“civil” rather than “criminal” in nature. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed this test of
“conviction” in Matter of Wong, 28 I&N Dec. 518 (BIA 2022), in which it held that the
hallmarks of a criminal conviction include: proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to
confront one’s accuser, the right to a speedy and public trial, the right to notice of the
accusations, the right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in one’s favor, and the right
against being put in jeopardy twice for the same offense. Id. at 523-524. Other rights, such as
the right to a jury trial or the right to appointed counsel are not, the BIA held, hallmarks of
whether a “conviction” is involved.
See Matter of Grullon, 20 I&N Dec. 12 (BIA 1989), holding that no “conviction”
occurred where the respondent qualified for a pretrial diversion program in Florida. The Florida
585
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client who successfully completes pretrial diversion in Nebraska
has not been “convicted” of a criminal offense for immigration
purposes.
(2)

Deferral of Judgment, Adjudication or Sentencing.

In 2019, the Nebraska Legislature adopted LB 686 which, among
other things, allows a court to defer entry of a judgment of
conviction under certain circumstances.586 However, for
immigration purposes, a client whose judgment has been deferred
under this statute has still been “convicted” of a crime for
immigration purposes because (1) the court has made a finding of
guilt and (2) ordered some form of punishment, penalty or restraint
on the client’s liberty. 587
Similarly, if a court finds a defendant guilty but then defers
sentencing, or accepts a guilty plea from a defendant but then
defers the adjudication of guilt while requiring the defendant to
engage in some sort of activity such as community service, the
client has been “convicted.” This is because the client has been
found guilty or has entered a plea of guilty and the court has
ordered some form of punishment, penalty or restraint on the
client’s liberty. In fact, even a guilty plea coupled with the mere
imposition of court costs, and no other penalty, satisfies the
definition of “conviction.”588 For these reasons, depending on the
exact contours of the process, a client who is involved in a
Nebraska drug court program may have been “convicted” under
the INA test if the client enters a plea of guilty and the court
imposes a form of punishment, penalty or restraint on the client’s
program, as described in Grullon, mirrors Nebraska’s in the sense that the client has not been
found guilty of any offense, nor has he entered a plea of guilty at the time of entry into the
pretrial diversion program.
586

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2292.
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See, e.g., Matter of Punu 22 I&N Dec. 224 (BIA 1998). In that case, the BIA
considered a Texas statute that permitted the defendant to enter a guilty plea and allowed the
court, once it had accepted such a plea, to withhold adjudication of guilt and (in the case at bar)
place the defendant on probation. The BIA held that the 1996 amendments to the INA that
resulted in the current version of § 101(a)(48)(A) clearly showed Congress’ intent to treat such a
situation as a “conviction” for immigration purposes.
588

Matter of Cabrera, 24 I&N Dec. 459 (BIA 2008). But see Guzman Gonzalez v.
Sessions, 894 F3d 131 (4th Cir. 2018), holding that imposition of costs under North Carolina
state law is not a “punishment or penalty” as those terms are used in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A).
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liberty; i.e., aa requirement that the client participate in drug court
activities.589
(3)

Probation.

For the reasons articulated in the preceding section, a client who is
sentenced to probation by a court has been “convicted” of a
criminal offense because he has either been found guilty of a crime
or has pled guilty and had some sort of punishment, penalty or
restraint on liberty imposed by virtue of being put on probation.590
(4)

Juvenile Adjudications.

A juvenile delinquency adjudication in a juvenile case is not a
“conviction” for purposes of the INA.591
(5)

Forum of Convictions.
(a)

Federal vs. State Convictions.

Unless otherwise set forth in a specific provision of the
INA, it does not matter whether a person is convicted of a
state crime or a federal crime -- so long as the crime fits the
categorical definition of a crime described in § 212 or
§ 237 of the INA, the conviction will make the person
inadmissible or deportable. In addition, a person may be
inadmissible or deportable as the result of conviction in a
tribal or municipal court.592

589

The author has heard from some Nebraska practitioners that clients have been able to
convince judges in a drug court setting to refrain from making them enter a guilty plea and then,
once the drug court procedures are complete, dismiss the case. If that is possible, then the client
has not been “convicted” for immigration purposes because the first prong of the statutory test
under the INA has not been satisfied. But if the court requires entry of a guilty plea, and then
allows the client to participate in drug court, that is a “conviction” for immigration purposes.
See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2246(4), defining “probation” as a sentence under which a
person found guilty of a crime upon verdict or plea is released by a court subject to conditions
imposed by the court and subject to supervision.
590
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Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000).

592

See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), relating to domestic
violence convictions.
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(b)

Foreign Convictions.

In most cases, foreign convictions will also qualify as
“convictions” under the provisions of the INA. In order to
qualify as a “conviction,” the foreign crime must, inter alia,
meet U.S. standards under most circumstances.593
(6)

Finality of Conviction.

Historically, a conviction must also be “final” in order for it to
qualify as a “conviction” under the INA.594 This means,
generally, that the client must have exhausted all direct appeals
available to him or her as a matter of right, or have waived such
appeals.595 The BIA has ruled on this issue, holding that the
finality requirement survived the adoption of IIRIRA.596
b.

Post Conviction Proceedings and Their Effect on Whether a
Person has been “Convicted.”
(1)

Statutory Set-Aside Under § 29-2264.

Under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2264(2), a person
convicted of certain criminal offenses may, under specified
circumstances, request that the sentencing court set aside the
conviction. If the court grants such a request, its order
rehabilitates the defendant in a number of ways, including

593

See, e.g., Matter of De La Nues, 18 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 1981) (holding that conduct
underlying a foreign conviction that would be merely a juvenile offense under U.S. standards
does not qualify as a “conviction” for immigration purposes); and Matter of McNaughton, 16
I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 1978), aff’d, 612 F.2d 457 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that a securities fraud
conviction under British law is substantially similar to conduct that would be criminal under U.S.
law, and is therefore a “conviction” for immigration purposes).
594

See, e.g., Smith v. Gonzalez, 468 F.3d 272 (5th Cir. 2006); Matter of Ozkok, 19 I&N
Dec. 546 (BIA 1988); Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901 (1955). But see Abiodun v. Gonzales, 461
F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2006), Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004) and
Griffiths v. I.N.S., 171 F.3d 994, 1008-1010 (5th Cir. 1999), (holding that the amendments to the
statute made by IIRIRA eliminated the requirement that a conviction be “final” in order to render
one deportable).
595

Pino, 349 U.S. 901. See also Will v. INS, 447 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1971).

596

Matter of J.M. Acosta, 27 I&N Dec. 420 (BIA 2018).
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nullifying the conviction, and removing all civil disabilities
imposed as a result of the conviction.597
Nevertheless, a beneficiary of this statutory scheme has still been
“convicted” of a criminal offense for immigration purposes, and
the set-aside granted by a court does not change that fact.598
(2)

Statutory Vacatur Under § 29-1819.02.

This statute allows a criminal defendant to request a vacatur of a
conviction in the event that the defendant was not given the
advisement required by the statute at the time of entering a guilty
or nolo contendere plea. The purpose of the advisement is to
inform the defendant that, if he is not a United States citizen, he
may face immigration consequences as the result of a guilty plea.
In the event that the advisement is not given, the court, upon the

597

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2264(5).

598

See, e.g., Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (1999); Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N
Dec. 621 (BIA 2003). In Roldan, the BIA held that if a court vacates a defendant’s conviction
for reasons related to post conviction rehabilitation, such a conviction still exists for purposes of
§ 101(a)(48)(A). In Pickering, the government alleged, and the BIA concluded, that the
criminal court in which the defendant had been convicted set aside the conviction in order to
avoid negative immigration consequences. The Sixth Circuit reversed the BIA’s decision
affirming the Immigration Judge’s order of deportation, however, because it held that the
government had not proven, by clear and convincing evidence, the reasons why the criminal
court had vacated the conviction. Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006).
However, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the BIA’s general holding that, if the government had
proven its allegations, a “conviction” would have still existed under the INA test.
But the Eighth Circuit does not agree with the Sixth Circuit’s burden of proof analysis.
Andrade-Zamora v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 945 (8th Cir. 2016). In that case, the Eighth Circuit held
that, in the context of a cancellation of removal case, the non-citizen bears the burden of proof to
show why a state court vacated his conviction, and if he presents no evidence showing that the
conviction was vacated due to a substantive or procedural defect, he has not carried his burden of
proof to show that the conviction was not vacated for a Pickering-type purpose. Curiously, the
Eighth Circuit does not discuss or cite the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Pickering in arriving at its
holding.
In 2018, the BIA reaffirmed its approach in Pickering, and indicated it would apply Pickering’s
reasoning on a nation-wide basis. Matter of Conde, 27 I&N Dec. 251 (BIA 2018). The import
of this decision is that if a conviction is vacated for an underlying procedural or substantive
defect, it is no longer a “conviction” for purposes of the § 101(a)(48) analysis.
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defendant’s request, must vacate the conviction and allow the
defendant to enter a plea of not guilty.599
In such circumstances, vacatur of the conviction is due to
deficiencies in the underlying proceedings, and not because of post
conviction rehabilitation, and therefore such a vacatur eliminates
the conviction for immigration purposes.600
(3)

Padilla Post Conviction Proceedings.

So-called Padilla post conviction proceedings attack the
underlying validity of convictions due to non-compliance by
counsel with the duty, under the Sixth Amendment, to advise
defendants of immigration consequences of guilty pleas. If a
conviction is vacated pursuant to such a proceeding, it is because
of an underlying legal defect in the original criminal proceedings,
and, as a result, no “conviction” would exist under the principles
articulated in Adamiak.
(4)

Pardons.

Although pardons do not negate “convictions,” they may help
avoid removal in certain cases, such as deportability for CIMTs,
aggravated felonies, and high-speed flights.601
(5)

Miscellaneous Considerations.

The BIA has held that, under a New York statute authorizing latereinstatement of a direct appeal in a criminal case, a “conviction”
still exists even if the state conviction is re-opened or is under
collateral attack.602

599

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02(2). See the earlier detailed discussion of Nebraska
cases interpreting this provision in section I.D.2.b.(2), supra.
600

See, e.g., Matter of Adamiak, 23 I&N Dec. 878 (BIA 2006), holding that vacatur of a
conviction under an Ohio statute that is similar to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1829.02 nullifies the
conviction for immigration purposes.
601

INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(v).

602

Matter of Cardenas-Abreu, 24 I&N Dec. 795 (BIA 2009). The Second Circuit
reversed Abreu, however, and so the holding is not good law in that circuit. Abreu v. Holder,
378 F. App’x 59 (2d Cir. May 24, 2010).
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The BIA has also held that a nunc pro tunc proceeding to correct
the conviction record as to what controlled substance was involved
in a controlled substance offense complies with Pickering because
such a substantive correction amends the subject matter of the
original conviction, which equates to a procedural or substantive
defect of the type that invalidates the conviction for immigration
purposes.603
3.

Relief from Removal.

Unlike grounds of inadmissibility, there are no “waivers” available to clients who
face removal under § 237 of the INA. Instead, the parallel concept that allows a
client to avoid deportation is called “relief from removal,” which can be thought
of as in the nature of an affirmative defense. Some clients may have available to
them various forms of relief from removal which, if successfully asserted, will
prevent the clients from being deported. Examples of such forms of relief could
include asylum claims,604 withholding of removal claims,605 cancellation of
removal claims,606 and so forth. While a complete consideration of all potential
forms of relief from removal is beyond the scope of this Guide, the important
concept to remember is that some clients may have the ability to avoid
deportation despite being convicted of certain crimes. Such relief from removal
will have to be sought before an Immigration Court if the clients are placed in
removal proceedings.
4.

Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude.

One who is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude is deportable if (1) the
conviction occurred within five years of the date of the person’s last admission to
the U.S. and (2) the crime of which the person is convicted carries a possible
sentence of one year or longer.607 If the person became a lawful permanent
resident under § 245(j) of the INA608 because he or she was a qualified informant,
then she or he is deportable if convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude
within 10 years of his or her last entry into the U.S. Substantively, the definition
603

Matter of Dingus, 28 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA 2022).

604

INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158.

605

INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).

606

INA § 240A(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (for certain permanent residents) and INA
§ 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (for certain non-permanent residents).
607

INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i).

608

8 U.S.C. § 1255(j).
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of “moral turpitude” for purposes of deportability is the same as it is for purposes
of inadmissibility.609
It is important to note that conviction of an attempt or conspiracy to commit a
crime involving moral turpitude, although perhaps carrying less severe
consequences in the criminal law context,610 makes no difference in the
immigration context. One who is convicted of an attempted crime involving
moral turpitude faces exactly the same immigration consequences as he or she
would had he or she been convicted of the underlying substantive offense.611
a.

Conviction Within Five Years of Last Admission.

The BIA has held that, in order for this ground of deportability to apply,
the crime involving moral turpitude must have been committed within five
years of the date of the admission by virtue of which a person was then
present in the United States.612 The facts of the case illustrate the rule.
Mr. Alyazji was admitted to the United States as a non-immigrant in 2001.
In 2006 he adjusted his status to that of a lawful permanent resident
(“green card holder”). In 2008, he was convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. The question the BIA had to decide was whether Mr.
Alyazji’s adjustment of status counted as an “admission,” which re-started
the five-year clock, and therefore made him deportable, or whether the
adjustment of status was not such an admission.
The BIA held that the most faithful reading of the statute is that an
“admission” for purposes of the five-year rule is an admission by which
the person actually is physically admitted to the United States. So,
although adjustment of status is clearly an “admission” in the sense that
one must demonstrate he or she is admissible (or, to say it another way,
not inadmissible) at the time of adjustment of status, it is not an
“admission” for purposes of the five-year rule in the deportation statute.
As a result, Mr. Alyazji was not deportable, because he committed the
609

See section V.C.3., supra.

610

See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-201.

611

See, e.g., Matter of McNaughton, 16 I&N Dec. 569 (BIA 1978). There is some
disagreement as to whether a person has the required mental state to commit a crime of moral
turpitude if he or she only needs to act recklessly in order to be convicted. Some courts have
held that it is “legally incoherent” for a person to attempt to act recklessly. Gill v. I.N.S, 420
F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2005); Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84 (3d Cir. 2004). In this type of
circumstance, being convicted of an attempt, as opposed to the underlying substantive offense,
would benefit the client in terms of immigration consequences.
612

Matter of Alyazji, 25 I&N Dec. 397 (BIA 2011).
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CIMT in 2008, which was more than five years after his physical
admission into the U.S. in 2001.
It is important to understand that the five- or ten-year dates referred to in
the statute begin from the date of the person’s last physical admission to
the U.S., regardless of how long the person has been living here.
Suppose, for example, your client is a Grecian national lawful permanent
resident who has been living in the U.S. for 50 years. She or he decides
to visit her or his family in Greece in 2021 and returns to the States on
December 3, 2021, after a three-week visit to Greece. If she or he is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude that carries a maximum
possible penalty of one year or longer at any time before June 3, 2026, he
or she will be deportable under this provision.
b.

Length of Maximum Possible Sentence.

Another important point is that a conviction of certain misdemeanors will
render a non-citizen deportable under this provision. Because the statute
speaks of crimes that carry possible sentences of one year or longer, this
includes crimes for which the maximum possible sentence is exactly one
year. In Nebraska, this would include Class I misdemeanors if the
underlying crime involves “moral turpitude.” So even a single
misdemeanor conviction may carry deportability consequences.
5.

Multiple Criminal Convictions.

This ground of deportability applies when a client is at any time after admission
convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, not arising out of a
single scheme of criminal misconduct, regardless if the client was confined as a
result of such convictions and regardless of whether the convictions arose out of a
single trial.613
As you can see, this ground of deportability differs from its cousin ground of
inadmissibility614 in several ways:
(1)

The crimes under the deportability statute must be crimes involving moral
turpitude, whereas the inadmissibility offenses need not involve moral
turpitude.

613

INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The BIA has held that a
defendant who was convicted in two counties of forgery and possession of stolen property based
on his use of multiple stolen credit or debit cards to obtain items of value from several retail
outlets on five separate occasions over the course of a day was convicted of crimes not arising
out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. Matter of Islam, 25 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 2011).
614

INA § 212(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).
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(2)

The crimes under the deportability statute must not arise out of a single
scheme of criminal conduct, whereas the inadmissibility ground would
apply even if the multiple convictions arise out of the same scheme of
criminal misconduct.615

(3)

There is no minimum length of sentence or confinement required for the
second or subsequent convictions to trigger the ground of deportability,
whereas under the inadmissibility statute, the aggregate sentences to
confinement imposed for the offenses must be at least five years.

6.

Aggravated Felonies.

Appropriately named, this is one of the more aggravating provisions in the entire
INA. Generally, it provides that one convicted of an “aggravated felony” at any
time after admission is deportable.616
The definition of “aggravated felony” is found in § 101(a)(43) of the INA.617
This term first made its appearance as a result of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988618 and has expanded dramatically since then. A great deal of federal
legislation enacted since 1988 that has dealt with deportation has added to the list
of crimes included in the definition of “aggravated felony.” A discussion of all
of the provisions of the aggravated felony definition is well beyond the scope of
this Guide, since analyses of what crimes constitute aggravated felonies literally
fill books. Following are highlights of some of the more frequently-encountered
subdivisions of the statute. Counsel are invited to consult the analyses of
individual Nebraska criminal statutes charts, and are cautioned to look closely at
the entire aggravated felony statute when assessing a criminal case.

615

In Wooden v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 1063 (2022), the Supreme
Court held that, for purposes of the enhancement provisions under the Armed Career Criminal
Act, a criminal defendant who was convicted of burglarizing 10 different storage units on the
same day did not constitute 10 separate “occasions” of burglary for ACCA purposes. Whether
this case might affect the “single scheme” analysis under § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) remains to be seen,
but it is possible that it may have some impact on the analysis.
616

INA § 237 (a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). This is often the least of an
immigration client’s worry, however. A client who has been convicted of an aggravated felony
is barred from seeking a whole host of immigration benefits or forms of relief from removal for
which she or he might be eligible in the absence of an aggravated felony conviction.
617

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).

618

Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, Nov. 18, 1988.
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a.

Murder, Rape or Sexual Abuse of a Minor.

The “murder” part of this statute619 is one of the original provisions of the
aggravated felony statute. By its terms, “murder” includes all levels of
crimes classified as “murder,” but would not include such crimes as
manslaughter.620
The provisions regarding rape and sexual abuse of a minor were added by
IIRIRA in 1996 and, due to the fact that the terms are not defined in the
statute, have frequently been the subject of litigation.
Because the statute does not define “rape,” courts have been left to
determine what Congress meant by that term. Most current criminal
statutes do not use the term “rape.” Instead, they use the term “sexual
assault.” Courts are therefore left to struggle with whether “rape” always
is “sexual assault” under applicable state statutory schemes. “Statutory
rape” is likely “rape” for purposes of the aggravated felony statute,621
although in light of the Supreme Court’s re-emphasis on the categorical
approach as articulated in Descamps, this may be an open question. In
Castro-Baez v. Reno,622 the Ninth Circuit held that sexual assault
committed by drugging the victim constituted “rape” as defined by the
aggravated felony statute.623 But, again, given the emphasis of following
the federal “generic” definition of an offense set forth in Descamps, this
619

INA § 101(a)(43)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A).

620

Probably. The BIA, in Matter of N-W-, 25 I&N Dec. 748 (BIA 2012) calls this
statement into question. The respondent in M-W-, while driving under the influence of alcohol,
rear-ended a car, killing the occupants on impact. He was charged with second degree murder
under a Michigan statute. The BIA held that one convicted of murder in violation of a statute
requiring only a showing of extreme recklessness or a “malignant heart” has been convicted of
“murder” for purposes of the aggravated felony statute even in a case where the defendant was
voluntarily intoxicated and no intent to kill was established. If the BIA really means what it
says in this opinion, it dramatically expanded the definition of “murder” for aggravated felony
purposes.
621

See, e.g., Silva v. Gonzalez, 455 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2006).

622

217 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2000).

623

The defendant argued that the California statute under which he was convicted was
not coterminous with the federal sexual assault statutory definitions, and therefore did not
constitute “rape.” The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that it had to define the term by
employing the ordinary, contemporary, and common meaning of that word and then determine
whether or not the conduct prohibited by the California statute fell within that definition. Id. at
1059.
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interpretation may be open to challenge. Other questions also arise with
regard to what constitutes “rape.” In a non-precedent decision, the BIA
held that sexual contact without penetration is not “rape” for purposes of
the aggravated felony statute.624 And, more recently, the BIA held that
“rape” means vaginal, anal or oral intercourse, or digital or mechanical
penetration, no matter how slight.625
“Sexual abuse of a minor” is defined very broadly by the BIA.626
Although the BIA has defined “minor” to include any victim of sexual
abuse under the age of 18,627 in Esquivel-Quintana,628 the Supreme Court
held that consensual sexual intercourse between an adult and a person age
16 or over is not “sexual abuse of a minor” under the aggravated felony
definition. However, if the crime of which one is convicted fits the
categorical definition of “sexual abuse of a minor,” even a state
misdemeanor conviction for sexual abuse of a minor constitutes an
aggravated felony under § 101(a)(43)(A).629
As can be seen from this very brief discussion, this is a very complex area
of law. Practitioners are invited to consult the analyses of individual
624

Matter of Gutierrez-Martinez, 2004 WL 880256 (BIA 2004) (unpublished).

625

Matter of Keeley, 27 I&N Dec. 146 (BIA 2017).

626

See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I&N Dec. 991 (BIA 1999), holding that
a respondent convicted of indecent exposure to a minor in the minor’s presence for the purposes
of sexual gratification had been convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor” for purposes of the
aggravated felony statute. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that conviction of indecent
conduct in the presence of a minor under an Arizona statute was not “sexual abuse of a minor”
because the statute neither required that the minor be touched or even be aware of the
defendant’s conduct. Rebilas v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2007). The defendant was
convicted of public indecency to a minor by, “in the presence of a minor, intentionally or
knowingly engaged in an act of sexual contact and was reckless about whether a minor under the
age of fifteen years was present.” Id. at 1164. In Matter of Guevara Alfaro, 25 I&N Dec. 417
(BIA 2011), the BIA held that any intentional sexual conduct by an adult with a child involves
moral turpitude, as long as the perpetrator knew or should have known that the victim was under
the age of 16.
627

Matter of V-F-D, 23 I&N Dec. 859 (BIA 2006).

628

137 S. Ct. 1562, 198 L. Ed. 2d 22 (2017).

629

Matter of Small, 23 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2002). See also Garcia-Urbano v.
Sessions, 890 F.3d 726 (8th Cir. 2018), holding that violation of a Minnesota statute
criminalizing even consensual sexual intercourse between a defendant who was age 18 and his
victim who was age 15 constituted aggravated felony sexual abuse of a minor.)

169

Nebraska criminal statutes at the end of this Guide for a more detailed
consideration of how various Nebraska statutes would be interpreted.
b.

Drug Trafficking.

Section 101(a)(43)(B) of the INA630 states that “illicit trafficking in a
controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act), including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section
24(c) of title 18, United States Code),” is an aggravated felony. Thus, a
drug offense can be an aggravated felony in two ways: (1) it constitutes
“illicit trafficking” or (2) it is statutorily defined in the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) as a “drug trafficking crime.”
The first way in which an offense can be a “drug trafficking” offense is if
the defendant is convicted of an offense that involves unlawful trading or
dealing for profit in a drug classified as a “controlled substance” under the
CSA.631 This would include offenses whose elements involve sale of a
controlled substance or possession of a controlled substance with intent to
deliver.
The second way in which a drug offense can be a “trafficking” offense is
if it is defined as a “drug trafficking crime” in the CSA. Until 2006,
many individuals faced deportation as “aggravated felons” if they were
convicted of simple drug possession offenses that were classified as
felonies under applicable state law, since the BIA held that an offense
could be an aggravated felony if it was classified as a felony under either
state or federal law.632 In 2006, the United States Supreme Court had
occasion to interpret this portion of the statute in Lopez v. Gonzalez.633 In
Lopez, the Court held that, in order to be an aggravated felony under
§ 101(a)(43)(B), a drug trafficking offense must meet the federal
definition of “felony” –- a state drug offense, even if classified as a felony
under applicable state law, does not constitute an aggravated felony under
§ 101(a)(43)(B) unless the state offense would qualify as a “trafficking”
offense under the federal definition in the CSA. This decision resolved a
630

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).

631

21 U.S.C. § 802, et seq. See, e.g., Matter of Davis, 20 I&N Dec. 536, 541 (BIA
1992). If a drug offense does not include an element of dealing or delivery, but instead requires
only an offer to sell, it is not a “trafficking” offense. See, e.g., Matter of Garcia-Torres, A45
864 724 (BIA October 19, 2006), (unpublished); Davila v. Holder, 381 F. App’x 413 (5th Cir.
2010).
632

Matter of Yanez, 23 I&N Dec. 390 (BIA 2002).

633

549 U.S. 47 (2006).
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split in the circuits, some of which had held that drug trafficking offenses
that were merely misdemeanors under federal law, but felonies under state
law, qualified as “aggravated felonies” under § 101(a)(43)(B). In the
wake of Lopez, a drug trafficking offense must be a felony under the
federal definition in order to constitute an aggravated felony.634
Recognize, however, that under the CSA, one type of simple possession
offense is considered to be a felony “trafficking” offense: simple
possession of flunitrazepam.635
One of the issues left open by the Lopez decision was whether a second or
subsequent state drug offense for simple possession could be considered to
be an aggravated felony. The issue arose because, under federal law,
simple possession of a controlled substance after a prior final conviction
for drug possession is a felony.636 This is sometimes referred to as the
federal “recidivist possession” felony provision. In 2010, the Supreme
Court held that second or subsequent simple possession offenses are not
aggravated felony offenses under INA § 101(a)(43)637 unless the state
conviction is based on the fact of a prior conviction.638 In other words, in
order for a defendant to be a recidivist “drug trafficker,” he or she must
either admit his or her status or a judge or jury must determine that the
defendant is a recidivist. A simple subsequent conviction of a drug
possession offense, without more, will not suffice.
The Fifth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, has held that a defendant
who pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana, but whose sentence
was enhanced on the basis of a prior conviction for delivery of cocaine,
was guilty of a drug trafficking offense due to the enhancement provision,
which made the defendant a drug trafficker under the recidivist provision
of the Controlled Substances Act.639 This seems like quite a stretch, and
634

The defendant in Lopez was convicted of helping someone else possess cocaine in
South Dakota. South Dakota state law treated such conduct as the equivalent of possessing
cocaine, which was a felony offense under state law. Mere possession of cocaine is not a felony
under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 844(a)), however.
635

21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Prior to 2010, simple possession of crack cocaine was also a
drug trafficking offense, but the statute was amended by § 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,
Pub. L. No. 111-220, (August 3, 2010), to omit any reference to crack cocaine.
636

Id.

637

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).

638

Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010).

639

Okon v. Holder, No. 10-60347, 2011 WL 1773514 (5th Cir. May 10, 2011).
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there do not appear to be any other holdings finding that a simple
possession offense is a drug trafficking offense based only on the fact of
the sentence being enhanced for a prior conviction.
As discussed earlier,640 the Supreme Court has ruled that one convicted
under a Georgia statute of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
was not convicted of an aggravated felony trafficking offense where he
distributed a small amount of marijuana for no remuneration.641
c.

Firearms Trafficking.

INA § 101(a)(43)(C)642 states that “illicit trafficking in firearms or
destructive devices (as defined in section 921 of title 18, United States
Code) or in explosive materials (as defined in section 841(c) of that title)”
is an aggravated felony. This is a fairly straightforward provision and,
unlike drug trafficking crimes, here, “trafficking” is used in the ordinary
sense of the word – i.e., to sell or deal in “firearms,” “destructive devices,”
or “explosive materials” as those terms are defined in the applicable
statutes.643
d.

Firearms Offenses.

INA § 101(a)(43)(E)(ii)644 provides that conviction of any offense
“described in” certain sections of the U.S. criminal code relating to
firearms are aggravated felonies. It is important, in analyzing any state
criminal offenses, to make certain that you match the elements of the state
offense with the crimes described in the federal statutes listed in INA
§ 101(a)(43)(E)(ii). Consult the statutory analysis charts for analysis of
how individual Nebraska firearms offenses match the federal statutes.
One important fact to note is that the United States Supreme Court has
held that a state firearms offense can be an aggravated felony firearms
offense if it is otherwise described in the applicable federal statutes even
though the state offense does not contain an interstate commerce
element.645
640

See section V.C.3.b., supra.
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Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013).

642

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C).
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INA § 101(a)(43)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E), also describes offenses that relate
to firearms and explosive devices and makes them aggravated felonies.
644

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii).

645

Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 194 L. Ed. 2d 737 (2016).
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e.

Crimes of Violence.

INA § 101(a)(43)(F)646 makes a “crime of violence” an aggravated felony
if the term of imprisonment imposed by a court for such crime is at least
one year. “Crime of violence” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16 as “(a) an
offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other
offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of another may be used
in the course of committing the offense.” However, in 2018 the
Supreme Court declared subsection (b) to be unconstitutionally vague
(see discussion below). That subsection can no longer be used to describe
an aggravated felony crime of violence.647
Subsection (a) describes an offense that has, as an element, the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another. A typical example of such an offense is first degree
sexual assault, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319. Conviction under this statute
requires proof of, inter alia, sexual penetration. That constitutes the use
of physical force against the person of another and, therefore, fits the
definition of “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).648 It is worth
looking briefly at a few noteworthy decisions interpreting this statute.
(1)

Leocal v. Ashcroft.649

In Leocal v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court held that a client
convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and causing
646

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).

647

The Supreme Court has held that an attempt to commit a Hobbs Act robbery cannot
be a “crime of violence” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) because an “attempt” cannot,
by definition, involve a defendant using, attempting to use, or threatening to use force. United
States v. Taylor, ___ U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (June 21, 2022). However, because “attempts”
are also aggravated felonies (see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U)), such an offense would be an
aggravated felony crime of violence.
648

In other illustrative examples, the Eighth Circuit has held that pointing a gun at
another person is categorically a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 16(a) because it involves the
threatened use of physical force against another person (Reyes-Soto v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 369 (8th
Cir. 2015)), and the BIA has held that a conviction for an aggravated felony under a Puerto Rico
statute that does not require the use of violent physical force is not categorically a crime of
violence under this same statutory provision (Matter of Guzman-Polanco, 26 I&N Dec. 713
(BIA 2016).
649

543 U.S. 1 (2004).
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serious bodily injury was not convicted of an aggravated felony
because, under the Florida statute at issue in that case, a showing
of mere negligence was necessary in order to sustain a conviction.
Because there was no mens rea requirement to convict under the
Florida statute, the Supreme Court held that the offense was not a
“crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16, and therefore not an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).650 The Court
had no trouble holding that conviction under such a statute did not
satisfy the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), because the Court
interpreted “use” as requiring “active employment,” something not
present in a statute where mere negligent conduct will sustain a
conviction.
(2)

Matter of Sanudo.651

In Matter of Sanudo, the BIA held that conviction for domestic
battery in violation of §§ 242 and 243(e) of the California Penal
Code did not constitute a “crime of violence” because the statutes
criminalize “willful and unlawful use of force or violence” against
another. This language, the BIA held, was so broad that it could
include conduct that was not “violent” in the sense intended by
18 U.S.C. § 16, and therefore did not meet the definition of “crime
of violence” necessary to turn the conviction into an aggravated
felony under INA § 101(a)(43)(F).
(3)

Johnson v. United States (Johnson I).652

Although not an immigration case, Johnson v. United States agreed
in general with the BIA’s reasoning in Sanudo. In Johnson, the
defendant was convicted of knowingly possessing ammunition
after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). The government sought prosecution enhancement
under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), which provides that a person who has 3
previous convictions for a “violent” felony must be imprisoned for
a minimum of 15 years. The term “violent felony” is defined in

650

Until recently, there was some question as to whether Leocal could also be read to
stand for the proposition that reckless behavior is not sufficient to meet the definition of “crime
of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 16. That was settled by the Supreme Court in Borden v. United
States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021), holding that reckless behavior is not sufficient to meet the “crime
of violence” definition.
651

23 I&N Dec. 968 (BIA 2006).

652

559 U.S. 133 (2010).
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18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) in a very similar way to “crime of
violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16.
One of the Florida statutes under which the defendant in Johnson
was convicted allowed conviction for actually and intentionally
touching or striking another person against that person’s will or
intentionally causing bodily harm to another.653 The Supreme
Court held that, for purposes of a “violent felony,” there must be
“violent” force involved; i.e., force capable of causing physical
pain or injury to another.654 And the Court specifically drew a
comparison between the definition of “violent felony” in 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) and the definition of “crime of violence” in
18 U.S.C. § 16(a).655 As a result, it appears that any assaultive
offense that does not involve physical force sufficient to cause pain
or injury to another cannot be a “crime of violence” for purposes of
18 U.S.C. § 16(a).
(4)

Johnson v. United States (Johnson II).656

One of the more momentous cases decided in this area was the
2015 Supreme Court opinion in Johnson v. U.S (not to be confused
with the 2010 Johnson v. United States opinion by the Supreme
Court). The 2015 case is important not only because of the
holding in the case but also because of what it portends for the
future of the “crime of violence” analysis in an immigration
context. Johnson involved a defendant who had a long criminal
history. He was prosecuted for the federal offense of being a
felon in possession of a firearm. The government sought to
enhance his sentence under the provisions of the Armed Career
Criminal Act (ACCA) due to, among other things, his previous
conviction under Minnesota law of possessing a short-barreled
shotgun. The government sought to enhance Johnson’s sentence
under the so-called “residual clause” of the ACCA.657 The
Supreme Court held that the residual clause violates the Due
653

Id. at 136.

654

Id. at 140-141.

655

Id.
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576 U.S. 591 (2015).

That provision is found at 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), and defines a “violent felony”
as one that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.”
657

175

Process Clause because it is void for vagueness. The Court found
two major problems with the residual clause: (1) it requires a judge
to imagine the “ordinary case” offense, regardless of what the
actual facts are of the case, and (2) it fails to define how much risk
is necessary to qualify a crime as a violent felony.658 In holding
the residual clause to be an unconstitutionally vague statute, the
Supreme Court overruled 4 of its prior decisions that mandated the
use of the “ordinary case” approach to determining whether the
residual clause applied.659
(5)

Voisine v. United States.660

In 2016, the Supreme Court decided a case that, at first blush,
seemed to stand for the proposition that a mens rea of recklessness
is sufficient to constitute a crime of violence under the aggravated
felony statute. But that interpretation turned out not to be
correct.661 In Voisine v. United States, the Court held that a
reckless domestic assault qualifies as a “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” under 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(33)(A) and 922
(g)(9). The Court reasoned that the language in the statute662
includes not only knowing or intentional acts,663 but also those
committed recklessly.

658

Id. at 597.
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The cases overruled by Johnson are James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007);
Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009);
and Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011).
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136 S. Ct. 2272, 195 L. Ed. 2d 736 (2016).

661

See Borden, supra., specifically recognizing that the holding in Voisine was
statutory-specific, and does not control the more generic analysis of whether reckless behavior is
a sufficient mens rea to constitute a crime of violence. Borden, supra., 141 S. Ct. at 1825.
18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), which defines a “misdemeanor domestic violence
offense” as one that “has, as an element, the use or attempted use of physical force, or the
threatened use of a deadly weapon, committed by a current or former spouse, parent, or guardian
of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in common, by a person who is
cohabiting with or has cohabited with the victim as a spouse, parent, or guardian, or by a person
similarly situated to a spouse, parent, or guardian of the victim.”
662

663

The Court has held that knowing and intentional acts violate the statute. United
States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157 (2014).
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(6)

Sessions v. Dimaya.664

In Dimaya, the Supreme Court finished the work it began in
Johnson II, supra., and held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is also
unconstitutionally vague. After the Johnson opinion held that the
residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) was
unconstitutionally vague, Mr. Dimaya mounted a challenge to the
constitutionality of subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 16, given the
similarity in language between the two statutes.665 The Supreme
Court, without much discussion, held that, for the same reasons it
articulated in Johnson in holding the ACCA residual clause
unconstitutional, subsection (b) was also unconstitutionally vague.
(7)

Stokeling v. United States.666

In a bit of a surprise holding, the Supreme Court held, in a 5-4
decision, that a conviction of violation of the Florida robbery
statute qualifies as a “violent felony” for purposes of the ACCA,
because the physical force required under the ACCA, for purposes
of analyzing state robbery convictions, only requires the force,
however slight, necessary to overcome the victim’s resistance. As
an example, the Court held that, at common law, the force required
to pull a diamond pin out of a woman’s hair constituted sufficient
force to qualify as robbery. And that type of force, the Court held,
is sufficient to qualify a Florida robbery offense as an ACCA
predicate “violent felony.”
The Court noted that in Johnson II, supra., it had held that there
must be greater force to qualify a battery as a “violent felony” for
ACCA purposes. But, the Court held, that is because the common
law definition of battery, from which Congress borrowed in
writing the ACCA, required force sufficient to cause pain to the
victim. Not so with respect to common law robbery.

664

138 S. Ct. 1204, 200 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2018).

665

Compare the language of the two statutes. The residual clause of the ACCA defines
a “violent felony” as, inter alia, a federal felony offense that “otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(3)(2)(B)(ii).
Subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 16 defines a “crime of violence” as “any other offense that is a
felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or
property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”
666

139 S. Ct. 544, 202 L. Ed. 2d 512 (2019).
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The dissent, written by Justice Sotomayor, wasn’t buying this
distinction:667
Starting today, however, the phrase “physical force”
in § 924(e)(2)(B)(I) will apparently lead a Janusfaced existence. When it comes to battery, that
phrase will look toward ordinary meaning; when it
comes to robbery, that same piece of statutory text
will look toward the common law. To the extent
that is a tenable construction, the majority has
announced a brave new world of textual
interpretation.668
Nevertheless, five votes are more than four, so for purposes of
analyzing robbery offenses for ACCA purposes, even a slight force
is enough to qualify as sufficient force to constitute a “violent
felony.” As Justice Sotomayor points out, the result will be
different if the predicate offense in question is battery.
(8)

Matter of Dang.669

The BIA struggled to reconcile the holdings in Johnson,
Castleman,670 and Stokeling in Matter of Dang, a reported opinion
it released in April, 2022. The precise issue in Dang was whether
conviction of domestic battery under the Louisiana domestic abuse
battery statute constitutes a “crime of domestic violence” for
purposes of INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i). 671 The BIA held that, for
purposes of § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), a “crime of domestic violence” means
that the definition of “violence,” as set forth in both Johnson and
Stokeling, must be met. The BIA held that a mere offense of
touching would not constitute a “domestic violence offense:”
[W]e must now read Johnson and Stokeling together to
assess whether a statute categorically requires proof of
667

The voting split on this case was interesting. Justice Thomas wrote the majority
opinion, in which Justices Breyer, Alito, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined. Chief Justice Roberts,
along with Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, joined Justice Sotomayor in the dissent.
668

Id. at 560.

669

28 I&N Dec. 541 (BIA 2022).

670

572 U.S. 157 (2018).

671

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).
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“physical force” under § 16(a) in determining removability
under § 237(a)(2)(E)(i). The level of force is not satisfied
by a battery statute that criminalizes mere offensive
touching but is satisfied by a robbery statute that requires
proof of force sufficient to overcome the slightest
resistance. 672
Ultimately, the BIA determined that the definition of “crime of
violence” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) controls the definition of
a deportable “domestic violence” offense, and that a state statute
criminalizing simple battery by one domestic partner against
another – which Louisiana defines to include “the most trifling or
‘merely offensive’ touching” – does not meet that definition.673
f.

Theft Offenses.

Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43)(G)674 states that a “theft
offense,” including receipt of stolen property, or a “burglary” offense is an
aggravated felony if the client is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at
least one year.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the definitions of the terms
“theft” and “burglary” must be uniform, and must not depend on the
definitions given those terms by various states.675 In Taylor, the Supreme
Court adopted a “generic, contemporary” meaning of burglary (i.e., the
definition that is now used in most states’ criminal codes).676 The Court
held, “Although the exact formulations vary, the generic, contemporary
meaning of burglary contains at least the following elements: an unlawful
or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure,
with intent to commit a crime.”677

Dang 28 I&N Dec. at 549. One senses the BIA’s frustration at trying to align the
disparate holdings in Johnson and Stokeling.
672

673

Id. at 550.

674

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).

675

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).

676

Id. at 598.

677

Id. In a later decision, the BIA held, applying this definition, that burglary of a
vehicle under Texas law is not a “burglary offense” under the aggravated felony definition,
because a structure was not involved. Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 1325 (BIA 2000).
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In Gonzalez v. Duenas-Alvarez,678 the Supreme Court held that aiding and
abetting is included in the generic definition of “theft,” which it defined as
“taking of property or an exercise of control over property without consent
with the criminal intent to deprive the owner of rights and benefits of
ownership, even if such deprivation is less than total or permanent.”679
The BIA has held that a respondent who was convicted of unlawful
driving and taking a vehicle in violation of California law was convicted
of a “theft offense.”680 The Eighth Circuit has held that one who violates
Iowa’s identity theft statute has committed a “theft offense.”681
Because Nebraska has consolidated all theft offenses,682 any violations of
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-509 through 25-518 would be “theft offenses” for
purposes of Nebraska state law whether the theft resulted from intentional
taking or whether it resulted from the victim being defrauded. However,
a theft offense that is committed obtaining consent of the victim to transfer
the property when the victim’s consent was obtained by fraud does not
satisfy the federal generic definition of “theft” and therefore could not be
an aggravated felony theft offense.683 This once again proves the maxim,
“What’s bad for the criminal defendant is good for the immigration
respondent.”
The Supreme Court has held that, in order to be guilty of aggravated
identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), a defendant must know that
the “means of identification” she or he unlawfully transferred, possessed,
or used did, in fact, belong to another person.684
In an interesting case out of the Third Circuit, the Court held that where a
theft offense also involves fraud and deceit, the requirements of both INA
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549 U.S. 183 (2007).
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Id. at 189.

680

Matter of V-Z-S, 22 I&N Dec. 1338 (BIA 2000).

681

United States v. Mejia-Barba, 327 F.3d 678 (8th Cir. 2003).
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Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-510.

683

See, e.g., Matter of Garcia-Madruga, 24 I&N Dec. 436 (BIA 2008). See also,
Matter of Koat, 28 I&N Dec. 450, 453 (BIA 2022).
684

Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009).
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§ 101(a)(43)(G)685 and INA § 101(a)(43)(M)(i)686 must be met in order
for the offense to be an aggravated felony.687
In United States v. Figueroa-Estrada,688 the Fifth Circuit held that
conviction under a state statute that can be violated either by depriving the
owner of his property or by “appropriating” the property is a divisible
statute as to whether it is a theft offense, because the “appropriating”
division of the statute does not fit the generic definition of “theft” adopted
by the Supreme Court in Taylor, supra. As a result, the Fifth Circuit used
the modified categorical approach to determine which part of the statute
the defendant violated.689 Under a strict categorical analysis required by
Descamps, this approach is no longer viable, since the statute in question
merely involves different means of committing the same offense, and not
elements of separate crimes.
In a 2016 opinion, the Fourth Circuit held that, using the categorical
approach, an embezzlement is not a “theft” for purposes of this analysis
because the generic definition of a “theft” involves taking another’s
property without his or her consent, whereas at least the initial taking of
property in an embezzlement is done with the consent of the owner, albeit
the consent is obtained by fraud.690

685

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G).

686

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i). This provision includes under the definition of an
aggravated felony a fraud offense in which the loss to the victim exceeds $10,000.
687

Nugent v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2004).

688

416 F. App’x 377 (5th Cir. 2011).

Although decided before Descamps, the Fifth Circuit’s analysis for determining
whether the state statute was divisible would still be good, since the statute in question appears to
contain different elements, and not merely list different means of committing the same crime:
(1) A person commits theft if he or she knowingly obtains or uses, or endeavors to obtain
or to use, the property of another with intent to, either temporarily or permanently:
(a) Deprive the other person of a right to the property or a benefit from the property.
(b) Appropriate the property to his or her own use or to the use of any person not
entitled to the use of the property.
Fla. Stat. § 812.014 (2004) (416 F. App’x. at 381).
689
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Mena v. Lynch, 820 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2016).
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g.

RICO Offenses.

Any offense listed under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 relating to Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations is an aggravated felony, provided
that the maximum sentence possible is one year or more.691 As with
crimes of violence, this includes a number of crimes, and practitioners
should become familiar with the types of crimes listed in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962. Such offenses could include bankruptcy fraud, bribery,
counterfeiting, extortion, wire and mail fraud, unlawful debt collection,
and other crimes of the type described in the federal statute.
h.

Failure to Appear.

If a criminal defendant commits the offense of failing to appear for service
of a sentence, he or she commits an aggravated felony, provided that the
underlying offense is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years
or more.692 Additionally, if a person fails to appear before a court
pursuant to a court order “to answer to or dispose of” a felony charge for
which the possible punishment is two years or more, she or he has
committed an aggravated felony.693
i.

Attempts and Conspiracies.

Any attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the offenses defined as
aggravated felonies is, in and of itself, an aggravated felony.694
7.

Controlled Substance Offenses.

INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i)695 states that any non-citizen who has been convicted any
time after admission of a violation (or a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any
law or regulation of a State, of the United States, or of a foreign country relating
to controlled substances is deportable. This ground of deportability reads very
much like the ground of inadmissibility discussed above696 with two exceptions.
First, in order to make a non-citizen deportable, the controlled substance
691

INA § 101(a)(43)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(J).

692

INA § 101(a)(43)(Q), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(Q).

693

INA § 101(a)(43)(T), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(T).

694

INA § 101(a)(43)(U), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U).

695

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

696

See section V.C.5., supra.
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conviction must have occurred after admission into the U.S. Second, there is an
exception to this ground of deportability for a single offense of simple possession
of 30 grams or less of marijuana.697
INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii)698 states that if, at any time after admission, a non-citizen
is or has been a “drug abuser” or “addict,” he or she is deportable. This ground
of deportability is very similar to the related ground of inadmissibility699 and will
likely be interpreted in the same way.700
8.

Firearms Offenses.

A non-citizen is deportable if, at any time after being admitted into the U.S., she
or he is convicted under any law of purchasing, selling, offering for sale,
exchanging, using, owning, possessing or carrying any weapon, part or accessory
that falls under the definition of a firearm or destructive device, as those
definitions appear in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(3) and (4).701 A conviction for
attempting or conspiring to commit a firearm offense also renders one
deportable.702
This ground of deportability should not be confused with the aggravated felony
firearms offenses703 -- it is much more inclusive. Although one convicted of a
firearms offense that makes him deportable under this provision may also have
been convicted of an aggravated felony trafficking offense, the two tests are not
697

One facing the issue of inadmissibility as the result of a controlled substance offense
must affirmatively request a waiver if the conviction fits the “30 grams or less” simple
possession category. In the deportation context, conviction of such an offense is a straight
exception to the ground of deportability -- no affirmative request for relief from removal is
necessary.
698

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii).

699

INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv). See discussion in section
V.C.2., supra.
700

Most of the time, the ground of inadmissibility is interpreted by a consular officer of
the State Department, who is evaluating the admissibility of a person attempting to enter the U.S.
from abroad, whereas this ground of deportability will be interpreted by a DHS official here in
the U.S. As a practical matter, however, DHS officials often look to State Department
guidance on issues of inadmissibility when interpreting companion provisions of deportability.
701

INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C).

702

Id.
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INA § 101(a)(43)(C) and (E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(C) and (E).
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identical, and counsel should look closely at the two statutes to determine if both
are implicated by a particular conviction.
If the person is charged with a crime that does not involve a firearm as an
essential element of the offense, but receives an enhanced sentence because a
firearm was involved, most courts hold that this is not a firearms offense for
immigration purposes.704
In Nebraska, it appears as though any offense involving the definition of a
“firearm” will not be a firearms offense for purposes of INA § 237(a)(2)(C)
because the definition of “firearm” under the Nebraska statutes includes antique
firearms, whereas the federal definition of “firearm” specifically excludes antique
firearms.705 Although it is incumbent upon a client to demonstrate that there is a
realistic probability that a person could be prosecuted for possessing an antique
firearm under the Nebraska statutes, the Nebraska Court of Appeals has affirmed
the conviction of a person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm
under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1206 where the firearms he possessed were black
powder pistols.706 Such pistols are “antique firearms” under the federal
definition.707
9.

Domestic Violence Offenses and Crimes of Child Abuse, Neglect, or
Abandonment.
a.

Domestic Violence Offenses.

There are two types of domestic violence offenses that make a non-citizen
deportable: (1) conviction of certain “domestic violence” offenses and (2)

704

See, e.g., Matter of Rodriguez-Cortes, 20 I&N Dec. 587 (BIA 1992); but see Vue v.
I.N.S., 92 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that a conviction for aggravated robbery with a
weapon did constitute a firearms offense where the record of conviction demonstrated that a
firearm was used in the commission of the crime). It seems unlikely that this case would be
decided the same way today, given the reinforced holdings of the categorical approach in cases
such as Descamps, Moncrieffe and Mathis. Additionally, the client did not contest the
government’s use of the indictment during removal proceedings, which is the document from
which it was determined that a weapon was involved.
Compare the definition of “firearm” in Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-1201(1) with the
definition in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a).
705
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State v. Tharp, 22 Neb. App. 454, 854 N.W.2d 651 (2014), affirming the conviction
of a person convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of § 28-1206.
707

18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(16).
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violation of protection orders. Each of these offenses is discussed in turn
below.708
If a non-citizen, after being admitted to the U.S., is convicted of a crime of
domestic violence, stalking, child abuse, child neglect, or child
abandonment, he or she is deportable.709 The term “crime of domestic
violence” means any crime of violence (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16)710
committed against (1) a current or former spouse, (2) a person with whom
the client shares a child in common, (3) a person with whom the client
either is living or with whom the client once lived as a spouse, (4) a person
“similarly situated” to a spouse under the laws of the jurisdiction where
the crime is committed, or (5) a person who is protected from the client
under the domestic or family violence laws of the United States, any state,
any tribal government, or any unit of local government.711
There has been a significant amount of litigation concerning this
deportation provision. As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has
weighed in with two significant decisions in this area: the Castleman and
Voisine decisions.712
In 2006, the BIA issued an important decision interpreting this ground of
deportability. In Matter of Sanudo,713 the BIA held that a non-citizen’s
conviction for domestic battery in violation of California law was not
categorically a “crime of violence” and therefore the § 237(a)(2)(E)(i)
ground of deportability did not apply.714 Other decisions have followed
708

It is important to note that this ground of deportability does not have a counterpart
ground of inadmissibility under INA § 212, 8 U.S.C. § 1182. However, a domestic violence
offense may also be considered as a crime involving moral turpitude (see, e.g., Matter of Tran,
21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996); but see Matter of Sanudo, 23 I&N Dec. 968 (2006), limiting the
Tran analysis), or may be considered some other type of inadmissible or deportable offense,
depending on the facts of the case.
709

INA § 237(a)(2)(E)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).

710

In light of the Dimaya opinion holding subsection (b) of 18 U.S.C. § 16 to be
unconstitutionally vague, one only need be concerned with whether the offense fits the definition
of “crime of violence” under subsection (a).
711

Id.
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See section V.D.6.d., supra, for a discussion of Castleman and Voisine.
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23 I&N Dec. 968 (BIA 2006).

Sanudo also held that violation of this California statute did not constitute a “crime
involving moral turpitude” under § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), because under
714
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this same analysis.715 Given the decision in Johnson v. United States,716
there is a good argument that any statute under which a conviction can be
obtained without a showing of at least bodily injury is not a “crime of
violence.”717
There is also a very good argument that, under certain statutes, a crime of
violence is not involved even if there is bodily injury present. In a 2018
order (on file with the author), Judge Anderson of the Omaha Immigration
Court held that conviction under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-310(1) (third degree
assault – intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury to a
domestic partner) is not a crime of domestic violence because, under the
categorical approach, the statute is indivisible, and recklessness is not a
sufficient level of scienter to support a finding that the statute is a crime of
violence.718
Finally, the BIA held in a 2022 precedent opinion that a state domestic
battery statute that criminalizes trifling or merely offensive touching does
not constitute a crime of domestic violence.719
The Board of Immigration Appeals issued a significant decision in 2016
interpreting this deportability provision. In Matter of H. Estrada,720 the
BIA held that the circumstance-specific approach as set forth by the U.S.

California law, a conviction could be sustained for a very minor and incidental unconsented-to
touching of the victim, not necessarily involving any violence or tangible harm. Id. at 972.
See, e.g., Bhan v. Gonzalez, 198 F. App’x 604 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
conviction under a Washington fourth degree assault statute was not a “crime of violence,” and
therefore not a “domestic violence offense,” because the statute can be violated by mere touching
or spitting); Matter of Sejas, 24 I&N Dec. 236 (BIA 2007) (holding the same way, and for the
same reasons, with respect to a Virginia statute).
715
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559 U.S. 133 (2010).

717

In fact, a local immigration practitioner has reported to us that she was able to
convince an Immigration Judge that a conviction of her client under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-323 for
domestic assault was not a “crime of violence” and therefore did not render her client deportable
under § 237(a)(2)(E)(I).
This decision is obviously bolstered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v.
United States. See section V.D.6.e.(1), supra.
718
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Matter of Dang, discussed supra at section V.D.6.e.(8).
26 I&N Dec. 749 (BIA 2016).
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Supreme Court in the Nijhawan case,721 rather than a strict categorical
approach as articulated by Descamps,722 was the appropriate method to
use to determine whether the assault crime of which the respondent was
convicted was committed against a person who qualifies as a domestic
partner. And, of course, there is the Voisine decision723 that reinforces
this circumstance-specific approach in such cases.
The INA also renders deportable any non-citizen who violates a protection
order issued against that person.724 A “protection order” includes not
only free-standing proceedings, such as those under Nebraska’s Protection
From Domestic Abuse Act,725 but also temporary orders entered ancillary
to other proceedings, such as the types of temporary orders that may be
entered in conjunction with dissolution or legal separation actions.726
Understand that even if the client is not convicted of a criminal offense for
violating the protection order, she or he could still be deportable: even a
finding of civil contempt would satisfy the provisions of this part of the
statute.727
b.

Child Abuse, Neglect, or Abandonment.

The Board of Immigration Appeals has interpreted this ground of
deportability expansively, to include any offense involving an intentional,
knowing, reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission that constitutes
maltreatment of a child or that impairs a child’s physical or mental wellbeing, including sexual abuse or exploitation.728 In Aguilar-Barajas, the
BIA outlined the breadth of its holding:
At a minimum, this definition encompasses convictions for
offenses involving the infliction on a child of physical harm, even
if slight; mental or emotional harm, including acts injurious to
721

See the discussion of Nijhawan in section V.C.3.b.(6), supra.

722

See the discussion of Descamps in section V.C.3.b.(8), supra.

723

See section V.D.6.d.(5), supra.

724

INA § 237(a)(3)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).

725

Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 42-901 to 42-929.

726

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-357.

727

See, e.g., Diaz-Quirazco v. Barr, 931 F.3d 830 (9th Cir. 2019).

728

Matter of Aguilar-Barajas, 28 I&N Dec. 354 (BIA, 2021).
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morals; sexual abuse, including direct acts of sexual contact, but
also including acts that induce (or omissions that permit) a child to
engage in prostitution, pornography, or other sexually explicit
conduct; as well as any act that involves the use or exploitation of
a child as an object of sexual gratification or as a tool in the
commission of serious crimes, such as drug trafficking.729
The Board also distinguished Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions,730 which
involved “sexual abuse of a minor” as defined in 8 U.S.C. §
1101(a)(43)(A), from the “child abuse” ground of removability in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i), holding that the latter ground of removability sweeps
more broadly than the former, and includes any “child” under age 18,
whereas the aggravated felony “sexual abuse of a minor” ground applies
only to children under age 16.
10.

Terrorist Activity.

This ground of deportability731 is defined, and interpreted, exactly the same as the
corresponding ground of inadmissibility.732
11.

Miscellaneous Grounds of Deportability.

The foregoing subsections are not an exhaustive list of all grounds of
deportability. As with the case of the numerous grounds of inadmissibility, other
grounds of deportability exist. They relate to crimes such as espionage,733
sabotage,734 treason,735 sedition,736 failure to comply with Selective Service

729

Id at 355.

730

137 S. Ct. 1562 (2017).

731

INA § 237(a)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).

732

INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). See section V.C.9., supra., for a
discussion of this ground of inadmissibility.
733

INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(i).

734

Id.

735

Id.

736

Id.
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laws,737 document fraud,738 and unlawful voting.739 All grounds of deportability
are found in INA § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227, and practitioners are urged to consult
that section of the INA when determining whether their non-citizen client is
charged with a crime that carries deportation consequences.
E.

“Inchoate” Immigration Offenses.

There are some offenses that, although they do not have any immediate inadmissibility or
deportation consequences, can make a non-citizen client’s life miserable in the future.
For example, clients who engage in certain acts are ineligible to receive some types of
relief from deportation or waivers of inadmissibility. As such, criminal law practitioners
should have some familiarity with these “inchoate” immigration offenses in order to try
to avoid admissions or convictions that will have future collateral effects on a client’s
immigration options.
1.

Lack of Good Moral Character.

In order to be eligible to receive certain benefits under the INA, a non-citizen
must demonstrate that she or he is of “good moral character.”740 That term is
defined in the INA741 by listing acts which, if committed by a non-citizen, will
preclude him or her from demonstrating “good moral character.”
One is precluded from establishing that she or he is of “good moral character” if:
• He or she is or was a “habitual drunkard.”742
• She or he commits an offense that places him or her in a class of persons
described by INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)743 (relating to crimes involving moral
737

INA § 237(a)(2)(D)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(D)(iii).

738

INA § 237(a)(3)(B) and (C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(B) and (C).

739

INA § 237(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(6).

740

Some of the instances in which a demonstration of good moral character is required
include naturalization (an application to become a U.S. citizen), voluntary departure (an
application that, if granted, allows one to leave the U.S. voluntarily in lieu of being removed
under an order of removal), and cancellation of removal (a form of an affirmative defense to
removal available to certain non-citizens). Other programs, such as eligibility for benefits under
the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act (NACARA) or the Temporary Protected Status
(TPS) program (see section III.I.1., supra) also require a showing of good moral character.
741

INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).

742

INA § 101(f)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1).

743

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A).
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turpitude or controlled substance violations), (a)(2)(B)744 (relating to multiple
criminal convictions), (a)(2)(C)745 (relating to controlled substance traffickers),
(a)(2)(D)746 (relating to engaging in prostitution or commercialized vice),
(a)(6)(E)747 (relating to alien smuggling), or 212(a)(9)(A)748 (relating to entry
into the U.S. after previously having been removed).749 A person cannot
demonstrate good moral character if she or he falls in the above-described class of
people even if, under those sections, the person would not be inadmissible.750
• His or her income is derived principally from illegal gambling or he or she has
been convicted of two or more gambling offenses.751
• He or she has given false testimony for purposes of receiving any immigration
benefit.752
• He or she has been confined, as a result of a conviction, to a penal institution
for an aggregate period of 180 days or more, even if the confinement was the
result of crimes committed outside the period for which he or she must
demonstrate good moral character.753
• He or she has been convicted of an aggravated felony.754
744

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).

745

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C).

746

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D).

747

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E).

748

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A).

749

INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3).

750

Id. There is one notable exception to this, however. If an individual is convicted
of, admits having committed, or admits committing acts constituting the essential elements of a
crime involving moral turpitude (see section V.C.3., supra.), and if the “petty offense” exception
applies (see INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) and also see section
V.C.3.d.(2)), then the person is not precluded from showing good moral character. Matter of
Urpi-Sancho, 12 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 1956).
751

INA § 101(f)(4) and (5), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(4) and (5).

752

INA § 101(f)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6). See Matter of Richmond, 26 I&N Dec. 779
(BIA 2016) for a case interpreting this provision.
753

INA § 101(f)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7).

754

INA § 101(f)(8), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8). See section V.D.6., supra, for a discussion
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Some immigration benefits require one to demonstrate affirmatively that she or he
is of good moral character. Other benefits are “discretionary” in nature, meaning
that an immigration official can refuse to confer the benefit on a non-citizen if, in
the official’s exercise of discretion, that person does not deserve a favorable
exercise of discretion.755 In deciding whether or not to exercise discretion in
favor of an individual, immigration officials frequently look at the “good moral
character” test, even though it is not always a categorical precondition to the
granting of the benefit.
It is important to understand that just because one has avoided committing the
acts that would require a finding that she or he is not of “good moral character,”
this does not mean that the person has “good moral character.”756 It simply
means that the person is not categorically barred from demonstrating that he or
she is, in fact, of good moral character.
However, if the person either (1) makes a false claim to U.S. citizenship or (2)
registers to vote or actually votes in an election at any level in violation of a law
requiring voters to be U.S. citizens, she or he can still be found to be of good
moral character. In order for this exception to apply, the person must show the
following: both his or her parents are U.S. citizens, she or he resided
permanently in the U.S. before reaching age 16, and he or she reasonably believed
at the time of making the claim that he or she was, in fact, a U.S. citizen.757
In the documents related to a criminal proceeding, it would be helpful to try to
delete any references to any of the acts listed in the statute since some of those
acts do not require a conviction to bar one from demonstrating good moral
character. Unless the statute specifically requires otherwise, mere commission of
the listed acts can bar one from establishing good moral character, even if she or
he was not convicted of a crime relating to the commission of such acts.

of aggravated felonies. To qualify as an “aggravated felony,” a conviction for a qualifying
criminal offense must have occurred after November 29, 1990, unless the crime is murder, in
which case the date of the conviction is irrelevant. See §§ 501(b) and 509, Immigration Act of
1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990). See also Castiglia v. I.N.S., 108 F.3d
1101, 1103-1104 (9th Cir. 1997).
755

Examples of such benefits are adjustment of status, asylum and cancellation of

removal.
756

See the last paragraph of INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).

757

Id.
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2.

Particularly Serious Crimes.

One who (1) has been convicted by a final judgment of a “particularly serious
crime,” or (2) who USCIS or ICE has “serious reasons” for believing has
committed a “particularly serious crime” is ineligible to apply for either asylum758
or withholding of removal.759 As to (1), the statutes actually read that a noncitizen is ineligible for these immigration benefits if “the alien, having been
convicted of a particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the
United States.” Although this sounds like a two-pronged test (conviction of a
particularly serious crime + being a danger to the United States), the BIA has held
that it is not, and that one who has been convicted of a “particularly serious
crime” is per se a danger to the United States.760 Most federal courts have agreed
with that interpretation, including the Eighth Circuit.761 The Eighth Circuit has
held that the “serious reason for believing” test under (2) above equates to a
finding of probable cause, rather than a lower standard of “some evidence.”762
The term “particularly serious crime” is partially defined in statute. For purposes
of an asylum claim, one who has been convicted of an aggravated felony763 has
been convicted of a “particularly serious crime.”764 For purposes of asserting a
withholding of removal claim, one has been convicted of a “particularly serious
758

INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii) and (iii). Former
Attorney General Ashcroft held that he was “highly disinclined” to exercise his discretion to
grant asylum where the non-citizen has been convicted of a dangerous or violent crime unless
extraordinary circumstances exist. Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373 (AG 2002). The
respondent in Jean was convicted of second degree manslaughter under New York law relating
to the death of an infant. Also, as to the “final judgment” requirement, the BIA has held that a
deferred adjudication under state law is a “final judgment” for purposes of this statute. Matter
of D-L-S, 28 I&N Dec. 568 (BIA 2022).
759

INA § 241(b)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) and (iii). Withholding
of removal is a benefit that is similar in nature to asylum, except that it is strictly an affirmative
defense to a removal proceeding. Additionally, unlike an application for asylum, withholding of
removal is a non-discretionary form of relief, which means that if the person meets all of the
elements entitling him or her to withholding of removal, an immigration official must grant the
relief, whether or not the official deems the individual “worthy” of the relief.
760

Matter of Carballe, 19 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1986).

761

See, e.g., Tian v. Holder, 576 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2009).

762

Barahona v. Garland, 993 F.3d 1024 (8th Cir. 2021).

763

For a detailed discussion of aggravated felonies, see section V.D.6., supra.

764

INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
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crime” if he or she is convicted of an aggravated felony and has, in connection
with such conviction(s), been sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment of
at least five years.765 The withholding statute makes clear that aggravated
felonies are not the only types of crimes that can constitute “particularly serious
crimes.”766
Although “particularly serious crime” is partially defined by the statutes, its
complete definition has been left to administrative tribunals and the courts.
Whether a crime that is not an aggravated felony is “particularly serious” is
determined on a case-by-case basis. The Board of Immigration Appeals has
given some guidance on the factors it considers in determining whether a crime is
“particularly serious.” It looks at the nature of the conviction, the circumstances
and underlying facts of the conviction, the type of sentence imposed, and whether
the type and circumstances of the crime indicate that the person likely will be a
danger to society.767
The Eighth Circuit has held that evidence of a defendant’s mental health at the
time the crime was committed should be considered by the Immigration Court and
the BIA when deciding whether a crime is “particularly serious.”768 Given the
holding in Shazi, if it is otherwise consistent with the goals of the client in a
criminal case, criminal defense counsel should consider presenting mental health
evidence in criminal court (if nothing else, as part of the sentencing process) for
cases in which a conviction might otherwise be considered to be a particularly
serious crime. Such “ready made” evidence in the criminal record would be of
assistance to immigration counsel who may seek to argue that such evidence
should be considered by immigration decision-makers addressing the issue of
whether a conviction was for a particularly serious crime.
It is difficult to paint with any broad strokes in this area, but, generally speaking,
crimes against persons are more likely to be considered particularly serious
crimes than property crimes, although that is not exclusively true.769 Robbery

765

INA § 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).

766

Id.

767

Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1992). Matter of N-A-M, 24 I&N Dec.
336 (BIA 2007).
768

Shazi v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 441 (8th Cir. 2021).

769

Id.
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with a firearm,770 drug trafficking crimes,771 mail fraud crimes involving
substantial amounts of money,772 conspiracy to commit wire fraud,773 an
aggravated felony fraud offense (even though the respondent was not sentenced to
a term of imprisonment of five years or more),774 and possession of child
pornography775 have been held to be particularly serious crimes. Burglary with
intent to commit theft776 and simple possession of cocaine777 have been held not
to be particularly serious crimes. The Ninth Circuit has held that it is at least
possible that a serious DWI offense, or multiple DWI offenses, might be
particularly serious crimes.778
Practitioners should also remember, however, that given the wide number of
crimes that now are categorized as aggravated felonies, there are many nonviolent crimes that will, by statutory definition, be considered to be particularly
serious crimes.
3.

Significant Misdemeanors.

Non-citizens who have been granted Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
(DACA) relief will lose their eligibility for DACA if they are convicted of a
“significant misdemeanor” or three or more “non-significant” misdemeanors.779
A “significant misdemeanor,” for DACA purposes, is defined as one that is a
misdemeanor under federal law (i.e., one that carries a possible penalty of
imprisonment of more than five days up to one year), and either (1) is an offense
of domestic violence, sexual abuse or exploitation, burglary, unlawful possession
or use of a firearm, drug distribution or trafficking, or driving under the influence
or (2) is one for which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of more
770

Matter of Carballe, 19 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1986).

771

Matter of Y-L-, A-G-, R-S-R-, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (AG 2002).

772

Arbid v. Holder, 674 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2012); Tian, 546 F.3d 890.

773

Matter of F-R-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 460 (BIA 2022).

774

Matter of T-C-A-, 28 I&N Dec. 472 (BIA 2022).

775

Matter of R-A-, 25 I&N Dec. 657 (BIA 2012).

776

Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982).

777

Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I&N Dec. 819 (AG 1994).

778

Delgado v. Holder, 648 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2011).

779

For a more complete discussion of the DACA program, see section III.I.3.a., supra.
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than 90 days. The sentence must involve time to be served in custody, and
therefore does not include a suspended sentence.780
A “non-significant misdemeanor” for DACA purposes is a misdemeanor as
defined under federal law (i.e., one that carries a possible penalty of imprisonment
of more than 5 days up to a year), other than an offense of domestic violence,
sexual abuse or exploitation, burglary, unlawful possession or use of a firearm,
drug distribution or trafficking, or driving under the influence and is one for
which the individual was sentenced to time in custody of 90 days or less.781
VI.

WAIVERS OF INADMISSIBILITY AND RELIEF FROM REMOVAL.

As discussed earlier,782 the Nebraska Supreme Court has implicitly held that Padilla requires
criminal defense counsel to advise their clients if a particular conviction will imperil any forms
of relief from removal to which they might otherwise be entitled. Rather than add another
category to each of the statutory analysis charts, I discuss here the most common forms of
waivers of inadmissibility and relief from removal for which clients may be eligible. For each
form of waiver or relief from removal, I have (1) set forth the elements the client must prove to
qualify and (2) indicated what types of criminal offenses will categorically bar the client from
qualifying for that particular waiver or relief.
In order to help you advise your clients fully of the possible immigration consequences they face
as the result of criminal proceedings, I have developed flow charts for each form of waiver of
inadmissibility and relief from removal discussed here. Those flow charts appear in
Attachment 3. If conviction of the crime in question would imperil a waiver or form of relief
to which the client might otherwise be entitled, make certain to advise the client accordingly as
part of your Padilla responsibilities.
A.

Introduction.

Just as it is important to determine whether your client should be concerned with
inadmissibility, deportability, or both, it is important to understand the basic terminology
regarding waivers of inadmissibility and relief from removal.
Generally speaking, if your client is concerned about whether he or she will be
inadmissible to the United States as the result of a criminal proceeding, you need to
analyze whether there are any waivers of the particular ground of inadmissibility with
which your client is concerned and, if so, whether the criminal proceedings in which your
client is involved might imperil his or her opportunity to apply for such waivers. On the
780

U.S.C.I.S., Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals,
https://www.uscis.gov/DACA (last visited June 22, 2022).
781

Id.
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See the discussion of State v. Gonzalez in section I.D.2.c.(4)(a), supra.

195

other hand, if deportability is the main concern for your client, then you need to
determine which forms of relief from removal might be available to your client, and
whether the criminal proceedings in which your client is involved might jeopardize such
relief.
Following is a brief overview and discussion of some of the more common types of
waivers of inadmissibility and relief from removal. Only the most common forms of
waivers and relief from removal are discussed here. For a more thorough discussion,
refer to various of the resources discussed in section I.E., supra.
1.

Section 212(h) Waivers for Certain Grounds of Inadmissibility
Related to Crimes.

The main waiver of inadmissibility available to non-citizens who are charged with
or have been convicted of crimes is found in Section 212(h) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.783 If your client is concerned that a criminal proceeding
might make him or her inadmissible to the United States, you will need to look
carefully at the provisions of § 212(h) to determine if your client might be eligible
for a waiver of grounds of inadmissibility and, if so, whether you can do anything
during the course of the criminal case to preserve the availability of the § 212(h)
waiver to your client.
Think of waivers of inadmissibility as akin to pardons for past offenses. In other
words, a waiver is granted to a client who would otherwise be inadmissible to the
United States if (1) the client is categorically eligible for the waiver and (2) the
federal authorities in charge of adjudicating the waiver application decide to
exercise discretion in the client’s favor and grant the waiver application.
This is an important point about waivers: all of them are what Homeland Security
and Department of State officials call “discretionary” benefits. What that means,
as a practical matter, is that even if an individual is categorically qualified for the
waiver, the decision-maker can decide, in the exercise of discretion, not to
approve the waiver application. Therefore, while your main focus as a criminal
defense lawyer is to preserve the client’s categorical eligibility for a waiver, you
should, if possible, also emphasize any positive equities your client has during the
making of what immigration authorities call the record of conviction: the
information (or indictment), plea (or trial), judgment (or verdict), and sentence.
Favorable comments, findings or evidence in any of these documents does have
an impact on immigration decision-makers, and will be a big help to your client
when it comes time to apply for the waiver.

783

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).
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a.

Elements of Section 212(h) Waiver.
(1)

Grounds of Inadmissibility That Can be Waived.

A § 212(h) waiver is available to waive the following grounds of
inadmissibility:
(1) Crimes involving moral turpitude;784
(2) A single controlled substance offense relating to possession of
marijuana of 30 grams or less;785
(3) Multiple criminal convictions where the aggregate sentences to
confinement imposed were five years or more;786
(4) Prostitution or commercialized vice crimes;787 and
(5) Certain non-citizens who are eligible for immunity from
prosecution.788
No other criminal grounds of inadmissibility can be waived by
virtue of a § 212(h) waiver.
(2)

Those Eligible to Apply for a § 212(h) Waiver.
(a)

Non-Lawful Permanent Residents.

The following non-LPRs are eligible to apply for a § 212(h)
waiver:
(1) Those who have a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident parent, spouse, son or daughter who will suffer
“extreme hardship” if the waiver is not granted to the
person.789
784

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).

785

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

786

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B).

787

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D).

788

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(E).

789

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B).

197

(2) Those who are inadmissible as the result of prostitution
or commercialized vice crimes if:
(a) The activities for which the person is
inadmissible occurred more than 15 years before his
or her application for admission;
(b) The person’s admission to the United States
would not be contrary to the national welfare,
safety, or security of the United States; and
(c) The person has been rehabilitated.790
(3) The spouses or children of one who qualify as victims
of domestic violence under the VAWA provisions of the
INA, meaning that they have been abused by their U.S.
citizen or LPR spouse or parent.791
(b)

Lawful Permanent Residents.

Although the § 212(h) waiver is most often applied for by
those who have not yet obtained permanent status in the
United States, it is sometimes applied for by lawful
permanent residents (green card holders) if inadmissibility
is an issue for them.792 Ironically, the § 212(h) waiver is
more difficult to get for LPRs than it is for non-LPRs.
LPRs are eligible to apply for a § 212(h) waiver if:
(1) They have not been convicted of an aggravated felony
and
(2) They have had lawful continuous residence in the
United States for a period of at least seven years before the
initiation of removal proceedings against them.793
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8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(A).
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8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(C).

792

See section V.B.1.c, supra, for a discussion of when lawful permanent residents need
to be concerned with inadmissibility.
793

8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (last full paragraph).
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b.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible § 212(h) Waiver
Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for a § 212(h) waiver. A flow chart to help determine
eligibility is found at Attachment 3.
(1) Is inadmissibility an issue for your client?
(2) If so, is the crime with which your client is charged one of the crimes
eligible for a § 212(h) waiver?
(3) If so, is your client either (1) a non-LPR with a qualifying family
member or (2) an LPR who has not been convicted of an aggravated
felony and who has been in the U.S. continuously in lawful status for at
least seven years?
c.

Preserving Eligibility for a § 212(h) Waiver.

If your client is potentially eligible for a § 212(h) waiver, you should try to
preserve your client’s eligibility for the waiver. Some ways in which you
could do this include:
(1) If your client has been charged with a crime that is not one eligible for
a § 212(h) waiver, you should attempt to negotiate for a charge that is
eligible for a waiver.
(2) If the client has positive equities, try to have those reflected in any
documents constituting the Record of Conviction.
(3) In general, a § 212(h) waiver will not be granted for those convicted of
violent or dangerous crimes,794 so if your client is charged with such a
crime, you should try to negotiate a plea in which your client pleads to a
non-violent offense.
2.

Cancellation of Removal for Non-Permanent Residents.

Certain individuals who are undocumented, and who are in removal proceedings,
can apply for a form of relief from removal referred to as “non-LPR cancellation.”
This form of relief from removal is akin to an affirmative defense to the removal
proceeding. The client must affirmatively apply for the relief, and carry the
burden of proof to establish eligibility for the relief. But the payoff for an
794

See, e.g., In re Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373 (AG 2002), denying a waiver in the exercise
of discretion for a refugee seeking to become an LPR because she was convicted of second
degree manslaughter in the death of her toddler relative.
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undocumented individual is huge: if the cancellation application is approved, the
person becomes a lawful permanent resident (i.e., gets his or her green card).
The statutory provisions regarding non-LPR cancellation are found at INA
§ 240A(b).795
Pereida v. Wilkinson.796 In 2021, the Supreme Court issued an important
decision regarding non-LPR cancellation of removal. In Pereida, the Supreme
Court held that non-LPR cancellation applicants bear the burden of proof to
demonstrate that they were not convicted of any disqualifying crimes in order to
qualify for non-LPR cancellation. Here is a summary of the case.
Mr. Pereida was an undocumented client who was placed in removal proceedings.
He applied for non-LPR cancellation of removal. Because he had been convicted
of attempted criminal impersonation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-638, there was a
question about his eligibility for non-LPR cancellation; more specifically, the
issue was whether his conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT),
which would disqualify him from receiving non-LPR cancellation.797 The lower
courts found that § 28-638 was a divisible statute, with some sections describing
CIMTs and some sections not.798
This presented the parties with a dilemma because, although the government
introduced a complaint of the information charging Mr. Pereida with a violation
of § 28-638(a) for using a fraudulent Social Security card for the purposes of
obtaining employment, there was no evidence in the record as to which section of
the statute of which Mr. Pereida was actually convicted. Mr. Pereida argued that,
under the categorical approach as it relates to divisible statutes,799 it must be
assumed that he was convicted of the least culpable conduct necessary to sustain a
conviction under § 28-638, which would not be a CIMT.
Ultimately, that position did not prevail. The Supreme Court held that, in the
context of an application for non-LPR cancellation, which is a form of relief from
removal, the non-citizen client carries the burden of proof on all aspects of the
case, including demonstrating that he was not convicted of a disqualifying
offense. In the context of an application for relief from removal, the Court held,
795

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
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Pereida v. Wilkinson, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S. Ct. 754, 209 L.Ed.2d 47 (2021).
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INA § 240A(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C).
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More specifically, the courts, including the Supreme Court, agreed that a conviction
for violating § 28-638(c) – carrying on any profession, business, or any other occupation without
a license, certificate, or other authorization required by law – would not constitute a CIMT.
799

See section V.C.3.b., supra.
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the non-citizen cannot simply rely on the categorical approach to shift the burden
of proof to the government to show that he or she was convicted of a
disqualifying offense – he or she must affirmatively demonstrate, as part of
carrying the burden of proof, that he or she was not convicted of a disqualifying
offense.
This obviously puts criminal defense counsel on the horns of a dilemma in
deciding what strategy to employ during state court criminal proceedings. In the
case of a divisible statute containing both removable and non-removable offenses,
it would be to the non-citizen’s advantage for the record of conviction to be silent
as to which part of a divisible statute was involved in cases in which the
government carries the burden of proof. On the other hand, in cases involving
applications for relief from removal, it is to the non-citizen’s advantage to, if
possible, have the record of conviction specify that the client was convicted of a
non-removal part of the divisible statute. So how is criminal defense counsel to
resolve this dilemma? There is no one-size-fits-all answer to this question,
because the strategy will vary in each case, depending on the facts and
circumstances.
Suppose that you represent a client who is charged with, and likely to be
convicted of, violation of one section of a divisible statute, some parts of which
involve removable offenses and at least one part of which involves a nonremovable offense. If the specific offense involved is, in fact, a removable
offense, and if the only issue on the immigration side of things is whether the
client is removable, then keeping the record of conviction ambiguous is the best
approach, since the government carries the burden of proof to show that the client
is removable and, absent some specificity in the record of conviction, the
categorical approach assumes that the client was convicted of the least culpable
offense necessary to sustain a conviction – in this hypothetical case, a nonremovable offense.
However, suppose you represent another client, charged under the same statute,
but this client is eligible for some form of relief from removal that requires the
client to demonstrate that they have not been convicted of a disqualifying offense.
In such a case, the best strategy would be to have the record of conviction specify
the part of the divisible statute of which the client was convicted (provided that
the specific part of the statute involved a non-disqualifying offense).
In short, the default criminal defense strategy, post-Pereida, is to have the record
of conviction specify the portion of a divisible statute of which the client was
convicted, provided the client was convicted of the portion of a divisible statute
that carries no adverse immigration consequences. On the other hand, if the
client is charged with a portion of a divisible statute that carries adverse
immigration consequences, then the best strategy is to leave or make the record of
conviction vague because, at least in the first instance (proving removability), the
government carries the burden of proof.
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Let’s consider application of this strategy under the facts of Pereida, since it
involved a conviction of a Nebraska criminal statute, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-638. It
is apparent from the strategy adopted by Mr. Pereida’s counsel that he was likely
charged with, and convicted of, a portion of the divisible statute that was a
CIMT.800 In such a case, keeping the record of conviction vague would be a
good strategy in terms of make the government prove removability. The problem
with that strategy, in the context of the facts of this case, is that the government
didn’t need to rely on a conviction to show that Mr. Pereida was removable – he
was removable because he was present in the country without documentation. In
such cases, the easiest way for the government to prove up removability is simply
to charge the non-citizen with being removable under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)801 –
someone present in the United States who has not been admitted or paroled into
the country. At that point, the only way to keep Mr. Pereida in the country is to
find some form of relief from removability – in this case, non-LPR cancellation.
But now the strategy becomes very different. Since Mr. Pereida carries the
burden of proof in the context of an application for relief from removal, he needs
to show that he was not convicted of a CIMT. And the only way to do that in the
context of a divisible statute, is to have the record of conviction clearly reflect that
he was convicted of the portion of the divisible statute that did not constitute a
CIMT.802
Although Pereida, doesn’t, as a practical matter, change the strategy
considerations that preceded the opinion,803 it does re-emphasize the importance
both of understanding how the categorical approach works in the immigration
context and identifying a non-citizen client’s situation as soon as practicable in a
criminal case so that the best strategy can be pursued.
a.

Elements of “Regular” Non-LPR Cancellation.

In order to be eligible to apply for non-LPR cancellation, a client must
meet the following requirements:

800

Most probably, § 28-638(1)(a).

801

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).

802

Of course, this is not always possible. If, in fact, the client is convicted of a CIMT,
then no amount of subterfuge will help someone in Mr. Pereira’s situation – he is simply not
eligible for non-LPR cancellation relief. That is, in all likelihood, what happened in Mr.
Pereira’s case.
803

Most courts, including the Eighth Circuit, had reached the same result as the
Supreme Court did in Pereida.
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(1) He or she must have been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of at least 10 years. The period of physical presence
begins when the client first physically enters the United States, even if
such physical entry is without documentation. The client stops accruing
physical presence for purposes of non-LPR cancellation at the earliest of
the following times:
(a) He or she is served with a document placing him or her in
removal proceedings (a Notice to Appear); or
(b) He or she commits an offense listed in INA §§ 212(a)(2),804
237(a)(2),805 or 237(a)(4).806
(2) He or she must have been a person of “good moral character”807
during the period of physical presence in the United States.
(3) He or she must show that his removal from the United States would
result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his or her U.S.
citizen or LPR spouse, parent or child.
(4) He or she is not inadmissible or deportable as a “terrorist” under INA
§§ 212(a)(3)808 or 237(a)(4).809
(5) He or she has not previously been granted non-LPR cancellation or
suspension of deportation, which was the name of non-LPR cancellation
before 1996.
804

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).

805

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4). Thus, even though an undocumented client’s primary issue
is inadmissibility, rather than deportability, if your client is eligible for non-LPR cancellation,
you should try to avoid having the client convicted of an offense listed in § 237(a)(2). As an
example, suppose you represent an undocumented client who is charged with a firearms offense.
Such an offense is not a ground of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(2) of the INA. However, if
your undocumented client is potentially eligible for non-LPR cancellation, you should try to
avoid a deportable firearms conviction even though such a conviction, in and of itself will not
subject the client to removal proceedings, because such a conviction would categorically bar
your client from applying for non-LPR cancellation.
806

807

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).

808

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3).

809

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4).
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b.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible Non-LPR
Cancellation Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for non-LPR cancellation of removal. A flow chart to
help determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3.
(1) Is your client undocumented?
(2) If so, has he or she been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous
period of at least 10 years before being placed in removal proceedings?
(3) If so, is his or her criminal record clean in the sense that he or she has
not previously committed a criminal offense that is described in
§ 1182(a)(2) (criminal grounds of inadmissibility), § 1227(a)(2) (criminal
grounds of deportability), or § 1227(a)(4) (terrorist grounds of
deportability) before accruing 10 years of physical presence?
(4) If so, does your client have a U.S. citizen or LPR spouse, parent or
child?
c.

Preserving Non-LPR Cancellation Eligibility.

If your client is potentially eligible for non-LPR cancellation, you should
try to preserve your client’s eligibility for cancellation. Some ways in
which you might do this include:
(1) Avoid convictions for any of the offenses described in the sections of 8
U.S.C. set forth above; and
(2) Avoid convictions of any offenses that would fall under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(f), which would preclude the client from demonstrating good
moral character.
d.

Elements of Non-LPR Cancellation for Victims of Domestic
Violence.

In order to be eligible to apply for non-LPR cancellation, a client who is a
victim of domestic violence must meet the following requirements:
(1) He or she must fall into one of the following classes:
(a) He or she is the spouse of a U.S. citizen or LPR and has been
battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by the abusive spouse;810
810

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II).
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(b) He or she is the son or daughter of a U.S. citizen or LPR and
has been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by the abusive
parent;811
(c) He or she is the parent of a child812 who was battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty by the child’s U.S. citizen or LPR
parent, even if s/he is not married to the abused child’s abusive
parent;813
(d) He or she was battered or subject to extreme cruelty by a U.S.
citizen or LPR s/he intended to marry, but the marriage was not
legitimate because of the abuser’s bigamy.814
(2) He or she must have been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than three years immediately preceding the
date of the application for cancellation of removal;815
(3) He or she has been a person of good moral character816 during the time
of his or her physical presence in the U.S.;817
(4) He or she is not:
(a) Inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2) (criminal grounds of
inadmissibility) or 1182(a)(3) (terrorist grounds of inadmissibility);
(b) Deportable under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(1)(G) (marriage fraud
ground of deportability), 1227(a)(2) (criminal grounds of
deportability), or 1227(a)(4) (terrorist grounds of deportability);818
811

Id.

“Child” is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b) to mean someone who is single and under
the age of 21.
812

813

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).

814

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(III).

815

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(ii). Issuance of a Notice to Appear (the charging
document placing someone in removal proceedings) will not “stop the clock” on the accrual of
the three-year residency requirement, as it would in “regular” non-LPR cancellation cases.
816

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).

817

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iii).

818

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(iv).
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(5) He or she has not been convicted of an aggravated felony;819 and
(6) He or she can demonstrate that removal from the U.S. would result in
extreme hardship to himself or herself, or to his or her child or parent.820
e.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible “Domestic Violence”
Non-LPR Cancellation Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for “domestic violence” non-LPR cancellation of
removal. A flow chart to help determine eligibility is found at
Attachment 3.
(1) Is your client undocumented?
(2) If so, does he or she fall into one of the classes of abuse victims listed
above?
(3) If so, has he or she been physically present in the U.S. for a continuous
period of at least three years before being placed in removal proceedings?
(4) If so, is his or her prior criminal record clean in the sense that he or she
has not done anything to make him or her inadmissible or deportable
under any of the provisions listed above?
f.

Preserving “Domestic Violence” Non-LPR Cancellation
Eligibility.

If your client appears to be eligible for “domestic violence” non-LPR
cancellation, you should try to avoid any pleas that would jeopardize such
eligibility. Pleas to avoid include:
(1) Any offenses that would preclude the client from demonstrating good
moral character under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).
(2) Any offenses that would make the client inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(2) (criminal grounds of inadmissibility) or 1182(a)(3) (terrorist
grounds of inadmissibility), or deportable under 8 U.S.C. §§
1227(a)(1)(G) (marriage fraud ground of deportability), 1227(a)(2)
(criminal grounds of deportability), or 1227(a)(4) (terrorist grounds of
deportability).
(3) An aggravated felony.
819

Id.

820

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(A)(v).

206

3.

Cancellation of Removal for Permanent Residents.

If your client is a permanent resident (LPR or “green card holder”), and if he or
she has been in the United States for at least seven continuous years, he or she
may be eligible for a form of relief from removal called Cancellation of Removal
for Permanent Residents. The statutory provisions of LPR Cancellation are
found at INA § 240A(a).821
a.

Elements of LPR Cancellation.

In order to be eligible to apply for LPR cancellation, a client must meet
the following requirements:
(1) He or she must have been a lawful permanent resident (i.e., had a
“green card”) for five years or more;
(2) He or she must have been residing in the U.S. in some lawful status for
at least seven years; and
(3) He or she must not have been convicted of an aggravated felony.
As with non-LPR cancellation, certain events will “stop the clock” on
accrual of residence. However, for LPR cancellation purposes, there are
actually two clocks: the seven-year clock and the five-year clock.
The Seven-Year Clock.
What Starts It? The seven-year clock starts once the client entered
the U.S. in any lawful status. That could include non-immigrant
status (i.e., student, visitor, etc.) or as an immigrant (i.e., green
card holder).
What Stops It? The seven-year clocks stops on the earliest of the
following events:
(1) The client is served with a Notice to Appear.
(2) The client commits an offense listed in INA §§ 212(a)(2),822
237(a)(2),823 or 237(a)(4).

821

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).

822

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).

823

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).
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What Crimes Do Not Stop the Seven-Year Clock?
If the client already has been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude (CIMT), but the CIMT fell under the petty offense
exception,824 the seven-year clock does not stop until the second
CIMT offense is committed.825
If the client is convicted of a crime that makes him or her
deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)826 the seven-year clock does not
stop unless the crime is “referred to” in INA § 212(a)(2).827 This
means, for example, that the seven-year clock does not stop for a
client convicted of a firearms offense, which is mentioned in the
deportable offenses section of the INA but not referred to in the
inadmissible offenses section.828 Other offenses that appear in
INA § 237(a)(2) that are not referred to in § 212(a)(2) include
crimes of domestic violence, crimes of stalking, violation of a
protection order, and crimes of child abuse. However, if the
offense of which the client is convicted is both a deportable and
inadmissible crime (i.e., domestic violence offenses that involve
infliction of serious bodily injury are also CIMTs), commission of
the “dual” offense will stop the seven-year clock.829
The Five-Year Clock.
What Starts It? The five-year clock starts at the moment the client
becomes an LPR (i.e., gets his or her “green card”).
What Stops It? The five-year clock continues to run until the
client’s removal proceedings are concluded, which would include
all proceedings before the Immigration Court, the BIA, and, if the
client obtains a stay of removal during any federal court appeals,
until those appeals are finally resolved.

824

INA § 212A(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).

825

Matter of Deando-Roma, 23 I&N Dec. 597 (BIA 2003).

826

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2).

827

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2).

828

Matter of Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000).

829

Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 206 L. Ed. 2d 682 (2020).
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b.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible LPR Cancellation
Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for LPR cancellation of removal. A flow chart to help
determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3.
(1) Is your client a lawful permanent resident (LPR)?
(2) If so, has he or she been an LPR for at least five years?
(3) If so, has he or she been residing in the U.S. in some lawful status for
at least seven years before being served with a Notice to Appear or before
having committed a prior offense listed in the statutes outlined above?
c.

Preserving LPR Cancellation Eligibility.

If the answer to all of the above questions is yes, your client may be
eligible for LPR cancellation, and you should try to avoid any pleas that
would jeopardize such eligibility. Pleas to avoid include:
(1) Any offense that would stop the seven-year clock from running, if the
client has not already acquired seven years of continuous presence.
(2) An aggravated felony.
4.

Adjustment of Status.

Some clients may be eligible to get green cards, usually as the result of their
relationship to a qualifying relative who has immigration status. Certain clients
may be eligible to adjust status (i.e., get a green card while remaining in the
United States). Other clients may be required to leave the United States to get a
green card by processing their applications through a U.S. consulate in their home
country.
Adjustment of status is a form of relief from removal, in the sense that if a client
is eligible to adjust status, and he or she is in removal proceedings, he or she can
file the adjustment of status application as a defense to the removal case and, if
the application is granted, he or she will avoid removal. Fortunately, the land
mines of which criminal defense counsel must be aware are the same, whether the
issue is adjustment of status or consular processing. In essence, you must try to
avoid having the client convicted of a crime that will render him or her
inadmissible under INA § 212,830 which is a part of your baseline analysis in any
event.
830

8 U.S.C. § 1182.
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The ability to adjust status depends in part on the client’s immigration status.
“Regular” adjustment of status proceedings are first discussed below, and then
adjustment of status proceedings for refugees.
a.

Elements for “Regular” Adjustment of Status.

There are many ways a client may be eligible to adjust status. The
discussion here focuses on eligibility based on a family relationship,
which is the most common way in which a client would be eligible to
adjust status.
In order to be eligible to adjust status, a client must meet the following
requirements:
(1) He or she must have entered the United States with inspection and
authorization.
(2) He or she must fall into one of the following categories:
(a) The client must have a U.S. citizen spouse.
(b) The client must have a U.S. citizen child age 21 or older.
(c) The client must be under age 21 and have a U.S. citizen parent.
(d) The client must have an approved visa petition filed by another
qualifying relative with a current priority date.831
(3) He or she must not be inadmissible, or must be eligible for a waiver of
any grounds of inadmissibility.
b.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible “Regular”
Adjustment of Status Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for “regular” adjustment of status. A flow chart to help
determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3.
831

Unless the client falls into one of the first three categories (1) through (3) above, he
or she will have to wait a number of years for a visa petition filed by another qualifying relative
(for example, a U.S. citizen brother or sister) to become current. That is because there are long
waiting lists in most visa categories. To be eligible for adjustment of status, a client must have
an approved visa petition with a priority date that is current. There are various resources online
that explain how to read and interpret the Visa Bulletin. For one example see
https://www.novacredit.com/resources/how-to-read-the-visa-bulletin/ (last visited June 23,
2022).
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(1) Did your client enter the United States with inspection and
authorization?
(2) If so, does he or she have a U.S. citizen spouse or U.S. citizen child 21
years of age or older?
(3) If not, is the client under age 21 and does the client have a U.S. citizen
parent?
(4) If not, is the client the beneficiary of an approved visa petition with a
current priority date which was filed for him or her by another qualifying
relative?
c.

Preserving “Regular” Adjustment of Status Eligibility.

To preserve your client’s eligibility for adjustment of status, try to avoid
pleading to any crimes that will make your client inadmissible under INA
§ 212.832 If you are unable to avoid this, determine if the client is eligible
for a waiver of any of the grounds of inadmissibility implicated by the
crimes of which he or she is convicted. Most often, this means
determining whether your client is eligible for a § 212(h) waiver.833
d.

Elements for Refugee Adjustment of Status.

If your client is a refugee and is eligible to adjust status under INA
§ 209834 because he or she has been in refugee status for at least one year,
you have a little more leeway in terms of what crimes will make your
client ineligible to adjust status. Although any crime that makes a client
inadmissible could be a problem, the waiver of inadmissibility available to
refugees who seek to adjust status is very generous.835 It essentially
allows waiver of all crime-related grounds of inadmissibility except drug
trafficking offenses,836 certain espionage offenses,837 and terrorist
activities.838
832

8 U.S.C. § 1182.

833

See section VI.A.1., supra.

834

8 U.S.C. § 1159.

835

INA § 209(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(c).

836

INA § 212(a)(2(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(C).

837

INA § 212(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A).

838

INA § 212(a)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B). There are actually two other
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In order for your refugee client to be eligible to adjust status, he or she
must meet the following requirements:
(1) He or she must have been admitted to or paroled into the United States
as a refugee; and
(2) He or she must have been in refugee status for at least one year.
e.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible Refugee Adjustment
of Status Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for refugee adjustment of status. A flow chart to help
determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3.
(1) Was your client admitted or paroled into the U.S. as a refugee?
(2) If so, has your client been in refugee status for at least one year?
f.

Preserving Refugee Adjustment of Status Eligibility.

If you are unable to avoid a conviction that makes your client
inadmissible, you should strive to avoid the convictions listed above that
cannot be waived for refugees seeking to adjust status.
5.

Asylum/Withholding of Removal.

Asylum and withholding of removal are two forms of relief from removal that are
potentially available to individuals who fear that if they return to their home
country they will suffer persecution, either by their government, or by a group or
groups their government is unwilling or unable to control.
Asylum and withholding cases are extremely complex, both factually and legally.
The purpose of discussing them here is simply to make you aware of which
criminal convictions would jeopardize such claims. You should certainly not
trouble yourself with trying to determine the validity of any possible asylum or
withholding claim your client may ultimately wish to assert to avoid removal.
That will be the job of the client’s immigration lawyer if and when the time comes.
a.

Elements of the Claims.

Asylum. The elements of an asylum claim are that the client either has
been persecuted or has a well-founded fear of being persecuted by the
grounds of inadmissibility that can be waived under § 209(c) but they do not relate to state
crimes, and they are not mentioned here.
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government or by a group or groups the government is unable or unwilling
to control. The feared persecution must be on account of the client’s race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. The Supreme Court has held that the “well-founded” fear
standard can be met by as little as a ten percent chance that the persecution
will actually occur.839 Additionally, unless some very limited exceptions
apply, a client must file an asylum claim within one year of the date the
client last entered the U.S., or s/he cannot pursue an asylum claim.
Finally, asylum claims can be filed affirmatively (before a client is in
removal proceedings) or defensively, as a form of relief from removal in
removal proceedings.
Withholding of Removal. The elements of a withholding claim are the
same as for an asylum claim. The difference between the two forms of
relief lies in the burden of proof. While it is enough to show a “wellfounded fear” of persecution to win an asylum case, a client must show
that it is more likely than not he or she will be persecuted in order to win a
withholding case. This burden of proof is essentially the “preponderance
of the evidence” burden of proof that exists in most civil cases. Unlike
asylum claims, withholding of removal claims can only be filed
defensively in the context of a removal proceeding. Additionally,
withholding claims do not have a one-year statute of limitations, so they
can be asserted even after the client has been in the U.S. for a year.
b.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for Possible Asylum or
Withholding of Removal Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for asylum or withholding of removal. A flow chart to
help determine eligibility is found at Attachment 3.
(1) Has your client expressed a fear of being persecuted if he or she must
return to his or her home country?
(2) If so, does the client fear being persecuted because of his or her race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion?
c.

Preserving Eligibility for Asylum/Withholding of Removal.

If the answers to these questions are yes, your client may be eligible to
raise an asylum or withholding claim as a defense to removal when the
time comes. You should try to avoid any pleas that would imperil such
relief.
839

I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
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Asylum. There are two crime-related bars to asylum.
(1) Aggravated felony. Anyone convicted of an aggravated felony
is barred from receiving asylum.
(2) Particularly serious crime. A client who is convicted of a
“particularly serious crime” is ineligible for asylum. For purposes
of the asylum analysis, a “particularly serious crime” includes all
aggravated felonies. However, a crime may be a “particularly
serious crime” even if it is not an aggravated felony.840
Withholding. There are two crime-related bars to withholding of removal.
(1) Aggravated felony + five-year term of imprisonment. Anyone
convicted of an aggravated felony and, as a result of the
conviction, is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five years or
more is barred from receiving withholding of removal.
(2) Particularly serious crime. A client who is convicted of a
particularly serious crime (as defined above) is ineligible for
withholding of removal.
6.

Temporary Protected Status.841

Certain non-citizens are entitled to an immigration benefit called Temporary
Protected Status (TPS). In essence, TPS is permission from the United States
Attorney General to non-citizens from certain countries that allows them to
remain in the U.S. until and unless the Attorney General determines it is safe for
them to return to their home country. TPS is most often granted to individuals
from countries that have suffered significant natural disasters. As an example,
the Attorney General granted TPS to Haitians in January 2010 who were in the
United States at the time of the earthquake that devastated Haiti. A complete
current list of all countries for which the Attorney General has designated TPS
can be found on the USCIS website.842
a.

Elements of a TPS Claim.

The way in which a client can initially qualify for TPS is complicated and
is not necessary to this discussion. For purposes of your Padilla analysis,
840

See section V.E.2., supra.

841

See the discussion of TPS at section III.I.1., supra.

842

U.S.C.I.S., Temporary Protected Status,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status (last visited June 23, 2022).
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all you need to know is whether your client is a current TPS recipient or is
eligible for TPS under a recent designation by the United States Attorney
General. You can determine if your client has been granted TPS by
asking to see any paperwork from USCIS granting TPS to the client.
Alternatively, the client may have an employment authorization document
(“work card”) issued by USCIS. The category listed on the work card
would be (c)(19). You can determine if the Attorney General has recently
designated your client’s country as being eligible for TPS by checking the
USCIS website referenced in the previous footnote.
b.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for TPS Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might have received TPS. A flow chart to help determine this status is
found at Attachment 3.
(1) Is your client from one of the countries currently designated by the
U.S. Attorney General as eligible for TPS?
(2) If yes, has your client actually received a grant of TPS and/or an
employment authorization document from USCIS?
c.

Preserving TPS Eligibility.

In order to be eligible for TPS, a client must not have been convicted of
any felony, or two or more misdemeanors.843 If possible, avoid any plea
to a felony, or to a second misdemeanor.
7.

Deferred Action.844

There are two major types of deferred action: (1) Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals (DACA); and (2) VAWA deferred action. Each one will be reviewed
below.845
843

INA § 244(c)(2)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i).

844

See the detailed discussion of Deferred Action at section III.I.3., supra.

845

Prior to the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I&N Dec. 187
(AG 2018), the Board of Immigration Appeals also recognized that prosecutorial discretion in an
Immigration Court context could take the form of administrative closure of the removal case.
See Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I&N Dec. 688 (BIA 2012). Given Attorney General Garland’s
vacatur of Castro-Tum, (Matter of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I&N Dec. 326 (A.G. 2021), we are now back
to the Avetisyan test for a client seeking administrative closure.
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As a reminder, deferred action is a program or policy of the DHS that allows ICE
to defer or postpone any action to remove someone from the United States who
would otherwise be removable. With the exception of Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (DACA), there are no official forms on which a client applies
for deferred action and there are no permanent formal rules governing the
granting of deferred action. It is essentially a matter of administrative grace
being given to certain persons who DHS believes present compelling
humanitarian factors or other positive equities. DACA, on the other hand, is a
much more formal program and has prescribed forms and guidelines that
applicants must use and meet in order to qualify for DACA relief.
a.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for DACA Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for DACA or might have been approved for DACA. A
flow chart to help determine this status is found at Attachment 3.
(1) Did your client come to the U.S. before he or she turned 16?
(2) If so, had he or she continuously resided in the U.S. for at least five
years as of June 15, 2012?
(3) If so, was he or she physically present in the U.S. on June 15, 2012?
(4) If so, is he or she currently in school or did he or she graduate from
high school, obtain a GED, or is an honorably discharged veteran of the
Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the United States?
(5) If so, was he or she under age 31 as of June 15, 2012?
If the answers to all of these questions are yes, then your client may be
eligible for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.
b.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for VAWA Deferred Action
Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for or have received VAWA deferred action. A flow
chart to help determine this status is found at Attachment 3.
(1) Has your LPR client filed a self-petition (USCIS Form I-360) in order
to obtain legal status on his or her own behalf without the assistance of his
or her USC or LPR abusive spouse?
(2) If so, is an immigrant visa immediately available to him or her under
the Visa Bulletin?
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(3) If not, has USCIS granted your client deferred action, as evidenced by
USCIS Form I-797 and/or an employment authorization document,
category (c)(14)?
(4) If not, has the client recently filed the I-360 with USCIS but not yet
heard if he or she will be granted deferred action?
c.

Preserving Deferred Action Eligibility.
(1)

DACA.

In order to preserve DACA eligibility, your client must not plead
to or be convicted of any felony offense (i.e., a Class IV felony or
higher in Nebraska), must not plead to or be convicted of any
“significant misdemeanor offense,” and must not have three or
more misdemeanor convictions of any kind.
(2)

VAWA.

Because there are no hard and fast rules on when USCIS will grant
VAWA deferred action to an applicant, it is difficult to lay down a
hard and fast rule on how criminal proceedings may affect
eligibility for this type of deferred action. However, since
deferred action is a discretionary benefit, it is safe to assume that
any type of criminal conviction has the potential to affect a client’s
continued eligibility for it.
The more serious the felony conviction, the less likely it is that
your client will be given prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, try
to avoid pleading to any felonies altogether, and certainly try to
avoid those that involve violence.
Also, if anything in the record of conviction indicates any possible
gang ties or membership, you should try to expunge such
references in order to maximize your client’s chances to obtain
prosecutorial discretion.
8.

Voluntary Departure.

Voluntary departure846 is a form of relief from removal that allows one to leave
the United States at his or her own expense in lieu of being involuntarily
removed. Because voluntary departure involves a person agreeing to leave the
U.S., it is often a form of relief from removal of last resort.
846

INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c.
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The benefit of voluntary departure is that it allows a client some time to wrap up
his or her affairs before leaving the country, allows the client to take as much
property as the client wishes (since he or she will be paying for his or her own
transportation) and, most importantly, does not place the client under a 10-year
bar on returning to the U.S., which would be the case if the client left pursuant to
a removal order.
a.

Elements of Voluntary Departure.

Pre-Conclusion Voluntary Departure. In order to be eligible for voluntary
departure requested before the conclusion of removal proceedings (i.e., at
the Master Calendar stage), a client must not be deportable as an
aggravated felon or as a “terrorist.”847
Post-Conclusion Voluntary Departure. In order to be eligible for
voluntary departure at the conclusion of removal proceedings, a client
must meet the following requirements:
(1) He or she must have been physically present in the United States for at
least one year before being served with a Notice to Appear;
(2) He or she must have been a person of “good moral character” for at
least five years before the date he or she applies for voluntary departure;
(3) He or she must be not deportable as an aggravated felon or as a
“terrorist”; and
(4) He or she must establish by clear and convincing evidence that he or
she has the means to depart the U.S. at his or her own expense and intends
to do so.848
b.

A Quick Checklist to Screen for Voluntary Departure
Eligibility.

Following is a text checklist that will help you determine if your client
might be eligible for voluntary departure. A flow chart to help determine
this status is found at Attachment 3.
Pre-Conclusion Voluntary Departure.
(1) Has your client been convicted of an aggravated felony?

847

INA § 240B(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a).

848

INA § 240B(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b).
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(2) Is your client deportable as a “terrorist” under INA § 237(a)(4)(B)?849
Post-Conclusion Voluntary Departure.
(1) Was your client physically present in the U.S. for at least five years
before being served a Notice to Appear by ICE?
(2) If so, has your client been a person of “good moral character”850 for at
least the past five years?
(3) If so, is your client’s criminal background free of any aggravated
felony convictions or “terrorist activity”?
(4) If so, does your client have the ability to depart the U.S. at his or her
own expense when the time comes?
If the answers to all of these questions are yes, then your client may be
eligible for voluntary departure and you should do what you can to
preserve that eligibility.
c.

Preserving Eligibility for Voluntary Departure.

The main way in which you can preserve your client’s eligibility for
voluntary departure is to avoid conviction of an aggravated felony or
“terrorist” offense, since either such conviction will bar a client from
receiving either type of voluntary departure.
Ultimate caution would also entail avoiding conviction of any offenses
that would bar the client from demonstrating “good moral character.”
9.

Orders of Supervision (OSUP).

Clients who are under orders of supervision are essentially living on the
administrative grace of ICE. Usually, these are clients who have final orders of
removal but for whom ICE has been unable to obtain travel documents because
the governments with which ICE is dealing are either unable or unwilling to issue
such travel documents. More details are spelled out in the regulations,851 but
among the factors that ICE considers in deciding whether to release a client under
849

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).

850

INA § 101(f), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).

851

8 C.F.R. § 241.5 generally deals with orders of supervision, while 8 C.F.R. §
241.4(e) contains the criteria for release that ICE considers in deciding whether to release a
detained client under an order of supervision.

219

an Order of Supervision are whether the client is a “non-violent person,” whether
the client is likely to pose a threat to the community if released, and whether the
client is a flight risk. Obviously, any serious criminal offense (that is, anything
beyond traffic infraction or the like) will imperil a client’s ability to remain free
under an Order of Supervision. Certainly any DUI offense is likely to result in
the client losing OSUP privileges. So while there are no hard and fast rules
about which convictions to avoid, it is important to understand that running afoul
of the law will put a client with an OSUP in a perilous situation.
10.

Prudential Revocation of Non-Immigrant Visas.

This topic is discussed in greater detail earlier in this Guide.852 But recall that
even a charge of DUI will put a non-immigrant’s visa in peril. Other convictions
could also lead to prudential revocations, depending on the seriousness of the
crime.
11.

Naturalization.

Although naturalization (i.e., the process by which a permanent resident becomes
a United States citizen) is technically not a form of relief from removal or waiver,
it is something you should have your eye on if you are representing a client who is
a permanent resident.
In terms of representing a client in a criminal case, the only issue for you as
criminal defense counsel is to try to avoid having the client convicted of an
offense that would preclude him or her from demonstrating “good moral
character” under INA § 101(f).853
VII.

CRITICAL CATEGORIES IN IMMIGRATION LAW.

This portion of the Guide discusses the “critical categories” within the spectrum of criminal
conduct or convictions that enhance immigration penalties for non-citizen clients. When
analyzing a criminal offense, practitioners are urged to think about which, and how many, of
these “critical categories” may be triggered if the client is convicted of the offense being
analyzed. Some categories carry more severe consequences than others, and practitioners
should take these differentials into consideration.
A.

Category 1 -- Lack of Good Moral Character.

As discussed above,854 commission of an act or conviction of a crime that brings one
852

See section V.C.2., supra.

853

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).

854

See section V.E.1., supra.
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within the provisions of INA § 101(f)855 will prevent that person from establishing “good
moral character.” Although such a prohibition, in and of itself, does not have any
negative immigration consequences, it can make certain immigration benefits
unavailable. And remember that some of the acts or convictions that prevent a person
from demonstrating good moral character also have other, and immediate, negative
immigration consequences, such as inadmissibility or deportability.
B.

Category 2 -- Juvenile Offenses.

Juvenile delinquency offenses are not “crimes” for purposes of the INA, and therefore
cannot serve as the basis for inadmissibility or removal.856 Obviously, then, it would be
best if your client is charged in juvenile court as a juvenile rather than as an adult. But
what if your juvenile client is charged as an adult? Does that automatically mean that if
he or she is convicted of the non-juvenile offense he or she has been convicted of a
“crime” for immigration purposes? No. He or she has only been convicted of a
“crime” if the state offense does not qualify for treatment as a juvenile delinquency
offense under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (FJDA).857
In Matter of Devison-Charles858 and the cases cited therein, the Board of Immigration
Appeals has repeatedly held that whether a juvenile has been convicted of a “crime”
depends on whether a state criminal offense qualifies for treatment as a juvenile offense
under the FJDA. The FJDA generally defines juvenile delinquency as violation of a law
of the U.S. committed by a person before reaching age 18 if such act would have been a
crime if committed by a person over age 18.859 The FJDA also provides that any person
under the age of 15 can be subject to prosecution as an adult if such a person is alleged to
have committed certain crimes of violence or certain controlled substance offenses.860
If, however, a person is alleged to have committed certain specified crimes of violence or
used a firearm in the commission of certain offenses, a person age 13 and older might be
subject to being charged as an adult.861
One of the valuable lessons of Matter of Devison-Charles is that the state statutory
scheme for dealing with juveniles does not have to be an exact match with the FJDA in
855

8 U.S.C. § 1101(f).

856

22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000).

857

18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-32.

858

22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000).

859

18 U.S.C. § 5031.

860

18 U.S.C. § 5032.

861

Id.
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order for the state scheme to qualify as “comporting” with the FJDA. The New York
scheme at issue in Devison-Charles, for example, proceeded with an adjudication of guilt
before determining the offender’s status. However, if the offender was found guilty but
also found eligible to be treated as a “youthful offender,” then the conviction was
automatically vacated. This, the BIA held, was the equivalent of a direct reversal on
appeal, and therefore the offender had never been “convicted” of a criminal offense, as
that term is defined in INA § 101(a)(48)(A).862 Further, the BIA held that when the
juvenile violated his probation and was re-sentenced, he was still a juvenile offender,
even though his re-sentencing took place when he was 25 years of age.863
It is therefore very clear that if your client is adjudicated as a juvenile delinquent under
the Nebraska Juvenile Code, the client will not have been convicted of a criminal offense
for immigration purposes. However, if the prosecutor seeks to treat your under-18-yearold client as an adult and you are unsuccessful in having the case transferred to the
juvenile court under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1816, the disposition of such a criminal charge
will not necessarily be considered a conviction for purposes of immigration law. Under
the BIA precedent discussed above, such a conviction will only be treated as a conviction
of a crime for immigration purposes if your client would have been eligible to be
prosecuted as an adult under the FJDA. So it is important to be aware generally of the
test employed by the FJDA even if your client is prosecuted as an adult under Nebraska
law. You may be able to shape the case in such a way that your client could be
considered a juvenile under the FJDA, and therefore any state court conviction would not
carry with it negative immigration implications.
C.

Category 3 -- Convictions.864

Generally speaking, it is in a client’s best interests not to have a conviction on his or her
record. In other words, if counsel can make arrangements, such as pretrial diversion,
that will not result in the client having a “conviction” entered against him or her, the
negative immigration consequences for the client may either not exist at all or, at the very
least, are likely to be less severe.
D.

Category 4 -- Petty Offenses.

If you are unable to prevent a criminal conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
try to make the crime fit under the “petty offense” exception to inadmissibility, found at
INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II).865 Although such a conviction will not necessarily prevent
862

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48).

863

Devison-Charles, 22 I&N at 1372-1373.

See the definition and discussion of what constitutes a “conviction” in section
V.D.2., supra.
864

865

8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II). See section V.C.3.d.(2), supra, for a discussion of

this topic.
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your client from facing removal proceedings,866 it will relieve him or her from having to
deal with an additional ground of inadmissibility if and when he or she is eligible in the
future to apply formally for admission into the U.S.
E.

Category 5 -- Particularly Serious Crimes.

Although conviction of a “particularly serious crime,” in and of itself, carries no direct
consequences regarding deportation or inadmissibility,867 such a conviction does carry
collateral consequences.868 In order to preserve immigration options for clients for
whom this is an issue (i.e., those clients who may be eligible or need to apply for either
asylum or withholding of removal), you should be sensitive to this issue.
F.

Category 6 -- Significant Misdemeanors.

We put this category ahead of “regular” misdemeanors since it will affect a client’s
ability to either qualify for or maintain DACA status.869 If your client either has DACA
status or might be eligible to apply for DACA, then you should avoid convictions for any
“significant misdemeanors,” as defined by the DACA guidelines. Also, recall that
conviction of three or more misdemeanors of any type will affect eligibility for DACA.
G.

Category 7 -- Misdemeanors.

Not surprisingly, it is normally better if a client is convicted of a misdemeanor rather than
a felony, since a felony conviction usually carries with it more severe immigration
consequences than a misdemeanor conviction. However, this is not universally true, and
you need to distinguish among the different types of misdemeanors to find out which are
less harmful.
1.

Not Involving Moral Turpitude.

If your non-citizen client is going to be convicted of a misdemeanor, then it might
as well be for this type of a misdemeanor. Most of the time, conviction of a
866

For example, if your client was formally and legally admitted into the U.S. and is
deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i) because she or he is convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude within five years of his or her last entry into the U.S. and the crime of which she
or he was convicted carried a possible sentence of a year or more, the fact that she or he is
convicted of a “petty offense,” in and of itself, will not stop ICE from beginning removal
proceedings.
867

That is, unless the nature of the crime makes it the type of crime that does have
direct deportation or inadmissibility consequences.
868

See section V.E.2., supra.

869

See section III.I.3.a., supra.
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misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude will have less severe immigration
implications. However, there are exceptions.
Conviction of a misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude will make a client
inadmissible if the client was previously convicted of another crime and if the
aggregate sentences to which the client were sentenced are five years or more.870
And conviction of virtually all misdemeanor drug offenses will render your client
both inadmissible and deportable.871 Finally, some misdemeanors actually fit the
definition of aggravated felonies.872 Obviously, conviction of a misdemeanor not
involving moral turpitude that is included in the definition of an aggravated felony
should be avoided if at all possible, since such a conviction carries very negative
immigration consequences.873
2.

Involving Moral Turpitude.

Conviction of even one crime involving moral turpitude at the misdemeanor level
can make your client both inadmissible and deportable.874 However, if your
client’s conviction is not within five years of his or her last entry into the U.S., he
or she can only be deported if he or she is convicted of two or more crimes
involving moral turpitude that do not arise out of a single scheme of criminal
conduct.875 If your client is facing a second conviction for a crime involving
moral turpitude, you can minimize the deportation (but not the inadmissibility)
consequences by trying to characterize the conviction, if possible, as arising out of
the same scheme of criminal conduct as the first conviction.
H.

Category 8 -- Domestic Violence Offenses.

Conviction of a domestic violence offense876 or violation of a protection order results in
the client being deportable under § 237(a)(2)(E) of the INA,877 but does not make him or

870

INA § 212(a(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B). See section V.C.4., supra.

871

See sections V.C.5. and V.D.7., supra.

872

See section V.D.6., supra.

873

Id.

874

See sections V.C.3. and V.D.4., supra.

875

See section V.D.5., supra.

876

See section V.D.9., supra, for a definition of “domestic violence offense.”

877

8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E).
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her inadmissible under § 212 of the INA878 at the time he or she seeks to re-enter the U.S.
Conviction of a domestic violence offense may also implicate other grounds of
deportability or inadmissibility, such as those dealing with crimes involving moral
turpitude,879 and may also result in a finding that the client lacks good moral character.880
Such consequences should be considered when counseling a client facing such a charge.
I.

Category 9 -- Firearms Offenses.

Conviction of a firearms offense will make your non-citizen client deportable.881
Deportation as a result of such a conviction leaves an immigration practitioner very few
options to prevent deportation.
Conviction for a firearms offense makes one deportable, but there is no comparable
ground of inadmissibility. But conviction of a firearms offense, depending on the facts
of the case, might implicate some of the other grounds of inadmissibility, particularly if
the conviction is at the felony level.882
Whether or not it is a good idea to accept a plea regarding a firearms offense depends a
great deal on your client’s immigration status. For example, if she or he has the ability
to re-enter the U.S. immediately because of some qualifying relationship, then a
conviction of a firearms offense, in and of itself, is not a bar to immediate readmission
and may cause less problems for a client than, say, a conviction of a second crime
involving moral turpitude.883 Of course, such a result is counter-intuitive, since most
practitioners would naturally assume that conviction for a firearms offense is more
serious than a conviction for theft. But that is not necessarily the case in an immigration
context.

878

8 U.S.C. § 1182.

879

Matter of Tran, 21 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 1996).

880

See INA § 101(f)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(3). See also section V.E.1., supra.

881

INA § 237(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). But recall that, in Nebraska, most
firearms offenses will not make the client deportable because the Nebraska definition of
“firearm” is overbroad. See section V.D.8., supra.
882

For example, if a firearm is involved in a conviction for second degree assault in
Nebraska under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-309(1)(b), such a conviction would constitute an
aggravated felony, since a “crime of violence” is involved. Most courts would also hold that
such a crime is a crime involving moral turpitude under the “assault plus” rationale articulated by
various courts and discussed in section V.C.3.c.(1), supra.
883

Unless, of course, the firearms offense can also be considered a crime involving
moral turpitude for some reason.
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J.

Category 10 -- Controlled Substance Offenses.

Conviction of any drug offense, with the exception of a single conviction of simple
possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana,884 will have drastic immigration
consequences for a non-citizen client. Conviction of a drug crime renders a client both
deportable885 and inadmissible.886 Additionally, if the client is convicted of a drug
trafficking crime, she or he has committed an aggravated felony.887
The immigration stakes are quite high where drug convictions are concerned. With the
exception of simple possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana, if a client is convicted
of a drug crime, whether it be simple possession or drug trafficking, she or he is not only
deportable, but permanently inadmissible as an immigrant.888 In other words, such a
client will be deported from the U.S. and will never be able to return legally as a
permanent resident. In addition, there are very few forms of relief from deportation
available to a client convicted of a drug offense. Drug offenses are truly a kiss of death
for non-citizen clients.
K.

Category 11 -- Aggravated Felonies.

Needless to say, conviction of an aggravated felony should be avoided, almost at all
costs. A non-citizen client who is convicted of an aggravated felony is deportable889 and
is also ineligible for most forms of relief from deportation.890

884

See sections V.C.5.(inadmissibility) and V.D.7. (deportability), supra.

885

INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).

886

INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II).

887

INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).

888

Under some circumstances, the client may be able to return to the U.S. as a nonimmigrant, but, as the law stands now, she or he will never be able to return again as an
immigrant. See INA § 212(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d), for the provisions regarding waivers of
inadmissibility available to non-immigrants.
889

INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). In fact, it is a virtual
certainty that such a client will be deported.
890

For example, as discussed earlier, an aggravated felon is ineligible to apply for
asylum, cancellation of removal, or voluntary departure. See INA § 208(b)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(b)(2)(B)(i); INA § 240A(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3); and INA § 240B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229c(a)(1), respectively.
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ATTACHMENT 1
CHECKLIST TO HELP DETERMINE IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

CHECKLIST
I.

Use Questionnaire (Attachment 2) to gather information related to the steps in this
Checklist

II. Determine client’s citizenship/immigration status.
A.

United States citizen (unless renounced or revoked -- see section III.B.e.)

B.

Legal permanent resident (verified by I-551 card, a/k/a “green card”)

C.

Conditional permanent resident (verified by I-551, CPR Resident Alien card)

D.

Non-immigrant (verified by Form I-94)

E.

Parolee (verified by Form I-94)

F.

Refugee (verified by stamp in passport, refugee document or employment
authorization document)

G.

Asylum recipient (verified by asylum document or employment authorization
document)

H.

Special categories of immigrants (see section III.I.)
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.
6.
I.

TPS recipients
Deferred Action recipients
a. DACA
b. VAWA
c. Prosecutorial discretion
Voluntary departure recipients
Cancellation of removal recipients
Clients released under an order of supervision (OSUP)
Stay of removal recipients

Undocumented client (entered without inspection or initially entered with
inspection but authorization to remain in the U.S. has since expired)

III. Explore follow-up information.
A.

If client is a legal permanent resident or conditional permanent resident,
determine the day, month and year the client obtained such status and verify that
client’s status is still valid.

B.

If client is a non-immigrant, determine type of non-immigrant (i.e., student,
visitor, temporary worker, etc.) and the date on which client’s non-immigrant
status will expire (stated on I-94 form).

C.

If client is a refugee or asylum recipient, determine when such status was
conferred on client and how long client has been residing in the U.S.

D.

If client is undocumented or out of status, determine the following:
1.

The date on which client last entered the U.S.

2.

Whether client has ever been in removal proceedings (if so, get dates and
details, including information on whether a removal order was entered
against client).

3.

Determine citizenship/immigration status of client’s spouse or adult
children (children age 21 or older), if applicable.

IV. Categorize crime with which client is charged.
A.

Crime involving moral turpitude1

B.

Drug offense2

C.

Aggravated felony3

D.

Domestic violence offense4

E.

Firearms offense5

F.

Other crimes that could make client inadmissible or deportable6

1

See sections V.C.3. and V.D.4., supra.

2

See sections V.C.5. and V.D.7., supra.

3

See section V.D.6., supra.

4

See section V.D.9., supra.

5

See section V.D.8., supra.

6

See sections V.C. and V.D., supra.

V.

Determine what “critical categories” are present that should be considered.
A.

Has client been charged with crime that could result in “bad moral character”?7

B.

Is there a possibility of working out an arrangement that would not result in a
“conviction” for immigration purposes?8

C.

Could client be charged as a juvenile rather than as an adult?9

D.

If client has a previous criminal conviction, will crime with which she or he is
charged have immigration consequences?10

E.

Has the client been charged with a “significant misdemeanor”?11

F.

If client is charged with a misdemeanor, is it a “crime involving moral
turpitude”?12

G.

Is the client charged with a “firearms offense”?13

H.

Is the client charged with a “domestic violence offense”?14

I.

Is the client charged with a “particularly serious crime”?15

J.

Is the client charged with a drug offense?16

7

See section V.E.1., supra.

8

See section V.D.2., supra.

9

See section V.C.d.(1)., supra.

10

See sections V.C.4. and V.D.5., supra.

11

See section V.E.3., supra.

12

See sections V.C.3. and V.D.4., supra.

13

See section V.D.8., supra.

14

See section V.D.9., supra.

15

See section V.E.2.., supra.

16

See sections V.C.5., and V.D.7., supra.

K.

Is the client charged with a crime that is an “aggravated felony”?17

VI.

Determine if the client has been convicted of any previous crimes, and get details on all
such crimes (jurisdiction where committed, statute(s) involved, sentence(s) imposed,
possible penalty(ies), etc.). Determine how, if at all, such prior offenses may affect the
client’s inadmissibility or deportability if the client is convicted of the offense(s) with
which she or he is charged.

VII.

Determine if the charge the client faces or the plea the client is considering will
potentially affect any relief from removal for which the client might be eligible.18

17

See section V.D.6., supra.

18

See section VI., supra.

ATTACHMENT 2
QUESTIONNAIRE TO AID CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS REPRESENTING NONCITIZENS

Immigration Questionnaire
Client Name:
Date of Birth:
Country of Birth:
Country of Citizenship:
Country of citizenship
of both parents:
Date of FIRST entry
into U.S.:
Place of FIRST entry into U.S. (name of airport, U.S.-Mexico border, etc.):
Manner of entry into U.S. (i.e. without inspection, tourist visa, employment based visa,
student visa, green card, etc.): Attach copies of all available documentation.

If client entered with inspection, when does/did period of authorized stay in the U.S.
expire (i.e. date on I-94 form or other period of authorized stay)? Attach copies of all
available documentation.
Dates of ALL exits and re-entries from and to U.S. since first entry, in chronological
order:

Manner of EACH re-entry into the U.S. listed in the previous box. Attach copies of all
available documentation.

What is client’s current immigration status (permanent resident, student, refugee, TPS
recipient, asylee, over-stay, no status, etc.)? Attach copies of all available
documentation.
Does client have an employment authorization document (“EAD”)? If yes, what is the
expiration date and category on the EAD? Attach copy of any EAD in client’s possession.
Is client married? If yes, when? What is spouse’s immigration status?

Does client have any children? If yes, dates and places of birth of each child and
immigration status of each child.

Has client ever filed any application with Immigration? If so, what type of application,
when was it filed, and what was the result of the application? Attach copies of any
available documentation.

Has client ever been detained by Immigration or put in removal (deportation)
proceedings? If so, give dates and details. Attach copies of any available
documentation.

Has client ever been detained by Immigration at the border and returned to their home
country? If yes, when? What exactly happened? Attach copies of any available
documentation.

Has client ever been a victim of a crime in the U.S.? If yes, provide date(s) and details.
Attach copies of all documentation.

Notes:

Complete table on page 4.

List (1) ALL crimes client has been charged with or convicted of, (2) the dates of each underlying act resulting in charges and/or
convictions, (3) the number of each statute under which the client was charged/convicted, (4) the case number of each case in which
the client was charged/convicted, and (5) the final disposition of each charge or conviction. Include all foreign convictions. Attach
copies of all available documentation.
Crime Charged/Convicted

Date of
Underlying Act

Statutes
Charged/Convicted

Case #

Final Disposition

ATTACHMENT 3
FLOW CHARTS FOR TYPES OF WAIVERS OF INADMISSIBILITY AND RELIEF
FROM REMOVAL

Section 212(h) Waiver
Is inadmissibility an issue for client?

No

Not eligible for § 212(h)
Waiver.

Yes

Is client Non-LPR with qualifying
family member?

No

OR
Is client a LPR not convicted of an
aggravated felony who has been in
the U.S. in lawful status at least 7
years?

Yes

No

Eligible for § 212(h) Waiver.
See Outline for Strategies.

Non-LPR Cancellation
Client undocumented?

No

Not Eligible for Non-LPR
Cancellation.

Yes
Continuous physical presence in U.S.
for 10 years?

No

Yes
Prior crimes as described in
§§ 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), or 237(a)(4)
of INA?

Yes

No
USC or LPR spouse, parent, or child?

Yes

No
Eligible for Non-LPR Cancellation.
See Outline for Strategies.

DV Non-LPR Cancellation
Client undocumented?

No

Not Eligible for DV NonLPR Cancellation.

Yes
Domestic Violence victim?

No

Yes
Continuous physical presence in U.S.
for 3 years?

No

Yes
Inadmissible under §§ 212(a)(2),
212(a)(3), or deportable under §§ 237
(a)(1)(G) or 237(a)(2)-(4) of INA?

Yes

No
Person of Good Moral Character
(INA § 101(f)) for 3 Years?
Yes

No
Eligible for DV Non-LPR Cancellation.
See Outline for Strategies.

LPR Cancellation
LPR for 5 years or more?

No

Not Eligible for LPR
Cancellation.

Yes

Residing in the U.S. in some lawful
status for 7 years or more?

No

Yes

Convicted of aggravated felony?

No

Yes

Eligible for LPR Cancellation.
See Outline for Strategies.

Adjustment of Status
Client entered U.S. with inspection
and authorization?

No

Not Eligible for Adjustment
of Status.

Yes
Client has USC spouse
or
USC child 21 or older?

No

OR
Client is under 21 and has USC
parent?

No

OR
Client is the beneficiary of approved
visa petition with current priority
date?

Yes

No

Eligible for Adjustment of Status.
See Outline for Strategies.

Refugee Adjustment of Status

Client was admitted to or paroled
into U.S. as a Refugee?

No

Not Eligible for Refugee
Adjustment of Status.

Yes

Client has been in Refugee status for
at least 1 year?

Yes

No

Eligible for Refugee Adjustment of
Status. See Outline for Strategies.

Asylum
Client has fear of being persecuted in
home country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political
opinion?

No

Not Eligible for Asylum.

Yes

Client convicted of aggravated
felony?

Yes

No

Client convicted of particularly
serious crime?

No

Yes

Eligible for Asylum. See Outline for
Strategies.

Withholding of Removal
Client has fear of being persecuted in
home country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political
opinion?

No

Not Eligible for Withholding
of Removal.

Yes
Client convicted of aggravated
felony with imposed sentence of 5
years or more?

Yes

No
Client convicted of particularly
serious crime?

No

Yes

Eligible for Withholding of Removal.
See Outline for Strategies.

Temporary Protected Status

Client from country designated for
TPS by U.S. Attorney General?

No

Not Eligible for Temporary
Protected Status.

Yes

Client current TPS recipient or
eligible to file for TPS?

Yes

Worry about preserving TPS eligibility.
See Outline for Strategies.

DACA
Client Came to U.S. Before Age 16?

No

Not Eligible for DACA.

Yes
Continuously in U.S. for 5 Years
Before 6/15/12 and Present in U.S.
on 6/15/12?

No

Yes
Currently in High School, High
School Graduate, GED Recipient or
Honorably Discharged Veteran?

No

Yes
Older than 30?

Yes

No

Yes

Convicted of Felony, “Significant
Misdemeanor,” 3 or more
Misdemeanors, or threat to national
security or public safety?

No

Eligible for DACA.
See Outline for Strategies.

VAWA Deferred Action
Client has filed I-360 self-petition for
LPR status based on abuse by LPR
spouse?

Not Eligible for VAWA
Deferred Action.

No

Yes
Immigrant visa is immediately
available under Visa Bulletin?

Yes

No
USCIS has affirmatively denied
VAWA Deferred Action to client?

Yes

No
USCIS has either (1) not yet told client if it
will grant VAWA Deferred Action or (2)
granted client VAWA Deferred Action?
Yes

No
Client either has or is eligible to
receive VAWA Deferred Action. See
Outline for Strategies.

Pre-Conclusion Voluntary Departure

Client convicted of aggravated
felony?

Yes

No

Deportable “Terrorist” under
INA § 237(a)(4)(B)?

No

Eligible for Pre-Conclusion Voluntary
Departure. See Outline for Strategies.

Yes

Not Eligible for PreConclusion Voluntary
Departure.

Post-Conclusion Voluntary Departure
Client present in U.S. at least 5 years
before served with NTA?

No

Not Eligible for PostConclusion Voluntary
Departure.

Yes
Person of Good Moral Character
under INA § 101(f)?

No

Yes
Client deportable as aggravated felon
or “Terrorist” under INA
§§ 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) or 237(a)(4)(B)?

Yes

No
Ability to leave U.S. at own expense
and intent to leave?

Yes

No

Eligible for Post-Conclusion Voluntary
Departure. See Outline for Strategies.

